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The international community has awoken to the reality that large transnational corporations 
(TNCs) do not only control more resources than a good number of states. They wield enormous 
influence in the corporate world which greatly impacts on local cultures and initiatives. Many 
of these TNCs, who operate in developing states, engage in activities which frequently result 
in human rights abuses.  Several states rely on the resources extracted by these large 
corporations as the main stay of their economies. Consequently, they lack the economic 
capacity and political will to effectively regulate the activities of the TNCs, leaving these 
entities to perpetrate human rights abuses in the local communities with impunity. Major 
international regulatory initiatives, such as the UN Guiding Principles, ILO declaration, and 
the OECD Guidelines have been adopted to fill in the regulatory gaps. As is analysed and 
detailed in this thesis, these initiatives have however proven ineffective. They have been 
criticized as being mere political commitments which lack the necessary legal binding force to 
ensure their implementation and enforcement. Following several calls from civil society, the 
Human Rights Council at its 26th session in July 2014, established an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group (OEIGWG) to elaborate on an international legally binding 
instrument on business and human rights to ensure that the activities of TNCs are effectively 
regulated. In July 2018, the OEIGWG published a zero draft of a legally binding instrument to 
regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. The Zero Draft contains proposals for what could later be the provisions 
of the much-anticipated instrument that could fill in the regulatory gaps left by current business 
and human rights instruments and ensure corporate accountability for human rights abuse. 
Following an in-depth discussion on states’ obligations to protect against human rights 
violations committed by business enterprises, the main thrust of this thesis is to examine the 




the current zero draft. This will be done in order to determine whether it holds any potential for 
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1.1. General overview of the research 
Questions relating to the accountability of transnational corporate entities for their harmful 
activities arose from the 1980’s which witnessed a progressive elimination of barriers to trade 
and investment and a growing mobility of capital across national boundaries.1 Sectors like 
production, manufacturing, and finance moved beyond the exclusive confines of states and 
became increasingly dominated by corporations who were the major drivers of this 
development.2 In order to take advantage of this process of economic globalisation, many 
developing states embraced foreign direct investment (FDI) as a necessary initiative for 
expanding their economies.3 Consequently, the corporate entities, whose parent companies are 
usually based in developed states such as the US, Canada and countries in the EU, moved to 
set up operations across state boundaries, often through subsidiaries. This led to an expansion 
of the size and influence of the transnational corporate entities internationally.4  Presently, over 
half of the world’s one hundred largest economies are corporate entities who have relatively 
more power than the governments of the states in which they operate.5 They now directly and 
indirectly influence negotiations over issues ranging from trade to national and international 
economic policy.6 Their role in the globalised world has become too important to be ignored.  
                                               
1 Justice M Wilcox ‘Foreword’ in M. Jones and P. Kriesler eds., Globalization, Human Rights and Civil Society 
(Prospect Media 1998) 6.  
2 ibid 
3 Scott Jerbi ‘Business and Human Rights at the UN: What Might Happen Next?’ (2009) 31 Human Rights 
Quarterly 299, 303.   
4 David Kinley and Junko Nolan ‘Trading and Aiding Human Rights: Corporations in the Global Economy’ (2007) 
25 Nordic Journal of human rights Law 4, 358.   
5 As at September 2016, the world’s top 100 economies consisted of 31 countries and 69 corporations – see, 
Duncan Green, ‘The worlds to 100 economies: 31 countries; 69 corporations’ (worldbank.org, 9 October 2016) 
<https://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/world-s-top-100-economies-31-countries-69-corporations> accessed 





The impact of the activities of transnational corporate entities has strong bearings on 
human rights. Through the commercial activity driven by corporate entities, jobs and wages 
are made available, goods and services are provided, which enable states to provide further 
goods and services for individuals. This positively influences a wide range of human rights 
including the rights to food, health, education, work, shelter and the freedom of movement. 7 
However, the economic power and influence of transnational corporate entities has 
worked like a double-edged sword. They have also recorded serious negative impacts on 
human rights in the pursuit of corporate investments in the states where they operate.8 The 
antecedents of Shell in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Texaco in Ecuador, and Union Carbide in India 
- incidents which resulted in mass deprivation of the entire range of human rights- are all 
testaments to the scope and scale of human rights harm that transnational corporate entities are 
capable of causing.9 The threat that these corporate entities pose to the enjoyment of human 
rights have been considered to be greater than that coming from some states.10  
Irrespective of their positions of strong economic and political advantage, no corporate 
entity operates outside a formal obligation to respect the laws of the states where they operate. 
However, human rights law has always focused on the state, because the state was seen as the 
only entity that was capable of greatly impacting the human rights of individuals. Thus, the 
state was given the primary obligation to protect, respect and fulfil human rights.11 
Nevertheless, the human rights obligation to protect as contained in the various human rights 
instruments, has been interpreted to entail the states’ duty to prevent third parties, including 
transnational corporate entities from engaging in conduct that impacts negatively on human 
                                               
7 ibid 
8 Amnesty International, ‘Corporations’ (Amnesty International.org) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-
do/corporate-accountability/> accessed 15 April 2019. 
9 A detailed discussion of the specific instances of human rights abuses by transnational corporate entities will be 
undertaken in the various chapters of this thesis. 
10  Dinah Shelton, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World’ (2002) 25 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 2, 279-280. 
11 UNHCHR, ‘Report by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on the issue of 




rights.12 Yet, at the time of drafting, these human rights instruments did not contemplate the 
emergence of powerful corporate entities that will rival the states’ influence on the human 
rights of individuals. Consequently, they do not adequately address the peculiarities of the 
corporate entities’ unique transnational character.  
Most transnational corporate entities carry out their operations in resource rich 
developing states, who lack the political will to effectively regulate corporate activities so as 
not to discourage corporate investments.13 Even in the rare situations where the host states are 
willing to regulate corporate activities, many of them are be incapable of initiating the 
necessary legal procedures, as they lack the financial resources and functioning, non-corrupt 
court systems, which are necessary to conduct effective investigations.14  
As a result of the relative imbalance of power coupled with the dependence of 
developing states on the presence of transnational corporate entities, victims of human rights 
abuses turn to the developed states, who are home to about 90 percent of the parent companies 
of the transnational corporate entities.15 These countries are known to have better domestic 
regulatory structures.16 Some home states like the US, the UK, Canada and Australia have 
actually made attempts at using their domestic legislation to ensure that their transnational 
corporate entities are held accountable for the actions of their foreign subsidiaries.17 However, 
these regulatory efforts have been unsuccessful. At present the protection of human rights is an 
obligation that states undertake with respect to the activities of persons located within their 
territories. There is currently no express provision in any human rights instrument that 
                                               
12 ibid 
13 Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights and Home 
State Advantage (London, Routledge 2014), Chapter 4. 
14 ibid 
15 Marion Weschka, ‘Human rights and multinational enterprises: how can multinational enterprises be held 
responsible for human rights violations committed abroad?’ 66 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht 
und Volkerrecht 3, 629. 
16 ibid. 




mandates states to extend the obligation to protect extraterritorially.18 Home states fear that an 
individual extension of the obligation to protect to the activities of the foreign subsidiaries of 
their corporate nationals would place them at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other 
states who may not see the need to extend their regulations to regulate their TNCs activities.19  
Beyond this, the corporate form itself also poses regulatory challenges. Legally 
speaking, the parent company located in the home state is considered separate and distinct from 
its subsidiaries and other corporate affiliates, even where they may actually be subject to 
uniform control.20 Accordingly, the subsidiaries which operate in the developing states are 
considered to be independent from their parent companies as separate corporate bodies, and 
are subject to the national legal order of the host state. Thus, any attempt by the home state to 
extend its regulations over the activity of a foreign subsidiary may be considered as an 
interference on the sovereignty of the host state. 21As there is no obligation on home states to 
extend human rights protection extraterritorially, they are usually reluctant to do so in order 
not to infringe on the sovereignty of the host states.22 Another related challenge is the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens, which presents the courts of a state with the ‘discretion to decline to 
hear a case when there exists a foreign court more appropriately suited to hear the matter’.23 
Following the challenges confronting host state and home state human rights regulation, 
attempts have been made to establish an international framework that specifically addresses 
the problems with regulating the activities of corporate entities as they affect human rights. A 
number of voluntary initiatives on corporate social responsibility have been established in this 
regard. Most of these initiatives are based on a set of principles, including human rights and/or 
                                               
18 International law recognises the right, but not the obligation of states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
their nationals committing wrongs abroad. 
19 Sarah Joseph, ‘Taming the Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights’ (1999) 46 Netherlands 
International Law Review 2, 184. 
20 Weschka (n15), 629-630. 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 




labour rights, that participating companies and states voluntarily commit to respect in their 
operations and within their spheres of influence. The structure of these initiatives varies. This 
thesis will focus on six of the most prominent of these initiatives- the UN Draft Code of 
Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the ILO tripartite obligations, the OECD Guidelines 
on Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact, the UN Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, and the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.24  
These initiatives have however been criticised as being too ‘soft’ because they lack any 
power to sanction companies when they fail to respect the principles and standards that the 
initiatives establish. Human rights activists have insisted that instead of focusing on voluntary 
soft law initiatives, a regulatory framework, which prescribes formal obligations, liabilities and 
sanctions, should be established. Such a framework was previously attempted with the 
proposed establishment of the UN Draft Norms on Transnational Corporations.25 The Norms 
sought to place direct international human rights obligations on transnational corporate entities 
comparable to those of states. However, the Norms never saw the light of day as they were 
unable to garner enough support for its establishment.  
Out of all the current regulatory initiatives, the UN Guiding Principles is said to have 
gained wide support amongst states and corporate entities, who have included them in their 
                                               
24 UN Draft Code on Transnational Corporations  (12 June 1990) UN Doc. E/1990/94; OECD, Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, 15 ILM 969 (1976) annex to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises, 21 June 1976, reprinted in 1976, ILM, vol. 15 967. The OECD periodically reviews 
and updates its guidelines. For the 2000 and 2011 reviews see, the OECD Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises 2000, reprinted in 2001, ILM, vol. 40, 237, and updated as, OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: Recommendations for Responsible Business Conduct in a Global Context, 25 May 
2011. <https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf> accessed 28 August 2017; ILO, ‘Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’ (March 2017), 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---
emp_ent/multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017; UN Global Compact, ‘Ten 
Principles of the UN Global Compact’ available at <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-
gc/mission/principles> (accessed 20 September 2017); Human Rights Council, The Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs): Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework (21 March 2011) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31. 
25 UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 




internal policies. The Guidelines build on the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework 
established by former Special Representative to the UN Secretary General, Professor John 
Ruggie.26 The Framework requires that states take steps to prevent human rights abuse by 
corporate entities; and places a responsibility to respect human rights on corporate entities.27 
This responsibility entails a requirement that they undertake human rights due diligence in their 
business relationships. The remedy aspect provides for greater access by victims to effective 
remedy. Yet there is a disconnect between the responsibility to respect human rights and the 
access of victims to effective remedy. This is because the responsibility to respect is framed in 
the form of an expectation and is not binding on corporate entities. Thus, if the corporate 
entities fail to execute their responsibility to respect by undertaking human rights due diligence 
in their business relationships, victims of any resulting abuse are left without a legal basis for 
holding corporate entities accountable.  
It is with this background that renewed calls were made for an international 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of corporate entities- this 
time, with provisions on binding consequences for corporate entities who fail to observe human 
rights standards in their operations. In response to these calls, the Human Rights council at its 
26th session, established an open ended intergovernmental working group on business and human 
rights (OEIGWG) to come up with a binding instrument to regulate in international human rights 
law, the activities of transnational corporations.28 The first and second sessions of the IGWG 
were dedicated to deliberations on the scope and content of the future instrument.29 The third 
session focused on discussions on the Elements Document that was released by the IGWG.30 In 
                                               
26UNGPs, (n 24). 
27 ibid, principle 11. 
28 UN Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights 25 June 2014 A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, 
para 1. 
29 ibid, paragraph 2. 




July 2018, a zero draft of the binding instrument was published.31 This thesis is primarily focused 
on examining the proposals in the zero draft with a view to determining its potentials and 
deficiencies in light of the current regulatory gaps relating to the accountability of transnational 
corporate entities for human rights abuses. It begins by examining the early frameworks for 
human rights protection and then goes on to examine the debates surrounding the accountability 
of transnational corporate entities for human rights abuses, and leading up to the publication of 
the zero draft of the future binding instrument.  
 
1.2. Research questions 
Following the overview of the issues surrounding the current human rights regulatory 
framework for transnational corporate entities, this thesis will focus on examining the 
following questions: 
- What does the states’ obligation to protect entail, particularly in respect of transnational 
corporate entities? 
- What is the scope of the obligation to protect? 
- What are the factors that militate against the states willingness and capacity to 
implement their obligation to protect? 
- How has the international community responded to challenges involved with both host 
state and home state regulation?  
- What are the major elements of the current international regulatory initiatives and what 
difficulties do they present in relation to the regulation of corporate activities and their 
impact on human rights?  
                                               
31 Legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business entities (Zero Draft), 16 July 2018 <https://www.business-




- Does the zero draft of the binding instrument in its current form present any potential 
for the future binding instrument to remedy the current gaps in ensuring the 




This thesis focuses on the activities of transnational corporate entities that engage in business 
activities transnationally. These entities have been defined using different combinations of 
terms. Authors have opted to focus on terms like ‘transnational corporations’, ‘multinational 
enterprises’ and ‘multinational corporations’.32 In the same vein, international organisations, 
including the UN and the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD), which have 
addressed issues relating to these class of entities have adopted their own terminologies, each 
adducing reasons for why their choices are better than other alternatives.33 However, the 
differences in terminologies are not overwhelmingly apparent as they are all used to capture 
the ability of these corporate entities to act across national borders in the international 
community. Legally speaking, there is no prescribed definition for these entities, thus 
attempting to provide a standard definition may result in inaccuracy.34 Rather than focus on the 
semantics, this thesis focuses on corporate entities that operate transnationally, owning, 
managing, or controlling other corporations in two or more states. The key element is the 
control exercised by the corporate entity over operations exercised outside the territorial 
                                               
32 According to C. W. Jenks, the variances in the definition of transnational corporate entities attests to the fact 
that ‘it has no coherent existence as a legal entity; it is a political and economic fact which expresses itself in a 
bewildering variety of legal forms and devices’. C. Wilfred Jenks, ‘Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations’ 
in Wolfgang Friedman, Louis Henkin and Oliver Lissitzyn (eds) Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup (Columbia 
University Press, 1972), 80; cited in Melba Kapesa, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Future of Corporate 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the Extractive Sector’ (DPhil thesis, Monash University 2012), 7. 
33 UN human rights documents on the subject adopt the term ‘transnational corporations’, see the Guiding 
Principles on Transnational Corporations and other business enterprises, ibid (n 24) and the UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
ibid (n 25). The OECD adopts the term ‘multinational enterprises’- OECD Guidelines, ibid (n 24). 




boundaries of the state in which it is established.35 However, for ease of reference this thesis 
adopts the term ‘transnational corporations’ (TNCs), especially as this is what is used in the 
zero draft of the binding instrument, which is the main subject for consideration in this thesis. 
However, other terminologies used by other international organisations or industry frameworks 
may be reflected in this work. Except otherwise stated, the stated definition applies when these 
other terminologies are used. 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
As previously stated, this research concerns the examination of the current international human 
rights law framework in relation to the regulation of the activities of transnational corporations. 
Thus, the doctrinal approach is the research method adopted in this thesis. The doctrinal 
approach is defined as providing ‘a systematic exposition of the principles, rules and concepts 
governing  a particular legal field or institution and analyses the relationship between these 
principles, rules and concepts with a view to solving unclarities and gaps in the existing law.’36 
This approach serves three main goals: description, prescription and justification.37 Hence, it 
will be applied to in describe the current international human rights regulatory framework in 
relation to TNC activities, identify the major regulatory gaps in this regard, and prescribe 
prospects for reform or amendment while providing legal justification for such prescriptions. 
In describing the existing law on the regulation of TNCs, the thesis will explore a range 
of primary and secondary data. It will examine the relevant provisions several UN international 
human rights treaties as well as the various regional human rights treaties. It will also consider 
relevant case law and decisions from the international Court of Justice, regional human rights 
                                               
35 Control can be through ownership of shares, control of board of directors, or through management of operations 
and affairs. - Phillip I. Bloomberg, ‘The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining parent 
and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities’ (1996) 28 Connecticut Law Review 295, 298 and accompanying footnote. 
36 Jan M. Smits, ‘What is legal doctrine: on the aims and methods of legal-dogmatic research’ (2015) Maastricht 
European Private Law Institute Working Paper 2015/06, 5 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2644088> accessed 1 May 2019. 




courts and commissions. The General Comments and Communications of the various treaty 
bodies will also be considered as these bodies are charged with the interpretation of their treaty 
provisions. It will also consider reports from UN special rapporteurs, and the various human 
rights bodies/commissions and civil society organisations on the subject. The study will also 
involve a critical analysis of the work of scholars in the area of business and human rights 
sphere and related fields in order to capture the main debates surrounding the regulation of 
TNCs. The analyses of these documents and instruments will provide a proper understanding 
of the current international human rights' regulatory framework regarding the activities of 
TNCs and will help expose its challenges. 
The study is also facilitated by the authors personal observation of the OEIGWG 
sessions in Geneva and information gathered from interaction with delegates and principal 
stakeholders at the sessions. Based on the information gathered from the primary and secondary 
sources and the personal observation and interactions in the OEIGWG sessions, the thesis will 
go on to make some prescriptions as to the underlying considerations that could guide the 
relevant decision makers on how and why the current regulatory framework should be 
strengthened.  
 
1.5. Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 of the thesis provides an overview of the early domestic human rights frameworks 
and discusses the common themes and how they came to bear on the international Bill of Rights 
(the Universal Declaration of human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). This discussion provides insight as to why the current human rights 
regulatory framework is state centric. The chapter goes on to argue that despite the state centric 




The chapter engages with the UN core human rights instruments, regional human rights 
instruments, together with relevant documents from the various treaty bodies, courts and 
commissions. Based on the examination of these documents, the chapter argues that although 
the international human rights law framework did not contemplate the emergence of large 
influential transnational corporate entities the current framework for human rights protection 
mandates states to protect individuals from the harmful activities of third parties, which 
necessarily include transnational corporate entities. The chapter then goes on to examine the 
nature and content of the obligation to protect as well as its scope of application. It argues that 
there is at least a theoretical case for the extension of the obligation to protect extraterritorially. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the key challenges that affect the states’ execution of its obligation to 
protect. It argues that because the states where TNCs execute their operations are usually 
developing states, they may lack the willingness and/or capacity to effectively and efficiently 
regulate the activities of the TNC.  The chapter provides an examination of case studies where 
this twin problem prevented victims of human rights abuses from obtaining redress for human 
rights harm resulting from TNC conduct. It discusses some of the failed attempts by home 
states to extraterritorially regulate the activities of TNCs. It specifically addresses the 
challenges presented by the of the separate legal personality of the TNC and its subsidiaries 
and other corporate affiliates, the issue of forum non conveniens and the challenges presented 
by principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. The chapter concludes by stressing the need 
for an international framework that will address these difficulties and adequately address the 
extraterritorial application of the obligation to protect.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a general overview of the current voluntary international regulatory 




rights sphere. The regulatory gaps and inadequacies in their application are identified and 
summarised. The chapter argues that although these instruments are insufficient as they address 
limited categories of human rights and lack any binding force of sanctions to ensure corporate 
accountability, they put the issue of business and human rights squarely on the international 
agenda and provide a basis for the development of an instrument that could address current 
regulatory gaps. 
 
Chapter 5 introduces the call by civil society, human rights activists and states to strengthen 
current regulatory initiatives by providing a binding instrument on TNCs and human rights. 
The chapter focuses on the events following the Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 and 
the resulting zero draft published by the Intergovernmental Working Group on TNCs and 
OBE’s in its fourth session. The key focus of this chapter is to examine in particular, the 
proposals in the zero draft in its current form, in order to determine whether the future binding 
instrument will in fact adequately address the current regulatory issues related to ensuring the 
accountability of TNCs for their activities that affect human rights, and remove the obstacles 
victims face in securing access to justice. 
 





TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE: THE 
STATES’ OBLIGATION TO PROTECT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It is now clear that states are no longer the only actors that can adversely affect the human 
rights enjoyment of individuals. In spite of this, current international human rights law 
instruments still focus on the state as the primary holder of human rights obligations.1 
Accordingly, states have the primary obligation to ensure that individuals are not prevented 
from enjoying their human rights, whether by the acts or omissions of the state itself, or by any 
other actor. Focusing particularly on transnational corporations, this chapter is concerned with 
establishing the basis and extent of the state’s obligation to protect the human rights of 
individuals that are threatened or affected by corporate activities. It begins by looking at the 
early expressions in domestic frameworks, of principles pertaining to the protection of the 
human person, and then goes on to establish how those basic notions were incorporated into an 
international standard for the protection of human rights as is recognised today. Following the 
operational structure of TNCs, the chapter then proceeds to examine the basis and extent of the 
obligations of the host and home States of TNCs, consecutively, as they relate to the protection 
of individuals from the activities of these corporate entities that result in human rights abuse.  
 
2.2 The idea of human rights protection  
Early normative frameworks embodying human rights standards developed at a time when 
international business was less prominent and international economic interdependence was far 
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less important.2 Rather, they were linked to early domestic codifications of individual rights, 
which found expression in compacts that were signed between rulers and sections of the 
community.3 Prominent examples include the Magna Carta of 12154 and the English Bill of 
Rights of 16895 which contained concessions that were obtained against the sovereign by 
feudal barons and men of affluence for themselves alone. Nevertheless, they were very 
significant.6 They each constituted provisions that are considered as the starting point for the 
limitation of the absolute power of the state.7 But by the 1700’s, a stronger push towards the 
recognition of the rights of individuals began to materialise. The American Declaration of 
independence expressed for the first time, the ‘inalienable rights of men.’8 This fundamental 
notion was adopted and elaborated in the Virginia Declaration which proclaimed that by nature 
‘all men are equally free and possess certain inherent rights, of which they enter into society.’9 
In expressing these natural inalienable rights of men, the Virginia Declaration included several 
liberties to be protected from State interference. They include, the freedom from cruel or 
unusual punishment,10 freedom of the press,11 and the provision that no one should be deprived 
or divested of their liberty except as permitted by law.12 The American Declarations served as 
a model for the French Declaration which swept away the notions of the absolute power of the 
State and replaced it by defining the natural rights of men as ‘liberty, property, security, and 
                                               
2 Daniel Aguirre, ‘Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic and Social Rights’ (2004) 35 
California Western International Law Journal 53, 58.  
3 Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of human rights Law: National, Regional and International 
Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press 2002), 14. 
4 The Magna Carta (The Great Charter) 1215 <http://constitution.org/eng/magnacar.pdf> accessed 13 May 2016. 
5 Bill of Rights 1689 <http://www.constitution.org/eng/eng_bor.htm> accessed 1 March 2017. 
6 ibid (n 3), 15. 
7 ibid. The Magna Carta and the English Bill of rights strengthened the fundamental idea that the power of the 
state should be limited for the sake of the individuals within it. 
8 The American Declaration of Independence, July 4 1776, <https://www.archives.gov/founding-
docs/declaration-transcript> accessed 19 March 2017.  
9 Virginia Declaration of Rights 12 June 1776, <http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm> accessed 19 
March 2017. 
10 ibid, para 9. 
11 ibid, para 12. 




the rights to resist oppression’ by the State.13 Similar to the American Declarations, the French 
Declaration proclaimed the ‘natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man’, which has formed 
a major recurring theme in present human rights law framework.14 
The rights contained in the English, American and French documents were mostly 
libertarian in character.15 They dealt primarily with the freedom of the individual from the 
state’s interference. In modern parlance, such rights are called ‘civil and political rights’ 
because they focus on the relationship between the individual and the state.16 Several other 
states adopted the Declarations as models for bills of rights in their various constitutions.17 
However, civil and political rights are not the only rights which were recognised under 
early domestic frameworks. A variety of social, economic and cultural rights were also 
recognised as subject to protection.18 These rights evolved in the late 19th century with the 
social reform in Europe.19 Economic, social and cultural rights are concerned with the creation 
of economic and social conditions by the state which allow every individual to develop their 
maximum potential.20 They are considered as rights which require state intervention to provide 
for work, health, and social security of individuals.21 The early domestic codifications of 
economic, social and cultural rights could be traced to the constitutions of the Soviet Union, 
Mexico and Germany in the early part of the twentieth century.22  
                                               
13 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 26 August 1789, 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b52410.html> accessed 19 March 2017. 
14 ibid 
15 Scott Davidson, Human Rights (Open University Press, 1993), 7. 
16 ibid 
17 According to Lauterpacht, the constitutions of Sweden (1809), Spain (1812), Norway (1814), Belgium (1831), 
Liberia (1847), Sardinia (1848), Denmark (1849), Prussia (1850), Switzerland (1847), Germany (1918), Russia 
(1918), Turkey (1928), China (1931), Afghanistan (1931, Siam (1932) and Japan (1946)- Hersch Lauterpacht, 
International Law and Human Rights (Archon Books, 1968), 89-90. 
18 Rhona K. M Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2016), 45.  
19 Asbjorn Eide, ‘Economic and Social Rights’, in Janusz Symonides (ed), Human Rights: Concepts and 
Standards (UNESCO Publishing 2000) ,113; Darwood Mzikenge and Chirwa, Lilian Chewi, The Protection of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (Cambridge University Press 2016), 36. 
20 Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2007), 269-270. 
21 Smith (n 18). 
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2.2.1 The International Framework for the Protection of Human Rights 
Although the early domestic frameworks for the protection of human rights took root in early 
European and American expressions, a closer analysis of the activities of these states at the 
time, shows that they contradicted the notions of human rights that they famously expressed.23 
While Britain and France pursued policies of imperialism and colonialism, the US invaded 
indigenous peoples’ lands and practiced slavery.24 All these were contrary to the human rights 
ideals expressed in the early Bills, Constitutions and Declarations.  
At the time, international law regarded states as its only subjects.25 Individuals as 
citizens of the state were subject to the complete authority of their government and other states 
in general, had no right to intervene to protect them when they were maltreated.26 It was not 
until after the Second World War that states gave serious consideration to the contradiction 
between human rights ideals and the way in which they treated individuals and residents within 
their territories and the territories over which they had belligerent control.27 The war and the 
events that preceded it in Germany and in the territories under German occupation, resulted in 
the perpetration of unprecedented atrocities. Millions of citizens were brutalised and many 
more were killed by the lawfully instituted government. 28 This shocked the conscience of the 
international community of states and triggered the commitment to establish a set of superior 
universal standards to which all national laws were required to conform.29  
                                               
23 Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 
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24 ibid. 
25 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University 2014), 143; Antonio Cassese, International 
Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005), 71-72. 
26 Kerri Woods, Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 37; Thomas Buergenthal, ‘International Law and the 
Holocaust’ Joseph and Rebecca Meyerhoff Annual Lecture, 28 December 2003 at 
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28 BBC World Service, ‘Background to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ at 
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States committed themselves to the establishment of the United Nations, which set as 
one of its primary objectives, the protection and respect of the human rights of individuals 
without distinction or discrimination.30 In furtherance of this objective, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights was established and given the mandate of responding to specific issues 
related to human rights by elaborating on human rights standards.31 In 1948, the Commission 
completed its first task: the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly.32 Drawing from different constitutional and domestic 
human rights legislation of states, the UDHR urges member states to promote a number of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights. It described these rights as part of 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.33 Notably, the early human rights 
instruments mark the overall tenor and language of the UDHR. In the first recital, the UDHR 
refers to its overall objective to ensure the ‘inherent dignity’ and the ‘equal and inalienable 
rights of all human beings,’ phrases that were also reflected in the American and French 
Declarations.34 
The thirty Articles of the Declaration outlined various provisions that set a common 
standard for all people and all nations. However, on its own, it does not create legal obligations 
for states. In its preamble, the Declaration describes itself as a ‘common standard’ toward 
which every individual and every organ of the society shall strive.35 Eleanor Roosevelt, who 
                                               
30 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, article 1. 3. 
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of the United Nations from April 1946 until it was replaced by the United Nation Human Rights Council on 15 
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was the presiding chair in the drafting process of the UDHR drew special attention to this point 
when she presented the document to the General Assembly for its final vote: 
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance 
that we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a 
treaty, it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to 
be a statement of law or legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles 
of human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General 
assembly by formal vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations.36 
In response to this exhortation, the UN Human Rights Commission proceeded to draft an 
international binding document. However, different views were expressed about the form of 
the document with the Soviet Union and its allies preferring to view the document as one 
fundamentally about economic and social rights, while the US and its allies continued to view 
civil and political rights as the essential human rights. In a bid to break the deadlock, two 
treaties were created: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)37 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).38  
The ICCPR essentially concerns the rights contained in Articles 3 to 21 of the UDHR, 
which includes such rights as, the right to life,39 the prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
                                               
36 Statement by Mrs D. Roosevelt on the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Delivered on 
the 9th of December 1948, Paris, France.  
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/PDFFiles/Eleanor%20Roosvelt%20-
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force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 




degrading treatment,40 prohibition of arbitrary arrest or detention,41 freedom of assembly and 
association and the freedom of expression.42 It established the Human Rights Committee 
(‘HRC’), a body of independent experts who monitor the implementation of the ICCPR through 
its consideration of state reports, individual complaints and inter-state complaints, and its 
preparation of General Comments and general discussions on topics addressed in the ICCPR.43 
The HRC uses the General Comments and general discussions on the ICCPR to clarify the 
scope and meaning of the ICCPR’s articles.44 Although their comments and discussions do not 
have binding formal character, they help elucidate to state parties the obligations they assumed 
by acceding to the ICCPR. Much of the discussion in proceeding sections will be based on the 
General Comments of the HRC.  
The ICESCR, on the other hand codifies the provisions of Articles 22 to 27 of the 
UDHR. These rights include, labour rights,45 the right to an adequate standard of living which 
includes the right to food and implies the right to water,46 the right to physical and mental 
health,47 and the right to a rich cultural life.48 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), a body of independent experts, monitors the compliance of states parties to 
the ICESCR.49 Apart from receiving periodic reports from states parties regarding compliance 
with the ICESCR, the CESCR may also consider inter-state complaints and complaints by 
individuals.50 It addresses such reports through concluding observations and interprets state 
                                               
40 UDHR ibid, article 5 ; ICCPR ibid, article 7. 
41 UDHR ibid, article 9 ; ICCPR ibid, article 10 
42 UDHR ibid, articles 19 and 20 ; ICCPR ibid, articles 19 and 21. 
43 See articles 28-43 ICCPR (n 37). 
44 International Justice Resource Centre, ‘Human Rights Committee’ <http://www.ijrcenter.org/un-treaty-
bodies/human-rights-committee/> accessed 20 April2017. 
45 UDHR (n 32), article 23; ICESCR (n 38), article 6 
46 UDHR ibid, article 25; ICESCR ibid, article 11. 
47 UDHR ibid; Article 12; ICESCR ibid, article 12. 
48 UDHR ibid, article 27 ; ICESCR ibid, article 15. 
49 Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’) Resolution 1985/17 of May 1985. The CESCR was set up to carry 
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50 See UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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obligations under the ICESCR through general comments.51 Like the HRC general comments 
and general discussions on states obligations under the ICCPR, the CESCRs general comments 
and concluding observations will form a major part in the interpretation of states obligations 
under the ICESCR in the following sections. 
Together with the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and the ICESCR are commonly 
referred to as the International Bill of rights.52 Both covenants expand on the provisions of the 
UDHR and serve as the main legal binding instruments of world-wide application.53 The 
UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR inspired regional organisations to set up their own systems 
for the protection of human rights. The Council of Europe established the ‘Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, which is the official name of what 
is now commonly referred to as the ‘European Convention on Human Rights’ (‘ECHR’).54 The 
ECHR and its Protocols are focused mainly on civil and political rights.55 Recognising the lack 
of recognition of ESCR, the Council of Europe adopted the European Social Charter which 
contains a catalogue of economic, social and cultural rights.56 The power to interpret and apply 
the provisions contained in the ECHR are conferred on the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’), while compliance with the European Social Charter is monitored by the European 
Committee of Social Rights.57 As will be demonstrated in subsequent paragraphs, several of 
the ECtHR decisions have been applied in explaining the general obligations of States under 
human rights law. 
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The Organisation of American States (OAS) established the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, which drafted the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) that is now considered as the most important human rights instrument in the Inter-
American System.58 The ACHR established the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Both 
the Court and the Commission have produced decisions that are of lasting significance to 
international human rights law.59 The Organisation of African Unity which is the predecessor 
to the African Union, like its European and American counterparts established the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples rights (ACHPR’.60 The Charter contains civil and political 
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.61 The African Charter established the 
African Commission of Human Rights which is mandated to interpret the Charter’s human 
rights provisions and provide guidance to States Parties on compliance with the ACHPR.62 To 
complement the role of the ACHPR, the African Court of Human and Peoples rights was 
subsequently created through a Protocol to the African Charter.63 
Several other international conventions on human rights have been introduced by the 
UN and ratified by states. The major ones to be considered in the course of this discussion 
include; the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),64 
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(1982) 21 I.L.M. 58. 
61 The Right to Food is conspicuously absent in the Charter provisions but is usually implied from the provision 
of the right to life under Article 4. The ACHPR also contains certain collective rights which include; rights to self-
determination, to dispose freely dispose of natural resources, and the right to a satisfactory environment favourable 
to development. (See Articles 21 and 24 ACHPR). The new set of rights as recognised in the African Charter are 
increasingly gaining prominence, for example, the UN General Assembly has adopted a Declaration on the Right 
to Development. -See UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development: resolution adopted by 
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Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),65 
Convention against Torture and all Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT),66 Convention on the Rights of A Child (CRC),67 Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)68 and the International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED)69 Although these conventions relate to 
subject specific areas, they all embody the standards of economic, social and cultural rights, as 
well as civil and political rights as enshrined in the ICCPR and the ICESCR.  
  
2.2.2 The interdependence of ESCR and CPR 
The United Nations consistently stresses that economic, social and cultural rights and civil and 
political rights as recognised in the various international human rights instruments are 
‘universal, inalienable and interdependent rights’ that ‘the international community must treat 
them in a fair and equal manner on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.70  
Despite this pronouncement, in practice, the commitment of states to economic, social 
and cultural rights does not measure up to their efforts in the field of civil and political rights. 
The UN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural rights in a statement at the Vienna World 
Conference of 1993, aptly captured the situation when it stated that 
The shocking reality…that states and the international community as a whole 
continue to tolerate all too often breaches of economic, social and cultural 
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67 Convention on the Rights of a Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3. 
68 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNGA Res 61/106 (24 January 2007) UN Doc 
A/RES/61/106. 
69 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, UNGA Res 61/177 
(20 December 2006) UN Doc ARES61/177. 




rights which, if they occurred in relation to civil and political rights would 
provoke expressions of horror and outrage and would lead to concerted calls 
for immediate remedial action. In effect, despite the rhetoric, violations of 
civil and political rights continue to be treated as though they were far more 
serious, and more patently intolerable, than massive and direct denials of 
economic, social and cultural rights…statistical indicators of the extent of 
deprivation, or breaches, of economic, social and cultural rights have been 
cited so often that they have tended to lose their impact. The magnitude, 
severity and constancy of that deprivation have provoked attitudes of 
resignation, feelings of helplessness and compassion fatigue. Such muted 
responses are facilitated by a reluctance to characterise the problems that 
exist at gross and massive denials of economic, social and cultural rights. 71 
This statement that was made over two decades ago, still captures the challenges experienced 
today.  Economic, social and cultural rights have habitually taken a back seat to civil and 
political rights. Several States lose sight of the fact that the failure to respect and to provide for 
the realisation of ESCR often initiates a chain of events that cause problems with civil and 
political rights.72 One example that demonstrates this connection is the well-known crisis that 
resulted from the activities of Shell and the Nigerian government in Ogoni land in the mid-
nineties: the effects of the crisis is still felt to this day.73  
The Ogoni people, who are mostly farmers and anglers, depend on their land and rivers 
for survival. The region also happens to be rich with vast deposits of petroleum resources. 
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– 11 December 1992) UN Doc E/1993/22, paragraphs 5 and 7. 
72 Daniel Aguirre, ‘Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(2004) 35 California Western Journal of International law 1, 9. 
73 Egbe Ojong Tandu, Mary Tandu and Abeki Okoro, ‘The Role of the Nigerian State in the Socio-Political 
Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’ (2017) 6 International Journal of Human and Social Science 




Shell, the largest oil producing transnational corporate entity in the country engaged in 
exploration activities for decades in the region. In the course of its operations, large amounts 
of oil spills occurred. This led to severe air and water pollution and contamination of arable 
land and serious health complications on the local population. Shell’s failure to enact measures 
to remedy the situation resulted in the violation of the people’s right to an adequate standard 
of living including the rights to food, health,74 and water, the right to work,75 and the right to a 
general satisfactory environment favourable to the peoples development.76 The first set of 
rights are enshrined in the ICESCR, while the second group of rights are recognised under the 
African Charter, both of which Nigeria has ratified. 77 These deprivations brought about 
deplorable social conditions, which should not have been the case considering the amount of 
profit that was being made through the extraction of resources from the community’s land.78 
The failure of the Nigerian government to secure the peoples ESCR led to further human rights 
infringement, this time, they were civil and political in nature.  
In response to the infringements, the local community came together and formed the 
movement for the emancipation of the Ogoni people (‘MOSOP’), a group which protested the 
unfavourable conditions in which the people lived.79 Rather than seek measures to improve the 
peoples poor living conditions, the Nigerian government had the nine leaders of MOSOP 
arrested for specious crimes, depriving them of their right to personal security,80 freedom from 
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torture,81 freedom from arbitrary arrests,82 and fair trials.83 Eventually, a tribunal that did not 
meet international standards, convicted the MOSOP leaders, and issued death sentences, which 
were carried out almost immediately.84 The defendants’ lawyers, who were themselves; human 
rights activists, abandoned the case before it ended stating that the verdict was preordained and 
that there was no justice before such a body.85 This was a gross violation of the right to life as 
contained in the ICCPR, which only permits the death penalty pursuant to a final judgement 
rendered by a competent court.86 
The events that unfolded in Ogoni land demonstrate how the failure to address ESCR 
may culminate in violations of CPR. If the Nigerian government had paid attention to the plight 
of the Ogoni people when their economic, social and cultural rights were being undermined by 
Shell, there would have certainly been no grounds for the protests and the resulting civil and 
political human rights violations would have been avoided. As will become apparent 
throughout the course of this study, the recognition of the interconnectedness of CPR and 
ESCR has not subsided in the 20-25 years since the Ogoni crises. Indeed, the importance of 
this recognition has increased with the complexity of international interaction ushered in by 
globalisation, as well as the ever-increasing influence on both sets of rights by the main drivers 
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2.3 States’ obligations under international human rights law 
In a major move to demonstrate the indivisibility and interconnectedness of CPR and ESCR, 
this time in relation to the nature of their obligations, Henry Shue introduced the idea of a 
tripartite typology of State human rights obligations. He spoke of obligations ‘to avoid 
depriving’, ‘to protect from deprivation’ and ‘to aid the deprived’.88 Shue stated that this 
division of the State obligations does not mean that ‘for every right there is a single correlative 
duty…instead…for every basic right and many other rights as well, there are three types of 
duties, all of which must be performed if the basic rights are to be fully honoured.’89 Thus, for 
each right stated in the ICCPR, ICESCR and other relevant international human rights law 
instruments, States must necessarily perform all their obligations.  
However, it is Asbjørn Eide, former Special Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights, who has become known as the originator of the tripartite terminology as it is 
known today. He introduced a slightly different version of the tripartite typology of obligations. 
Eide argued that ‘we cannot make a neat distinction between… civil and political rights on the 
one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other.’90 Rather, he suggested that 
State obligations be examined at three levels beginning from the predominantly cost-free 
passive obligation to respect, to the gradually more active obligations to protect and to fulfil. 
The obligation to ‘respect’ requires the State, and thereby all its organs 
and agents, to abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity of 
the individual or infringes on her or his freedom, including the freedom 
to use the material resources available to that individual in the way she 
or he finds to satisfy basic need. 
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The obligation to ‘protect’ requires from the State and its agents the 
measures necessary to prevent other individuals or groups from 
violating the integrity, freedom of action or other human rights of the 
individual-including the prevention of infringements of his or her 
material resources. 
The obligation to ‘fulfil’ requires the State to take all necessary 
measures to ensure for each person within its jurisdiction opportunities 
to obtain satisfaction of those needs, recognised in the human rights 
instruments, which cannot be secured by personal efforts.91 
This tripartite terminology connects the two sets of rights by demonstrating that compliance 
with each and every human right, whether economic, social, cultural, civil or political, could 
require various measures from (passive) non-interference to (active) ensuring of the satisfaction 
of individual needs, all depending on the circumstances of each case.92 
 
2.3.1 The Obligation to Protect 
Because the ‘obligation to protect’ deals with the obligation of the State vis-à-vis acts of third 
parties in favour of individuals, this work will focus on it in the interpretation of the States’ 
obligations with regards to human rights abuses by TNCs. An examination of the relevant 
treaties and human rights jurisprudence confirms that the obligation to protect extends to the 
protection against harmful TNC activities. Under the various human rights documents, TNCs 
are referred to in different ways, including ‘third parties’,93 ‘private actors’,94 ‘private 
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entities’,95  ‘legal persons’,96 and ‘private agencies’.97  Unless stated otherwise, the treaty 
bodies’ use of these terms implies that states must take action against abuse by a broad range 
of actors including TNCs.98 One good example in this respect is the HRC General Comment 
No. 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the ICCPR. 
The HRC stated that,  
the positive obligation on State Parties to ensure Covenant rights will 
only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the state, not 
just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against 
acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to 
application between private persons or entities.99  
Other general comments from the HRC also implicitly refer to TNCs by confirming the states’ 
duty to protect against private action and abuses by ‘private agencies’, ‘legal persons’ and 
‘private bodies’100 The CESCR has been more explicit. In its General Comment no 18 relating 
to the right to work, the committee stated that   
violations of the obligation to protect follow from the failure of states 
parties to take all necessary measures to safeguard persons within their 
jurisdictions from infringement of the right to work by third parties. 
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They include omissions such as the failure to regulate the activities of 
individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent them from 
violating the right to work of others...101  
Again, in clarifying the obligation of the state to protect interference with the right to 
water, the CESCR stressed that third parties included corporations.102 In fact, every CESCR 
general comment since general comment No. 12 on the right to adequate food contains, usually 
explicitly, the obligation to protect against violations of ICESCR resulting from the activities 
of corporate entities.103 In 2017, the CESCR published General Comment No. 24, which is 
specifically centred on state obligations under the ICESCR in the context of business 
activities.104 Commenting on the obligation to protect under the ICESCR, the Committee stated 
that ‘the obligation to protect means that state parties must prevent effectively infringements 
of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of business activities.’105  
The Committees of various subject specific Conventions such as the CEDAW,106 
CRC107 and CRPD108 also specifically mention the imperative on states to carry out their 
obligation to protect with respect to the activities of their TNCs. 
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2.3.1.1 What does the obligation to protect entail? 
Human rights treaties require State parties to take positive measures to protect human rights by 
adopting certain conduct with the view to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm 
caused by acts of private persons or entities.109 According to the monitoring bodies of the 
human rights treaties, whenever the obligation to protect arises, it would rest upon a due 
diligence standard. The HRC explained that, a State can be found in breach of its obligations 
under Article 2 of the ICCPR when ‘permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts 
by private persons or entities’.110 According to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, ‘under general international law and specific human rights 
covenants, states may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence 
to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing 
compensation’.111  
Thus, the due diligence standard in protecting human rights would require that where 
there are indications that an individual is at risk of having his/her rights violated, or where a 
situation exists, which gives rise to such a risk, preventive measures must be taken in order to 
ensure to the fullest extent possible, that these risks do not materialize.112 Where such violations 
are taking place, States must intervene to put an end to the violation.113 However, if the 
measures adopted fail, and violations occur, state authorities may not remain passive. They are 
under an obligation to provide effective remedies to the individual whose rights have been 
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violated, in order to ensure that he/she will be compensated, and that the wrong doer will be 
sanctioned through civil, administrative or criminal penalties in order to deter future 
violations.114  
Following this interpretation, the obligation to protect would create a ‘quasi-horizontal’ 
effect, which imposes a duty on the State to adopt, for the benefit of individuals under its 
jurisdiction, the necessary positive measures for prevention and prohibition of human rights 
against third parties, including TNCs.115 This varies from the traditional vertical dimension of 
the protection, which allows individuals to bring claims directly against the State for human 
rights violations that can be directly attributable to the State. Instead, the quasi-horizontal effect 
of the obligation to protect would permit individuals to bring an action against the State for its 
failure to demonstrate due diligence by reasonably preventing and/or punishing behaviour 
committed by third parties even though such acts committed by the third parties are not directly 
attributable to the State. The quasi-horizontal effect is indirect, therefore, it would not extend 
to the point where a legal claim against a third party can be brought on the basis of an abuse of 
international human rights.116 
However, although the views of the different human rights committees, established 
under the various treaties represent authoritative interpretations of individual human rights, or, 
of the nature of human rights obligations,  they are not legally binding.117 Nevertheless, they 
have highly authoritative character, which is justified by their adoption and application in 
human rights courts. The due diligence standard is no exception. It has been endorsed by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the ECtHR. In Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, 
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the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that as a consequence of the States obligation 
to protect the rights enshrined in the ACHR,  
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a state (for example, because it is the act of a private person or 
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to 
international responsibility because of lack of due diligence to prevent the 
violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.118 
The ECtHR has also adopted the due diligence standard, although it was late in naming it as 
such. Nonetheless, the court often takes as a starting point, the elements of positive preventive 
measures against potential third party harm. In Kilic v Turkey, although the ECtHR did not use 
the term ‘due diligence’ it decided that Article 2 of the ECHR on the right to life embodies an 
obligation on State parties to ‘take positive operational measures to protect an individual or 
individuals whose life is at risk from the acts of another individual.’119 Similarly, in Ilascu v 
Moldova and Russia, the ECtHR upheld the view that in securing the rights under the Covenant, 
a State has ‘a positive obligations’ to take all measures ‘that is in its power to take and that is 
in accordance with international law to secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention’.120  
Moreover, the duty of the various international human rights treaty bodies is to interpret 
the provisions of the treaties to ensure that States effectively discharge their human rights 
obligations. If the objective of setting international human rights standards is to ensure that 
individuals are adequately protected from human rights abuse, then it is only necessary that 
States discharge their obligation to protect with due diligence in order to fulfil this objective. 
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This idea of the objective of human rights is captured in the case law of the various human 
rights courts, dealing with third party interference with human rights and the States duty to 
protect. The following sub-sections focus on this. 
 
2.3.2 The obligation to protect Civil and Political rights 
As has been previously noted, CPR were initially conceived as strictly negative rights and 
required a minimum level of engagement with States. As a result, CPR were initially excluded 
from any type of positive action.121 However, the introduction of positive obligations was 
developed through human rights jurisprudence placing emphasis on the necessity of providing 
maximum protection of human rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights perfectly 
summarised the positive nature of civil and political rights in relation to the ACHR in the well-
known case of Velasquez-Rodriguez v Honduras.122 There, the Court stated: 
in principle, any violation of rights recognised by the Convention 
carried out by an act of public authority or by persons who use their 
positions of authority is imputable to the state. However, this does not 
define all the circumstances in which the state might be found 
responsible for an infringement of those rights. An illegal act which 
violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a 
state (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because 
the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international 
responsibility because of lack of due diligence to prevent the violation 
or to respond to it as required by the Convention.123  
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In applying the due diligence standard to the protection of the rights under the Convention, the 
Court noted that States have the obligation 
to ‘ensure’ the free and full exercise of the rights recognised by the 
Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation 
implies the duty of the State Parties to organise the governmental 
apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power 
is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically enjoying the free and 
full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, 
the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the 
rights recognised by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt 
to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for 
damages resulting from the violation.124 
Similarly, the HRC described the ICCPR obligations as both negative and positive in nature.125 
With respect to the positive dimension of the obligations, the HRC noted that States are 
required to ‘adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and other appropriate 
measures in order to fulfil their legal obligations.’126 The Committee further stressed that the 
failure to adopt ‘appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, 
investigate, or redress the harm caused by acts of private persons or entities will result in a 
failure to ensure Covenant rights.’127  
For its part, the ECHR in Article 1 which provides the general obligation of States to 
secure for everyone within their jurisdiction, the rights protected by the European Convention, 
has been applied as a basis for the expression of the due diligence standard in the protection of 
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ECHR.128 Ilascu v Moldova and Russia, the ECtHR acknowledged that the undertakings given 
by a contracting State under Article 1 of the European Convention include, in addition to the 
duty to refrain from interfering with enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed, the 
positive obligations to take appropriate steps to ensure respect for those rights and freedoms 
within its territory.129 Following the principle of due diligence, positive duties to prevent and 
punish civil and political rights have found their place next to the traditional notion of negative 
obligation.  
Having reviewed the theoretical framework for the application of the due diligence 
obligation to protect CPR, it is necessary to see how it is applied in practice. Arguably, the 
most examined CPR in this regard is the right to life.130 The right to life is provided for in 
Article 2 of the European Convention, which expressly requires that states must prevent 
violations of this right. Therefore, as noted by the ECtHR, the preventive dimension of the 
obligation requires  
The State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking 
of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction…This involves a primary duty on the State to 
secure the rights to life by putting in place effective criminal-law 
provisions to deter the commission offences against the person, backed 
up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and 
punishment of breaches of such provisions.131 
The ICCPR requirement that each state party should not only ‘respect’ but also ‘ensure’ the 
rights contained therein by adopting such laws and other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant is also an expression of the positive obligation 
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of CPR.132 Article 6 provides that states should protect ‘by law’ the right to life.133 This 
necessarily implies that the state obligation to ensure the right to life, they must necessarily 
adopt legislative measures to secure such right.134 Similar provision can be seen in Article 17 
which protects the right to privacy, article 9 and article 14 which provide guarantees against 
arbitrary arrest and for due process, including establishing and maintaining an independent 
judiciary, and ensuring the right to legal assistance.135 
These are clear indications that certain positive measures are necessary in ensuring that 
states protect the CPR of individuals from being affected by third parties, which invariably 
include transnational corporations.  
 
2.3.3 The obligation to protect economic, social and cultural rights 
Unlike civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights initially developed from a 
positive rationale that requires the state to provide the individual with certain entitlements 
considered vital to the individuals’ wellbeing.136 This depicts a purely vertical relationship 
between the state and individuals. Yet, the positive obligations of states to ensure ESCR 
encompasses an affirmative due diligence dimension with respect to the activities of third 
parties.137 
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The general obligations provision of the ICESCR requires that the state must 
‘undertake to take steps…to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the covenant by all appropriate 
means.’138 Clarifying this provision, the CESCR has stated that in the context of the covenant 
as a whole, while the full realisation of the rights might be achieved progressively, steps toward 
achieving that goal must be taken immediately.139 Such steps, according to the Committee must 
include means that are deliberate, concrete and targeted as much as possible towards meeting 
the obligations of the Covenant.140 Thus, in discharging its obligation to protect, a state must 
necessarily undertake immediate steps by adopting all appropriate means to ensure that human 
rights abuse resulting from third party abuse are prevented, and where such abuses occur, it 
must take steps to punish the perpetrators. Some practical examples of how the courts, 
committees and commissions have interpreted this obligation are as follows: 
Following the activities of Shell in Ogoni land, the African Commission of Human and 
Peoples Rights found breaches of the rights to health and a general satisfactory environment, 
the right to property, the right to housing, the right to food and the right to be free from forced 
deprivation of one’s wealth and resources.141 With respect to the right to food, the Commission 
declared that ‘the African Charter and international law require and bind Nigeria to protect and 
improve existing food sources to ensure access to adequate food for all citizens.’142 Interpreting 
the scope of the obligation it required that ‘the Nigerian Government…should not allow third 
parties to destroy or contaminate food sources, and prevent people’s efforts to feed 
themselves.’143 The ACHPR concluded by holding that the respondent state breached its right 
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to food obligations because it failed to prevent the private oil consortium from destroying food 
sources.144  
In Sarayaku v Ecuador, it was alleged that Ecuador granted a permit to a private 
company to carry out oil exploration and exploitation activities in the territory of the Kichwa 
indigenous People of Sarayaku.145 In the course of carrying out its operations, the company 
destroyed caves, waterfalls and underground rivers used as drinking water sources for the 
people, and cut down trees and plants of great environmental and cultural value: these were 
also used for food.146 The Inter-American Court found Ecuador to be in breach of its obligation 
to protect the people’s right to communal property and cultural identity by failing to prevent 
the oil company’s harmful activities.147 It ruled that Ecuador failed to provide adequate, 
accessible and effective consultation mechanisms and environmental impact mechanisms prior 
to the commencement of the company’s activities.148 The court also noted that the Government 
of Ecuador did not ensure that there was a reasonable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
companies’ activities in form of just compensation for the harm caused.149 
Similarly, in Lubicon Lake band v Canada, the Human Rights Committee found that 
Canada had breached of its obligation to ensure the rights of the Lubicon Lake Band to pursue 
its economic, social and cultural development, when it failed to prevent the provincial 
government of Alberta from expropriating their territory for the benefit of private corporate 
interests.150  Thus, the protection of economic, social and cultural rights necessarily entails the 
states’ obligation to adopt a standard for the prevention of human rights abuse by third parties. 
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It also requires the provision of mechanisms to compensate the affected individuals where 
possible and/or to deter future misconduct on the part of the wrong doers. 
  
2.4 The extent of the obligation to protect 
It is established that both CPR and ESCR are equally able to produce results with regard to the 
obligation to protect against third party harm. However, the mere existence of human rights 
harm caused by third parties does not mean that the state has failed to exercise due diligence in 
protecting human rights.151 This is because the obligation to protect is an obligation of conduct 
and not of result.152 Obligations of result require states to ensure the obtainment of a particular 
situation, - a specified result (in this case, respect for human rights) in accordance with the 
norms that obligate them to act or refrain from acting in the first place.153  Conversely, the 
obligation of conduct merely requires that states employ every possible means to achieve the 
desired result.154 If the result is not achieved, the responsibility of the state will only be 
questioned if the state cannot establish that it employed all the means available to it.155 Thus, 
where a state can show that it has exercised all available means to prevent and punish human 
rights violations by TNCs, it has discharged its obligation to protect even if the human rights 
abuse occurs despite its efforts.156 However, such means must be applied reasonably given the 
circumstances of each case.157  
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In Osman v The United Kingdom, the ECtHR listed a set of criteria for determining the 
reasonableness of a state’s preventive and punitive measures. These criteria include the 
unpredictability of human conduct, the difficulties involved in policing modern society, the 
knowledge of the risk, the operational choices, the possibility for the authorities to provide the 
necessary measures, as well as the need for proportionality.158 Apparently, these criteria do not 
provide a unitary method of interpretation. Rather, it seeks to determine the existence of a 
State’s obligation to protect on various criteria, which bear no relation to the point of presenting 
a single method of interpretation. However, they serve as a limited set of tools, which may be 
employed by the relevant investigatory and adjudicatory bodies in determining the adequacy 
of the means adopted by states in discharging their positive obligations. Treaty bodies have 
suggested the means by which States may adopt in discharging their obligation to protect. They 
include; regulatory, monitoring and adjudicatory measures. 
 
Legislation  
Treaty bodies usually suggest various regulatory measures that States may adopt in protecting 
human rights. The HRC highlights that Article 2 of the ICCPR enjoins states parties to’ adopt 
legislative, judicial, administrative, educational and other appropriate measures in order to 
fulfil their obligations’.159 Similarly, the CESCR confirms the means which should be used to 
satisfy the obligation to take steps as stated in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, to be ‘all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’160 
The requirement of the adoption of legislative measures in executing the States general 
obligations has been repeatedly included in treaties as a major means for the execution of States 
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parties’ obligations.161 Consequently, most treaty bodies confirm that the adoption of 
legislation to prevent third party violations of human rights is among states’ minimum 
obligations under the treaties in order to comply with the obligation to protect.162 For example, 
in its General Comment on state obligations under the ICESR, the CESCR explained that the 
obligation to protect ‘entails a positive duty to adopt a legal framework requiring business 
entities to exercise human rights due diligence in order to identify, prevent and mitigate the 
risks of violations of Covenant rights’163 The HRC has also indicated that legislative measures 
are an important means for punishing, preventing and deterring human rights abuse by private 
persons and third parties.164  
The treaty bodies do not generally specify what the content of the legislation should be 
or what form it should take. What is common in the commentaries is the reference to the State’s 
obligation to take legislative measures to prevent abuse. In its 15th annual report, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights stressed that, ‘the state is obliged to protect rights 
holders against other subjects by legislation…’165 In the words of the Commission, ‘protection 
generally entails the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere or framework by an effective 
interplay of laws and regulations so that individuals will be able to freely realise their rights 
and freedoms’.166 
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Nevertheless, some treaty bodies have given some specific guidance on the content of 
state legislation in relation to sector specific areas involving activities of TNCs. The CESCR 
has suggested that states should require business entities to adopt measures to prevent abuses 
of Covenant rights by subsidiaries, subcontractors, and other business partners, and enable civil 
suits and other effective means of claiming reparations by victims of human rights abuses 
against the corporate perpetrators.167 For TNCs conducting mining projects or engaging in large 
infrastructural developments, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(‘CERD’) emphasized that, ‘development objectives are no justification for encroachments on 
human rights, and that along with the right to exploit natural resources there are specific, 
concomitant obligations towards the local population’.168 Accordingly, the CERD 
recommended that State legislations should: set forth broad principles governing exploitation 
of land, including, environmental standards and equitable revenue distribution and rules 




The introduction of legislation alone is not sufficient to ensure human rights protection. It is 
necessary that the standards set up by states in their human rights regulations are clearly 
understood and applied by the third parties. Thus, the human rights treaty bodies have 
suggested that states must consistently monitor the activities of third parties to ensure that they 
do not contravene human rights regulations and affect the enjoyment of such rights. For 
example, The HRC has suggested that the obligation to protect indigenous peoples’ cultural 
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rights and ensure their participation in infrastructure decisions as contained in article 27 of the 
ICCPR, implies that states must monitor whether participating businesses are consulting with 
such communities.170 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also 
recommended that independent monitoring bodies be set up to conduct environmental impact 
assessment before any operating licence is issued to TNCs, as well as health and safety checks 
on the sites of gold mining activities.171 Such monitoring mechanisms, according to the 
CESCR, must be effective, well equipped and resourced.172  
One of such monitoring mechanisms include Human Rights Impact Assessment 
Instruments. A Human rights Impact Assessment Instrument is an instrument for examining 
policies, legislation, programs and projects to identify and measure their effects on human 
rights.173 In this regard, they are crucial tools in discharging the obligation to protect. This is 
because, the assessment of the compatibility of policies, legislation, programs and projects, and 
their likely impact on human rights creates the opportunity to revise the regulations or adjust 
them before and after they are implemented in order to fill in protection gaps.174  
Another important set of monitoring mechanism are Human Rights Indicators. A 
Human Rights Indicator is specific information that a state could rely on to assess its own 
progress in ensuring the enjoyment of human rights.175 Indicators are broadly classified as 
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quantitative or qualitative. The former are narrowly viewed as equivalent to statistics, and are 
usually articulated by directly observable objects, facts and effects or from perception, opinion 
assessment or judgement.176 For example, the number of recorded forced evictions in favour 
of third parties, or ratings based on an average scoring by a group of experts or journalists on 
the state of the right to prior consultation before land divestments.177 The latter is also 
articulated on the same observable indicia but expressed in narrative form. For example, the 
factual description of an event involving abuses of human rights by pollution of arable land, 
the perpetrator, and the victims, or, a narrative assessment on whether the right to food is 
properly guaranteed in law and practice in a given country.178 In the work of the UN human 
rights treaty bodies the use of appropriate indicators is a way to help State parties make precise 
and relevant information available to the treaty bodies, and to help them assess progressive 
implementation of State obligations under the treaties.179 
 
The procedural right to a remedy- Adjudication   
State regulation proscribing certain third-party conduct will have little impact without 
accompanying mechanisms to sanction perpetrators and compensate victims when abuses 
occur.180 This is why most treaty texts provide for the guarantee of both procedural remedies 
(effective access to an appropriate adjudicatory body) when a right is alleged to have been 
                                               
176 ibid, 16 
177 ibid,18 
178 ibid 
179 For example, the Committee against Torture recommended that Honduras should develop disaggregated 
indicators to monitor and document incidents of inter-prisoner violence with a view to revealing root causes and 
designing appropriate prevention strategies. – UN Committee against Torture, ‘Concluding Observations of the 
Committee against Torture: Honduras’ (23 June 2009) UN Doc CAT/C/HND/CO/1 para 17. 
180 OHCHR, ‘Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights’, (Report of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the issue of human 




infringed or where such infringement is imminent, and substantive remedies (award of 
adequate reparation to the victim).181  
In all cases involving the provision of procedural remedies by establishing adjudicatory 
mechanisms, there are clear minimum elements. Essentially, the rights holder should be entitled 
to lodge a complaint before an ‘impartial’ and ‘independent’ body when he or she considers 
that the obligations arising from the right have not been complied with.182 Such a body is 
considered to be independent and impartial where it is not subject to the control or influence 
of the authorities whose actions or omissions are subject to its review.183 Its independence and 
impartiality is also determined by its ability to issue orders to obligation holders when they are 
found to have breached their duties.184 Adjudicatory tasks are usually performed by courts, 
although some other mechanisms such as administrative tribunals, quasi-judicial bodies or 
arbitrators may also be adequate and sometimes more effective if they comply with the criteria 
of impartiality and independence.185 
In the past, and even presently, some have claimed that ESCR are incapable of being 
determined by courts.186 In order to justify this line of thinking, one of the arguments is that 
while CPR provide clear guidance on what is required in order to implement them, ESCR only 
set out aspirational and political goals.187 The content of ESCR is supposedly variable and lacks 
the certainty required for adjudication.188 For instance, it is usually said, that the right to health, 
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food or the right to housing have no clear meaning and that they offer no obvious standard by 
which one can determine whether an act or omission fulfils or violates it.189   
It is true that without a clear standard establishing the content and scope of the rights 
and its accompanying obligations, judicial determination would be almost impossible. 
However, this issue is not peculiar to ESCR as the determination of the content and scope of 
all human rights whether civil, political, economic, social or cultural is susceptible to imprecise 
labelling.190 This is because many legal rules are expressed in broad terms and to a large extent, 
unavoidable general wording.191  
Nevertheless, different courts and committees have come up with innovative concepts 
to overcome the outmoded assumption that ESCR cannot be submitted to judicial review. It is 
not within the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed analysis of all the different concepts, 
however, some illustrative examples will be mentioned. One of such measures is the 
determination of the ‘core content obligation’ or ‘minimum core obligation’.192 By this 
standard, a State would be said to be in breach of its obligations where it fails to satisfy the 
minimum essential levels of the rights in issue to the extent that such right become 
unrecognisable or meaningless.193 For example, in relation to the rights to food, health and 
housing, a State in which a significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuff, 
of essential primary health care, or of basic shelter and housing, is prima facie violating its 
ESC obligations.194 Another measure adopted by the courts is the adoption of a 
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‘reasonableness’, ‘adequacy’ or ‘proportionality’ test. With these, judges measure whether 
legislative or regulatory measures adopted by States comply or fail to comply with the 
minimum core obligations.195  
A second argument put forth in support of the non-justiciability of ESCR is the 
provision in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which calls for the ‘progressive realisation’ of 
ESCR.196 Following this provision, the treaty realises that the full realisation of the rights it 
contains would require gradual implementation. However, the CESCR has clarified this 
provision, first, by explaining that not every obligation arising from the Covenant is qualified 
by the idea of progressive realisation as some duties have immediate effect. The committee 
gave certain examples of such immediately realisable rights including those contained in 
Articles 3,197 7 (a)(i),198 8,199 10,200 13(2)(a)201 and 15(3),202 which would be immediately 
applicable by judicial and other adjudicatory organs.203 
However, the one most important within the scope of this thesis is the obligation 
contained in Article 2(1) - to ‘take steps by all appropriate means’ to implement the rights 
enshrined in the Covenant.204 This obligation is one that each State party is required to satisfy 
once it has ratified the ICESCR.205 The obligation to take steps by all appropriate means 
includes deliberate, concrete and targeted adjudicatory action by the courts and other necessary 
competent bodies depending on the circumstances of each case, with the view to ensure that 
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the rights of individuals as contained in the Covenant are determined.206 Thus, when an 
individual alleges that there has been an infringement on his or her rights by a third party, or 
that such an infringement is imminent, the State is obligated to set up independent and impartial 
systems of redress of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature to appropriately determine the rights of 
such an individual.  
 
The substantive right to a remedy -Reparation  
The obligation to provide reparation is immediately linked to the obligation to provide 
independent and impartial adjudicatory bodies. Where an individual’s rights have been 
determined, and relevant adjudicatory body establishes that such rights have indeed been 
adversely affected, the State is duty bound to ensure that the individual receives reparation.207 
The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to remedy have set out the starting point 
for the forms of remedy that can be issued upon the finding of a breach of an obligation.208 
They include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition.209 The CESCR also suggests identical remedies in the event of a breach of economic, 
social and cultural rights.210 For its part, the Human Rights Committee spoke on the nature of 
remedies and the obligation of member States to provide them in its General Comment No. 31. 
In addition to those suggested by the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
remedies and the CESCR, the HRC included ‘measures of satisfaction such as, public 
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apologies, public memorials, and guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws 
and practices, as well as bringing justice to the perpetrators of human rights violations.’211 
No form of reparation has been considered as the most effective, however, each means 
of reparation is usually based on the nature of the harm caused and its effects on the individual. 
In many situations involving TNCs especially in the extractive industry where indigenous 
people are deprived of their land due to the effects exploration and exploitation activities, the 
most appropriate form of redress would be the restitution of the land, but where the effects of 
the activities on the land are so severe, (as is usually the case) and such lands become 
inhabitable or lose their arability, just, fair and prompt compensation as far as possible in the 
form of what they lost would seem appropriate in the circumstance.212 Thus, adjudicatory 
bodies will need to consider the peculiarities of each case to determine the appropriate remedies 
for the aggrieved individuals. 
 
2.5 Is there an extraterritorial obligation to protect? 
The obligation to protect individuals from human rights abuses by third parties, including 
TNCs, which occur within a State’s jurisdiction is relatively well settled. However, the 
extension of this obligation beyond the State’s jurisdiction is still a debated subject. The phrase, 
‘within a State’s jurisdiction’ is often interpreted as being synonymous with the physical 
territorial boundaries of the State.213 One major reason for this restrictive interpretation is the 
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way and manner in which international human rights law evolved- as affording protection to 
citizens and residents located within the territorial boundaries of the State.214 The emergence 
of large transnational enterprises which possess the ability to operate beyond the territorial 
boundaries of their home States has led to the increasing challenge of the restrictive 
interpretation of the application of States’ obligations. This challenge is worth serious 
consideration, especially when we consider the continuous growth in the transnational power 
and influence of TNCs, which give them the ability to affect the human rights of individuals 
across borders often times, negatively.215 
Supporting the challenge to the territorial limitation of human rights obligations, this 
section makes an argument for the extraterritorial application of the States obligation to take 
positive action to prevent their TNCs operating abroad from negatively affecting the enjoyment 
of human rights. In lending credence to this argument, this section draws support from an 
examination of the content of human rights obligations as contained in the various human rights 
instruments. The section also examines the criteria for the expansive application of human 
rights obligations, particularly in connection with the relationship between the State and its 
transnational corporate entities. 
 
2.5.1 The UN Charter and the extraterritorial application of the obligation to protect 
The UN Charter opens with reference to the horrors of the past, but declares that its objectives 
are in favour of ‘future generations’. According to the Charter, these objectives include, 
‘international cooperation’ in solving international problems and the promotion of human 
rights.216 Confirming the human rights objective of the Charter, Article 55 provides that ‘the 
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UN shall promote universal respect, for and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction…’ To underline that Article 55 is not merely exhortatory, 
Article 56 states that ‘all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.’’ 
By virtue of these Charter provisions seen in the context of Article 103, the UN member States 
are obligated to cooperate, jointly and severally, to observe, promote and encourage universal 
respect for all human rights.217 
The idea of international cooperation presupposes the existence of an international 
community that goes beyond the relations between States.218 Cooperation is inseparable from 
the realisation of a common ideal. It is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving an end.219 
It is in this sense that the importance of international cooperation in the field of human rights 
becomes apparent, in that, cooperation becomes inseparable from the realisation of the 
common ideal set out in the UN Charter-the guarantee of human rights universally.220  
These principles of legal argument which are derived from the notion of international 
cooperation carry over into the positive obligation to protect through the reading of Article 56 
of the charter which calls on States to pledge themselves ‘to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the organisation’.221 The requirement to take action presupposes the adoption 
of measures towards achieving and securing human rights universally.  
The word ‘joint’ has not been substantially discussed in the commentary to the UN or 
in scholarly work on Article 56, yet from the reading of the Article, it is obvious that the 
intention was that the action should be taken by the members, through the UN as well as by the 
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members between and among themselves. If a narrower meaning was intended, the wording 
would probably have reflected this. The requirement of joint action clearly has an 
extraterritorial element. As Skogly notes, ‘only one of the States acting ‘jointly’ may at any 
given time address the promotion of respect for human rights domestically, all other States 
involved in the joint action will logically be addressing human rights respect in another 
State.’222  
Apart from the requirement of joint action, Article 56 also calls for ‘separate action in 
cooperation with the UN’. When read together with Article 55, the argument for human rights 
obligations transcending the territorial boundaries of individual States is further strengthened. 
The article uses the term universal, rather than domestic, meaning that individual States shall 
promote the respect of human rights not only for individuals within their territory but also 
universally.223 
Thus, the first instrument codifying international human rights law recognises the fact 
that a single State cannot comfortably embark on its own to ensure that all human rights are 
respected and observed.224 Certainly, if this were to be the case, there would be no need for the 
establishment of an international Charter prescribing human rights, rather, the human rights 
practices of each State would be governed solely by their domestic laws.225 Clearly, the 
international community at the time of signing and drafting believed that the protection of 
human rights is only possible through inter-state action. Following this, it could be asserted 
that the obligation of states to cooperate jointly and separately to secure human rights 
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extraterritorially goes to the very essence of the establishment of international human rights 
law. 
The UDHR, which provides an interpretation of the Charter also sets out clearly the 
need for international cooperation in ensuring that human rights are protected and respected 
universally, particularly in Articles 22 and 28. Article 22 generally sets out the right of every 
one to social security and ESCR, it then goes on to refer to the necessity of both ‘national and 
international cooperation in the realisation of these rights.226 Article 28 takes this a step further 
and covers the full range of rights recognised in the Declaration including civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights. It provides that ‘everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realised.’227 It has been confirmed that this would necessitate the structural adjustments and 
use of all possible means both within States (‘social order’) and between States (‘international 
order’) to ensure the rights and freedoms contained in the document.228 
The rights in the UDHR have been elaborated on and given binding force in the 
ICESCR and ICCPR. The scope of human rights obligations contained in these treaties as well 
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2.5.2 The extraterritorial application of the obligations under the ICESCR and other 
ESCR Instruments 
The general obligations provision of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR refers to the States parties’ 
obligation to ‘take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation’ for 
the realisation of the rights recognised in the covenant.229 It does not refer to either territory or 
jurisdiction as delimiting criteria for the application of its provisions. Thus, any intention that 
a territorial implication is implicit in the provision could be challenged based on the fact that 
some extraterritorial dimension to the ICESCR obligations seems contemplated in the 
undertaking by States parties’ ‘to take steps…through international assistance and cooperation’ 
to achieve full realisation of covenant rights.230 Fons Coomans clearly demonstrates the 
relationship between international assistance and cooperation when he stated that ‘cooperation 
is the wider term meaning a relationship providing for mutual advantages for the participating 
States, while providing assistance is a unilateral act requiring efforts from one State to the 
benefit of another State.’231 Skogly suggests that an important aspect of the obligation of 
international assistance and cooperation is to ensure that the rights guaranteed by the ICESCR 
are not being affected by States actions and inactions in terms of negatively affecting the rights 
of individuals in other countries, or, that the rights are being abused by third parties.232 The 
prevention of abuse by third parties can definitely not be achieved without the States taking 
positive steps to ensure that such abuse is prevented or halted. 
A number of key statements in the General Comments of the CESCR refer to the 
extraterritorial reach of the obligations contained in the Covenant. In its General Comment on 
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the right to food, the CESCR stated that State Parties are obligated to ‘take steps to respect the 
enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, “to protect that right”, to facilitate access to 
food and to provide the necessary aid when required.’233 Similarly, in its General Comment on 
the right to health, the CESCR stated that, ‘depending on the availability of resources, States 
should facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries, 
wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when required.’234 In General Comment No. 
24 on states obligations in context of business activities, the CESCR confirmed that the 
obligation to protect requires state parties to prevent and redress infringements of Covenant 
rights that occur outside their territories due to the activities of business entities’.235 Beyond its 
General Comments, the CESCR has emphasised States extraterritorial obligations in other 
ways. In its Concluding Observations to Ireland’s 2002 treaty report, the CESCR, employing 
diplomatic niceties, ‘encouraged’ the Irish government, to ‘do all it can to ensure that the 
policies and decisions of [the international organisations where it has membership status] are 
in conformity with the obligations of States under the Covenant, in particular the 
obligations…concerning international assistance and co-operation.’236  
Just like the ICESCR, the CRC also incorporates obligations, which have an 
extraterritorial reach. In Article 4, the CRC begins with the imperative to all States parties’ to 
‘undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the convention.’237 This, like the ICESCR does not 
specifically refer to territory or jurisdiction. Rather, the provision goes on to state that ‘with 
regard to the economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures 
to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework 
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of international cooperation.238 Thus, it could be argued that the States’ obligation would 
necessarily require positive steps to undertake certain conduct, which, according to the CRC, 
includes ‘all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures’, and it is additionally 
required that these measures are implemented within the framework of international 
cooperation to achieve the rights enshrined in the covenant.  
The CRPD also does not contain the territorial or jurisdictional limitation terms. Article 
4(2) provides that 
With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party 
undertakes to take measures to the maximum of its available resources 
and, where needed, within the framework of ‘international 
cooperation,’ with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of these rights.239 
Unlike the ICESCR and the CRC, but similar to the UN Charter, the CRPD does not contain a 
reference to ‘international assistance’. Nevertheless, ‘international assistance’ is now 
commonly seen to be part of international cooperation’ thus, the difference is unlikely to imply 
a narrower sphere for the extraterritorial obligations.’240  
In Article 32, the CRPD calls on the State parties to recognise ‘the importance of 
international cooperation and its promotion, in support of national efforts for the realization of 
the purpose and objectives of the convention.’241 Hence, in spite of the fact that the territorial 
State has the primary obligation to comply with the requirements of the treaty, there is also a 
need for international cooperation to support the national efforts, which, according to Article 
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4(1)(e) includes the adoption of all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination on the 
basis of disability by third parties, including private enterprises.242  
 
2.5.3 Extraterritorial application of the obligations in the ICCPR and other CPR 
instruments 
The ICCPR like most other CPR instruments, differ from the ICESCR, CRC and CRPD in 
relation to their obligation’s provisions. They make no mention of ‘international assistance’ or 
‘international cooperation’ but rather, delimit the sphere of their application to either 
jurisdiction, territory, or both. However, the various treaty bodies have interpreted these 
delimiting criteria to extend beyond the physical boundary of the State parties. The ICCPR in 
Article 2(1) mandates each States party to undertake ‘to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its “territory” and subject to its “jurisdiction”.243 
Two contending interpretations have been given concerning this provision. The first 
considers the expression ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ as 
limiting a State Party’s obligations recognised under the ICCPR to individuals who are both 
present within the State’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction.244 This interpretation focuses 
on what its proponents consider as the ordinary meaning of the conjunction, ‘and’. They 
contend that if the drafters had intended that ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘territory’ should be read 
disjunctively, they would have used the word ‘or’ instead of ‘and’.245 The second interpretation 
on the other hand, is that the Covenant’s application is not limited to the territorial confines of 
the State Parties. This second interpretation of Article 2(1) has been adopted by the Human 
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Rights Committee. The Committee in Lopez v Uruguay, stated that while Article 2(1) imposed 
an obligation on the State Parties to respect and ensure the obligations under the Covenant to 
individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, that language, ‘does not imply 
that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of the rights under the 
Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State’.246  
It is difficult to deny the fact that the most natural reading of the language in the general 
obligations provision of the ICCPR is limited to individuals who are both within the territory 
and subject to the State Parties jurisdiction.247 However, this logically coherent natural or 
ordinary meaning of the text does not signify the end of the interpretative enquiry.248 According 
to the well-established principle of treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the ordinary or textual meaning of a treaty text has to be 
interpreted in the light of its context and its object and purpose, particularly where the ordinary 
or textual interpretation has the potential to render the treaty provisions internally 
contradictory, or where it is incoherent with its legally correct meaning to the point of 
absurdity.249 This incoherence was noted by the HRC which explained that ‘it would be 
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a 
State Party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State which 
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.250 Allowing this would lead to a direct 
contradiction of the basic tenets of international human rights law. 
In its General Comment No. 31, the HRC further explained that: 
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While article 2 is couched in terms of the obligations of State Parties 
towards individuals as the rights-holders under the Covenant, every 
State Party has a legal interest in the performance by every other State 
Party of its obligations. This follows from the fact that the rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person are erga omnes 
obligations and that, as indicated in the fourth preambular paragraph of 
the Covenant, there is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Furthermore, the contractual dimension of the treaty 
involves any State Party to a treaty being obligated to every other State 
Party to comply with its undertakings under the treaty.251 
Supporting its decision with the holding in Lopez v Uruguay, the ICJ in the Wall case stated 
that extraterritorial application of ICCPR obligations is a natural reading of the Covenant 
provisions considering the object and purpose of the treaty.252 It further maintained that its 
interpretation was supported by the drafting history, noting that the drafters of the Covenant 
did not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they acted outside their 
national territory.253 The ICJ re-affirmed its position in DRC v Uganda, where it decided that 
Uganda, through the conduct of its armed forces in Congo, had violated its obligations under 
international human rights law.254  
Some of the other main treaties addressing civil and political rights, such as, the ACHR, 
the ECHR, and the CAT, as well as some provisions of the CRC, conceive treaty obligations 
as operating within the States ‘jurisdiction’.  
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Under the ACHR and the ECHR, the States parties obligations to ‘secure the rights 
contained in the Conventions have been interpreted by both the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights and the ECtHR as ‘not limited or merely co-extensive with national territory’, 
but extends to the acts of the States’ ‘agents which produce effects or are performed outside 
their own territory.’255 Under Article 2 (1) of the CAT, the State parties are obligated to take 
‘effective measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.’256 The 
Committee against Torture addressed the meaning of jurisdiction and territory in its General 
Comments No. 2 on the Implementation of Article 2 by State Parties.257 Although it did not 
specifically separate the concepts of territory and jurisdiction like the HRC did with the ICCPR, 
it interpreted Article 2 (1) as applying not only within the States’ parties’ sovereign territory 
but also extending to any territory under their jurisdiction.258 
 
2.5.4 Other human rights treaties 
There are yet other human rights treaties that do not contain a general provision using the terms 
‘territory’, ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘international corporation and international assistance’ to stipulate 
the scope of applicability of the obligations they contain. These include, the CERD, CEDAW 
and the ACHPR. In the case of the CERD, there are a subset of obligations that are conceived 
in the context of the States ‘jurisdiction’. For example, the obligation in Article 3 concerning 
racial segregation and apartheid applies to parties with respect to the ‘territories under their 
jurisdiction.’259 Article 6 also provides for the obligation of States to provide remedies with 
respect to individuals ‘within their jurisdiction’.260 No other Article in the CERD, including 
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Articles 2 and 5 that contain a wide range of obligations, provide for any territorial limitation 
of the Conventions obligations. In Georgia v Russia, Russia asserted that based on the absence 
of a textual limitation of the CERD, the covenant could not apply to its alleged acts stemming 
from its military intervention in Georgia.261 The ICJ acknowledged the lack of restriction in 
either Article 2 or Article 5 of the CERD, but stated that ‘these provisions generally appear to 
apply like other provisions of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a State party when it 
acts beyond its territory.’262  
Just like the CERD, there is no reference to jurisdiction or ‘international assistance or 
cooperation’ in the general obligations provision of the ACHPR.263 However, during its 57th 
session, the African Commission on Human and People’s rights adopted General Comment 
No.3 on the right to life contained in article 4 of the ACHPR. In paragraph 14 of General 
Comment No. 3, the African Commission notes that ‘a state has certain obligations to protect 
the life of individuals outside its territory.’264 According to the Commission, ‘the nature of 
these obligations depends for instance on the extent the state has jurisdiction or otherwise 
exercises effective authority, power or control over either the perpetrator or the victim.’265 In 
paragraph 18 of the General Comment, the African Commission affirms the obligations of 
states’ to hold accountable corporate nationals domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction 
responsible for committing or contributing to arbitrary deprivations of life extraterritorially.266  
General Comment No.3 further emphasises a broad interpretation of the right to life as the right 
to a ‘dignified life’, which, according to the Commission includes the ‘realisation of various 
                                               
261Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia 
v Russian Federation) (Preliminary objections) [2011] ICJ Reports 70, para 193-194 
262 ibid, para 109. 
263 See ACHPR (n 60), article 1. 
264 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Right to Life (Article 4), 
(4-18 November 2015) African Union Executive Council Doc. Ex.CL/921 (XXVII), para 14. 
265 ibid 




economic, social and cultural rights’- rights whose infringement may in certain circumstances 
entail violations of the right to life.267  
As for the CEDAW, there is no reference to any delimiting criteria in its provisions, 
however, the CEDAW Committee has stated in its General recommendations that ‘the 
obligations of States Parties…apply without discrimination both to citizens and non-citizens, 
within or outside their territory.’268 The Committee stressed that ‘the State parties are 
responsible for ‘all their actions affecting human rights, regardless of whether the affected 
persons are in their territory’ or outside it.269 
  
2.5.5 Findings on the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaty obligations 
Contrary to the restrictive interpretations of international human rights obligations, the various 
human rights treaty texts and the relevant treaty bodies do suggest that the application of human 
rights obligations are not limited to the territorial boundaries of States. The UN Charter declares 
that the basis for the establishment of a universal framework for the protection of human rights 
is to ensure that all States work together to ensure respect and protection for such rights. All 
other human rights instruments, binding or non-binding, are built on the basis of the objects 
and purposes expressed in the UN Charter.270 A denial of the extraterritorial applicability of 
human rights obligations will go against the very essence of international human rights law. It 
is on this basis that the various human rights supervisory bodies interpret the treaty provisions 
as having extraterritorial flavour. Thus, the key question should not be whether international 
human rights obligations extend extraterritorially, but rather, in what circumstances this occurs. 
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The majority of the human rights treaties discussed above, particularly those addressing 
civil and political rights (-the ICCPR, CAT, ACHR, and the ECHR), conceive the State parties’ 
obligations as operating within the States’ ‘jurisdiction’. Under these treaties, States are 
obligated to ensure the protection of the human rights of individuals ‘within their 
jurisdiction’.271 The ICJ not only confirmed the extraterritorial reach of the term ‘jurisdiction’ 
as contained in the ICCPR and other human rights treaties which expressly refer to the term.272 
It also read the concept into the ICESCR in the Wall Advisory Opinion,273 the ACHPR and the 
CRC in DRC v Uganda,274 and the CERD in Georgia v Russia,275 as a trigger for the 
extraterritorial application of the obligations contained in the treaties.  
Thus, it can be said that the idea of jurisdiction in international human rights law is a 
threshold criterion.276 In other words, where a State is said to have jurisdiction over individuals 
the State has an obligation to protect them from human rights abuses by third parties, and where 
jurisdiction is not established, no such obligation arises.277 This would mean that in order to 
establish whether a State has human rights obligations towards individuals located beyond the 
States territorial confines, it is essential to determine that the State has extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to that effect. 
Most interpretations of the term jurisdiction as it applies extraterritorially, have been 
linked to the consequences of the application of the ECtHR standard of effective control over 
foreign territory or persons.278 In determining whether a State has jurisdiction under the various 
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human rights treaties, two major questions are usually up for determination. Does the State 
exercise effective control of an area or territory in which the victim/victims of the alleged 
human rights violation is located (spatial model of jurisdiction)?279 Or, does the State through 
its agents exercise authority or control over the individual victim of the alleged human rights 
violation (personal model of jurisdiction)?280 It is the exercise of control/authority that brings 
the individual/individuals within the jurisdiction of the State for the purpose of the application 
of the States human rights obligations. Conversely, a of lack of control/authority, and 
invariably, a lack of jurisdiction would mean that a States human rights obligations will not 
apply extraterritorially.   
However, this approach does not do justice to the idea of human rights, nor does it 
sufficiently consider global and social changes caused principally by the globalisation and 
transnationalisation of relations and operations. States spheres of influence are distributed 
globally in different ways. It is now possible for a State, through its nationals, policies and 
programs, to influence the human rights of individuals extraterritorially, without having to 
exercise effective control directly over territory or persons. Moreover, restricting the States’ 
ability to influence human rights to only territory and persons within its physical control goes 
against the universality of human rights.  If the universal validity of human rights rests on the 
idea that human rights are valid in all countries, and that all States are bound to promote the 
respect human rights everywhere, then the limitation of the obligations of States to the current 
notion of jurisdiction must be questioned. 
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The difficulty in establishing jurisdiction based on the effective control standard was 
captured by Milanovic in his discussion of the Genocide case.  According to him: 
Since it was impossible to prove the required degree of certainty that 
the Srebrenica genocide was attributable to Serbia under either the test 
of complete control or the test of effective control, the Court 
nonetheless found Serbia responsible for failing to prevent that 
genocide, i.e., for its own wrongful act of failing to exercise due 
diligence to prevent violations by third parties.281 
Thus, the court relied on the Serbia’s ability to prevent genocide even when effective control 
could not be established. The ICJ, provided in detail, the basis for the establishment of the due 
diligence obligation to protect human rights extraterritorially.  
 
2.5.6 The criteria for establishing the extraterritorial obligation to protect 
According to the ICJ in the Genocide case,  
A State will only violate its due diligence obligations when it 
manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which are 
within its power and which might have contributed to preventing the 
violation.282  
Discussing the criteria for assessing when a State has discharged the due diligence obligation, 
the ICJ stated: 
The first which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the 
capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, 
or already committing genocide. This capacity itself depends, among 
                                               
281 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2011), 47. 
282 Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 




other things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned from 
the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as well 
as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the 
main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also 
be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only 
act within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s 
capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal 
position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger, or the 
reality, of genocide.283 
Furthermore, the court added a knowledge requirement, noting that 
a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to acts, arise 
at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned 
of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. 
From that moment onwards, if the State has available to it means likely 
to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of committing genocide 
or reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent…it is under a 
duty to make such use of these means as the circumstances permit.284 
Thus, according to the ICJ, where a state has the capacity to effectively influence a third party 
and such a state can foresee or has knowledge that such third party is committing, about to 
commit or has committed genocide, such a State may be held responsible for failing to prevent 
genocide or punishing the perpetrators. Thus, even in the absence of effective control over 
territory or persons, the state can be held responsible for failing to exercise due diligence in 
preventing the third party from committing genocide when the State has the capacity to 
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influence the third party’s actions and has knowledge of its potential to cause harm or that such 
harm has been committed.  In this case, it is the act or omission of the state in relation to the 
third party that brings the individual under the power of the State and triggers corresponding 
obligations on the state to exercise due diligence in protecting his or her human rights against 
third party abuse.285  
However, the ICJ limited its judgement to defining the specific scope of the obligation 
to prevent genocide. It stated that it did not ‘purport to establish a general jurisprudence 
applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an 
obligation for states to prevent certain acts’.286 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that 
States may bear obligations other than the prevention of genocide, which ‘protect essential 
humanitarian values, and which may be owed erga omnes.287  
The concept of erga omnes was introduced into positive law by the ICJ in the Barcelona 
Traction case of 1970, when determining that erga omnes obligations are the concern of all 
States. According to the court, because of the importance of the obligations involved, all States 
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection. 288 The ICJ reasoned that  
Such obligations derive, for example, from the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning 
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination.289 
The court in this passage, did not clarify whether its reference to ‘basic rights of the human 
person’ was synonymous with human rights generally. However, in a latter part of the 
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judgement, the court indicated that it had intended to distinguish between human rights in 
general and basic rights of the human person. The court emphasised that in contrast to the 
ECHR, ‘which entitles each State which is a party to the Convention to lodge a complaint 
against any other contracting State for violation of the Convention, irrespective of the 
nationality of the victim’,290 ‘on the universal level, the instruments which embody human 
rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights 
irrespective of their nationality.’291 
Here, the court appears to suggest that while basic rights of the human person give rise 
to obligations erga omnes, and are appropriate for protection by all States regardless of where 
the victim is located, other human rights, can be espoused, under the agreements embodying 
such rights, only by the State of nationality of the victims. 
This pronouncement is problematic, particularly when the need to classify human rights 
as either ordinary or basic arises. It has been suggested the term ‘basic rights’ refers to 
fundamental rights;292 that the irreducible core of rights, deemed non-derogable under the 
ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR constitute fundamental rights.293 However, that irreducible core 
consists of only four rights- the right to life, the prohibition of slavery, torture and retroactive 
penal measures. It is not clear whether there would be consensus reaching beyond these limited 
set of rights. While some may insist that due process rights are fundamental and indispensable, 
others would consider that the rights to food, adequate standard of living and other basic needs 
take precedence.294  
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Beyond this, an examination of the provisions of the UN Charter,295 the UDHR,296 the 
ICCPR,297 the CERD298 and the CEDAW,299 reveals that the terms ‘human rights’, ‘freedoms’, 
fundamental human rights’, ‘fundamental freedoms’, ‘rights and freedoms’, and most 
commonly, ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ are generally used interchangeably. This 
is an indication that there is no substantive or definable legal difference between these terms. 
In these instruments at least, human rights are not inferior to fundamental rights and freedoms. 
They are the same.  
Notwithstanding the above discussion, the ICJ in the Bercelona Traction case is clear 
on one issue. Its reference to the body of general international law and to universal or quasi-
universal agreements suggests that a fundamental right must be firmly rooted in international 
law and that claims or goals, would not qualify. Since the courts judgement, there has been a 
growing acceptance in contemporary international law of the principle that, apart from 
agreements conferring on each State party locus standi against the other State parties, all States 
have a legitimate interest in and the right to protect against human rights generally. The 
universal acceptance in principle of human rights by States of all political stripes and their 
invocation at domestic and international levels, coupled with the active involvement of 
virtually all States, individually and collectively, to promote and protect human rights through 
the UN and regional human rights systems in Africa, the Americas and Europe, has led to a 
certain belief that states have assumed human rights obligations beyond the mere acceptance 
of treaty law.300 Endorsing this view, the International Law Institute wrote in its Resolution on 
                                               
295 (n 30) Preamble, Articles 1(3), 13(b), 55(c), 62(2), 76(c). 
296 (n 32) Preamble, Articles 2, 29(2), 30. 
297 (n 37) Articles 2(1), 3, 5(1), 5(2). 
298 (n 64) Preamble, Article 1(1). 
299 (n 65)Preamble, Articles 1, 3. 
300 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World 
Trade Organisation’  (Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper Series 2010/008, 2001) 
<https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Protecting_Human_Rights_in_a_Global_Economy_Ch.htm>  accessed 




the Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-intervention in Internal Affairs of 
States, that  
Human rights are a direct expression of the dignity of the human person. The 
obligation of States to ensure their observance derives from the recognition 
of this dignity as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
This international obligation, as expressed by the International Court of 
Justice is erga omnes; it is incumbent on every state in relation to the 
international community as a whole, and every State has a legal interest in 
the protection of human rights. The obligation further implies a duty of 
solidarity among all States to ensure as rapidly as possible the effective 
protection of human rights throughout the world.301 
If the universal respect of human rights is to be achieved, it is necessary that this emerging 
approach be adopted to ensure that the international community as a whole has a legal interest 
in their protection. 302 
Thus, with this understanding, a detailed consideration of the criteria for establishing 
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2.5.6.1 The Capacity to influence effectively 
According to the ICJ, the first criterion for establishing the extraterritorial obligation to exercise 
due diligence is the ‘capacity to influence effectively’.303 In describing the elements of this 
criterion, the court stated that such capacity depends, inter alia, on the geographical distance 
of the state concerned from the scene of the events, as well as links of all other kinds, between 
the state and the main actors in the event. According to the court, physical proximity is not 
necessarily decisive. 304 This point is very plausible especially as the advent of globalisation 
has collapsed the concept of space, 305 while introducing connections such as economic, 
political, regulatory, financial and other links between States and TNCs.  
One apparent example of the application of these links are international investments. 
States are usually very active in the investment activities of their TNCs, they provide financial 
assistance through pension schemes and Export Credit Agencies (ECA), which help TNCs to 
carry out their capital intensive projects overseas.306 These schemes are regulated by the 
domestic legislation and policies of the State, and TNCs are heavily reliant on them.307 As such, 
the States’ investment behaviour signalling approval or disapproval of TNC activities could go 
a long way in influencing the human rights impact of TNC activities. The threat of divestment 
will largely influence the TNCs to follow the direction desired by the State. Precisely because 
States have the power to influence the activities of TNCs through investment schemes, it could 
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be argued that they have a due diligence obligation to prevent such TNCs from negatively 
affecting the human rights of the individuals located in the areas where they operate.308  
Another major example of a connecting link is Bilateral Investment Agreements 
(BIAs). Home States conclude BIAs with host States in favour of their corporate nationals who 
invest in the host States.309 These agreements include regulatory terms that govern the 
investments of their corporate nationals in foreign States.310 Typically, they introduce 
provisions that emphasise protection to foreign corporate investors without any regard to the 
human rights consequences of foreign investment. 311  Thus, corporate investors may carry out 
their activities without due regard to the human rights of the individuals located within the 
areas where they operate. The dispute that arose as a result of the provisions of the US-Ecuador 
Bilateral Investment Treaty is a good illustration of this problem.312 The Agreement was signed 
between the United States of America and Ecuador in favour of Chevron (successor of Texaco), 
a US corporation carrying out oil exploration activities in Ecuador. It included a provision 
granting Texaco immunity from all suits arising from its operations.313 In the event of gross 
human rights abuse resulting from environmental pollution of the Ecuadorian Amazon, the 
affected indigenous people were estopped from claiming compensation in the Ecuadorian 
courts against the corporate entity.314  
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As home States have the leverage of concluding such agreements with the host States, 
they have the capacity to effectively influence their corporate nationals’ operations by 
including human rights obligations and complaints standards for their corporate nationals.  
Further explaining the States’ ‘capacity to influence effectively’, the court stated that 
such capacity to effectively influence varies greatly from one State to another depending on 
the States’ legal position vis-à-vis the actors causing the harm.315 Based on this, it has been 
stated that following the international law principle of active personality,316 the home states, 
(where TNCs are registered and thereby nationals) should regulate the activities of their 
corporate nationals by implementing domestic legislation that binds their extraterritorial 
operations. 317 The CESCR has indicated that States should take steps  
to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right to 
water of individuals and communities in other countries. Where state 
parties can take steps to influence other third parties in respect of the 
right, through legal or political means such steps should be taken in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable 
international law.’318 
In its General Comment concerning the right to health, the CESCR noted that 
in order to comply with their international obligations in relation to 
article 12, States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to 
health in other Countries, and to prevent third parties from violating the 
right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties 
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by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and applicable international law.319 
Concerned at reports of adverse effects of operations by TNCs registered in the United 
Kingdom but conducted outside its territory that affect the rights of indigenous peoples to land, 
health, environment and an adequate standard of living, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination called upon the United Kingdom ‘to take appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures to ensure that acts of transnational companies registered in the State 
party comply with the provisions of the Convention.’320  
After the CERD had received submissions from indigenous peoples in the United States 
complaining about the conduct of Canadian mining Companies on indigenous lands in the 
United States, the CERD, in its Concluding observations to Canada noted that Canada should  
Take appropriate legislative or administrative measures to prevent acts 
of transnational corporations registered in Canada which negatively 
impact on the enjoyment of right of indigenous peoples in territories 
outside Canada. In particular, the Committee recommends that 
[Canada] explore ways to hold transnational corporations registered in 
Canada accountable.321 
Noting with concern the reported participation and complicity of Australian mining companies 
in serious human rights violations in third countries, the Committee on the Rights of a Child 
called upon the state party to ‘examine and adapt its legislative framework (civil and 
administrative)…regarding abuses to human rights, especially child rights, committed in the 
territory of the state party or overseas and establish monitoring mechanisms, investigation, and 
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redress of such abuses, with a view towards improved accountability, transparency and 
prevention of violations.’322 
However, a common problem with regards to the TNCs is the separation of the legal 
personalities of the parent and the subsidiary. TNCs operate extraterritorially through 
subsidiaries that are registered in the States in which they conduct their activities. 323 By virtue 
of such registration, they are considered as separate legal entities from their parent companies 
that are registered in the home States.324 The home states of the parent companies will typically 
be incompetent or reluctant to regulate corporate activity abroad.325 There is, however, practice 
developing in some jurisdictions where parent companies are linked to the foreign subsidiaries 
when it can be established that the conduct that led to the human rights abuse by the foreign 
subsidiaries was set in motion by the parent company, or where the parent company benefits 
from the human rights harm caused by its foreign subsidiary.326 However, for reasons  to be 
discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, these methods have not recorded any significant success. 
 
2.5.6.2 The Knowledge and foreseeability requirement 
The second part of the ICJs analysis which runs cumulatively with the first, focuses on the 
element of knowledge and foreseeability. According to the court, ‘a State’s obligation to 
prevent, and corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should 
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normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.’327 
Thus, a state’s obligation arises not only if it is aware or was made aware of the risks the TNCs 
activities posed to human rights, but also if the state should have been aware of the risks.328 
According to the commentary to the Maastricht principles, it is this second strand of knowledge 
that provides the normative backing for the due diligence obligation to protect. 329 This is 
because it requires an assessment as to what actions a State must take to implement preventive 
measures, and to ensure cessation of violations as well as provide effective remedies when the 
rights are negatively impacted.330 This element of foreseeability also provides the limiting 
factor for the knowledge requirement as the State cannot be responsible to provide measures 
against what is unforeseeable.331 
The ICJ in the Genocide case went on to explain that the knowledge or foreseeability 
requirement, which triggers the State’s positive obligations might result from ‘actual or 
constructive’ awareness of the relevant events which should be interpreted in the light of any 
history which the actors may have had in relation to the harm.332 According to McCorquodale 
and Simmons: 
It cannot reasonably be argued today that states do not know that their 
corporate nationals (or the latter’s foreign subsidiaries) may engage in 
human rights violating activity in their extraterritorial operations. The 
negative impact of some extraterritorial corporate activity on human 
rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, is now well 
documented. In addition, there are increasing numbers of investor and 
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consumer campaigns in relation to extraterritorial TNC human rights 
impacts abroad, and of claims being brought in national courts against 
TNCs for egregious violations of human rights…At the very least, it 
can be asserted that states have constructive knowledge that corporate 
nationals may violate human rights standards in their extraterritorial 
operations. 333 
Citing examples of such circumstances of constructive knowledge, they noted that ‘where the 
corporate nationals invest in conflict zones, failed states or repressive regimes, and engage in 
a business relationship with host State governments or a non-state actor party to a civil 
conflict’, they are already put on notice of the imminent risk of human rights harm, and must 
then set up measures to prevent such harm from occurring.334 This is consistent with the general 
international law principle, which posits that where a state knows that its national’s activities 
will cause, or are causing harm to other States or persons, it has a duty to prevent such harm.335 
Thus, whether by actual or constructive knowledge, a state is aware or can foresee any 
extraterritorial harm or potential harm by its TNCs, it has an obligation to take steps to prevent 
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The states’ obligation to protect is well established in international human rights law. The 
obligation includes the duty to exercise due diligence in taking all reasonable measures/steps, 
in accordance with the states’ capabilities, to prevent human rights harm by third parties, 
including TNCs, to stop the continuity of such harm and to provide adequate remedy when the 
harm occurs. It is generally accepted both in jurisprudence and scholarly work on the subject 
that this obligation primarily rests on the territorial State, i.e., the State where the human rights 
harm in issue occurs. Despite the objections to its extraterritorial application, this chapter has 
examined the basic international and regional human rights law treaties, case law and 
publications by scholars in the field, and established that human rights obligations also include 
an extraterritorial focus. Thus, while it is true that international human rights law places the 
primary obligation to protect on the host States of TNCs, the home states have a concurrent 
obligation to protect human rights as well. In this regard, it has been asserted that it is the 
concept of jurisdiction defined as effective control that brings the individual under the power 
of the home state, triggering its obligations towards the individuals in the host state. However, 
the current State of globalisation and transnationalisation has extended the States sphere of 
influence beyond the confines of the current concept of jurisdiction.  It does not satisfactorily 
respond to the state’s obligation to protect individuals against the harmful operations of private 
business entities, which the State may not have control over, but may be able to influence by 
way of legal means. Nevertheless, available case law and decisions indicate that by wielding 
effective influence over a corporate entity coupled with the requisite knowledge of its violative 
conduct, a state may well have positive human rights obligations towards individuals in foreign 
territories, whether or not it exercises effective control. Evidently, a theoretical case can be 
made for all States to protect human rights both within their territories and extraterritorially, 




there is no international legally binding instrument that expressly requires States to regulate 
the activities of TNCs in international human rights law beyond their national boundaries,336 
and case law on extraterritorial jurisdiction is still limited by notions of effective 
control/authority. TNCs operate with transnational fluidity. Their activities span across 
national boundaries and different national legal orders. Without an international instrument that 
takes their transnational nature into consideration in providing regulatory standards, there may 
be challenges in the implementation of the obligation to protect and the ability of victims to 
gain access to remedy for corporate related abuse. The next chapter examines these challenges.
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PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
OBLIGATION TO PROTECT IN THE DOMESTIC REGULATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Although there are credible theoretical explanations for the duty of both host and home states 
to protect individuals against international human rights violations by TNCs, there are certain 
factors that impede the implementation of this duty in practice.  
It should be noted that the activities of TNCs across national boundaries is much more 
than a step across a geographical line.1 It is also a step into different economic, social, and legal 
settings which largely influence the scope and content of state regulations.2 As most host states 
(who bear the primary responsibility for protecting individuals against TNC operations that 
result in human rights violations) are still in the process of developing their economies, TNC 
operations have become a crucial factor for economic growth.3 Their uniquely powerful 
position makes it easy to influence decision making by the governments of the host states.4 
This is why it is inevitable that the more economically stable home states equally take up 
responsibility to ensure that the activities of their foreign subsidiaries do not result in human 
rights violations.5 However, regulation by home states is not without its own problems. The 
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extension of regulation from the home state to activities of TNCs taking place in host states 
raises questions on jurisdiction, while the complex, multifaceted structure of the corporate 
entities presents procedural obstacles.  
This chapter begins with a discussion on the specific issues that impede the host states 
execution of its international human rights law duty to protect. It will address how and why 
these impediments have made home states more attractive to victims who wish to seek 
remedies for the harm caused by TNCs. The chapter will go on to examine the various attempts 
at extraterritorial regulation of TNCs by home states, and the associated limitations of such 
attempts. In conclusion, this chapter will address how the impediments facing both host and 
home states affect their international human rights law obligation to protect individuals against 
the operations of TNCs that result in the violation of their human rights. 
 
3.2 Host States regulation of TNCs 
Although host states are under an international human rights obligation to use their 
national legal structures to prevent harmful TNC operations from negatively impacting human 
rights,6 most of these states are developing states with the principal objective of economic 
development.7 In many host states, domestic legislation is heavily compromised by the 
economic considerations of the states’ unbalanced relationship with TNCs.8 TNCs often take 
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advantage of the development needs of these states and co-operate with the governments to 
engage in irresponsible behaviour that results in human rights violations. This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that some states who have the desire to implement their international 
obligations do not possess the requisite means and mechanisms to do so.9 
Using factual examples of cases where the issue of TNCs and human rights have been 
addressed, the following sections will demonstrate how economic exigencies have rendered 
many developing host states unwilling or unable to apply their national legislation in regulating 
the activities of TNCs. 
 
3.2.1 Unwillingness to regulate 
When a state is unwilling to regulate it means that the state has the capacity to regulate but 
chooses not to do so, and therefore not to fulfil its obligation. The reasons for the states' 
unwillingness vary, but in the field of business and human rights, two reasons stand out: The 
pursuit of economic gain and corruption.  
 
3.2.1.1 The pursuit of economic gain 
Transnational corporations, through their global economic activities, serve as valuable 
channels of technology, create employment, provide means through which local firms can 
increase their productivity and export potential, and diversify the economy.10 Due to the 
anticipated economic benefit to be derived from the corporations activities, some developing 
states, (who, because of their vast deposits of natural resources, are usually host to TNCs who 
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explore, exploit and produce these resources), mortgage their capacity to regulate the activities 
of TNCs by deliberately tailoring their national legislation towards assisting TNCs to evade 
human rights standards.11  In such situations, TNCs will likely act with impunity as the 
incentives for state officials to act in the interest of its citizens have been compromised. A 
major example that reflects this attitude of host states is the mine waste dumping incident which 
took place in the Ok Tedi and Fly rivers in Papua New Guinea.  
The Ok Tedi mine is operated by the consortium, Ok Tedi Mining limited (OTML), a 
joint venture led by the Australian company, Broken Hill Proprietary Company limited (BHP) 
as majority shareholder and mine operator for the most part of its operations.12 The mine which 
is situated by the Ok Tedi River, a tributary of the Fly river was developed in the 1980’s to 
exploit the large copper and gold deposits in the region.13 About 250 indigenous communities 
live along the Ok Tedi and Fly rivers relying on the water, adjacent land and forests for their 
sustenance.14 From the outset, the Ok Tedi mine has been one of the country’s most important 
sources of foreign exchange and has accounted for a large percentage of the country’s annual 
GDP.15 Over the span of three decades, the mine had been dumping its waste into the Ok Tedi 
river. Thousands of people living along the river, who are dependent on the local natural 
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resources for the vast majority of their sustenance needs have been affected.16 The 
contaminated water resulted in the death of large numbers of aquatic life which was a major 
source of food for the indigenous people.17 Increased sedimentation in the river led to flooding 
of the riverbank lowlands which were traditionally used as farmlands. This in turn resulted in 
a significant reduction in the quality and quantity of plants, including sago trees, the staple 
food of majority of the communities.18 The people’s rights to health, adequate standard of 
living, food, water and healthy environment were severely undermined.19 
Although the PNG government allowed the OTML to dump its waste in the river, it did 
not provide any corresponding measures for mitigating the environmental impacts and resultant 
human rights effects it had.20 The government defended its stance on the grounds that the need 
to secure the economic benefits from the mine justified the human rights and environmental 
trade-off. The minister for Environment and Conservation at the time, Mr Jim Yer Waim was 
quoted as stating that: 
Everybody (ministers) were concerned with the effects on the Fly river and 
everybody was concerned with the welfare of the nation. We decided in 
favour of the people. It was the best decision any responsible government 
could take under the circumstances. In anything there has got to be give 
and take. We risked our environment in favour of the people.21 
Perhaps the most accurate summary of the rationale behind the government’s stance was given 
by The Times of PNG: 
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Because of political expediency, environmental experts say the 
government is foregoing the welfare and health of thousands of Western 
Province (Fly River) people and the environment of the nation to boost its 
financial capacity in a trying time.22 
The government’s decision was criticised as ‘an unjustifiable sacrifice of the rights and interest 
of the local population, and an outright capitalisation to pressure from the mining company 
which had consistently resisted the construction of a tailings dam because the cost would have 
made the whole enterprise economically unfeasible.’23 The government’s decision was clearly 
a calculated plan to secure economic revenue from Ok Tedi. The statement suggesting that it 
was ‘in favour of the people’ was one of political expediency that actually jeopardised the 
health and welfare of thousands of Fly River people.24  
As a result of the severe deprivations caused by the harmful activities of the companies, 
the affected communities initiated several legal proceedings against BHP and OTML in both 
Australia and PNG.25 In a bid to avoid liability arising from the suits, OTML and the PNG 
government concluded an agreement that OTML was to compensate all those who were 
affected by the mine on the condition that they abandon the suits filed against the companies. 
The agreement resulted in the Mining (Ok Tedi Eighth Supplemental Agreement) Bill of 1995 
which was to be codified into a law that would criminalise all future actions against OTML.26 
However, the Bill was widely criticised and was later rearranged resulting in the enactment of 
two separate but related pieces of legislation; the Mining (Ok Tedi Restated Eighth 
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Supplemental Agreement) Act 199527 and the Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal 
Proceedings) Act 1995.28 Although the new Acts abandoned the criminalisation of further 
prosecution of OTML, they contained several provisions that infringed the people’s rights to 
seek redress. While offering a package of 110 million Kina ($93million) to the affected 
communities, the Mining Act eliminated all previously available legal options for seeking 
compensation from OTML and its shareholders in the PNG courts, including those used in the 
existing law suits.29 It specifically excluded the application of any domestic law to the 
environmental and social impacts of the mine or to compensation claims arising from these 
impacts.30  
The Act established that any act or omission for which BHP and OTML were being 
sued were illegal and non-actionable.31 Therefore, the victims could no longer pursue civil 
claims against the company and consortium for these acts. Furthermore, the Compensation Act 
contained provisions that could be used by OTML and its shareholders as an absolute defence 
against any compensation claims against them.32 The Act established that its provisions would 
apply to foreign proceedings, and that any judgement against OTML obtained in a foreign court 
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could not be enforceable in PNG.33 Through this legal regime, OTML and its owners became 
virtually immune from legal action. Consequently, the indigenous people were forced to live 
with the deplorable conditions that resulted from the activities of BHP and OTML, while the 
corporations derived benefit from the vast resources in the region. 
Apart from situations like this one in Papua New Guinea, where host states have 
deliberately fashioned their laws to enable MNCs evade liability, in other instances, host states 
may have set up regulations such as anti-pollution and environmental legislations, that regulate 
TNC activity, however, their effective implementation and enforcement are usually not 
ensured. In fact, it has been said that in Nigeria ‘judges have developed a paternalistic attitude 
to the interpretation of some anti-pollution laws, against the background that nothing should 
be done to disturb the operations of oil trade which is the main source of the nation’s revenue’.34 
For instance, in the case of Allan Irou v Shell B.P,35 the judge rejected an application for an 
injunction in favour of the plaintiff whose land, fish pond and creek had been polluted by the 
defendants oil mining operations, his ratio decidendi being that, nothing should be done to 
disturb the operations of trade (i.e., in petroleum) which is the main source of the nation’s 
economy. The judge stated that: 
To grant an order would amount to asking the defendants [shell BP] to 
stop operating in the area…the interest of third persons must in some cases 
be considered, for example, where the injunction would cause stoppage of 
trade or throwing out a large number of working people.36 
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In rejecting another request for an injunction against the defendants in Chinda v Shell BP,37 the 
presiding judge described the plaintiff’s statement of claim demanding the restraint on Shell 
BP from operating within five miles of the plaintiff’s village due to the pollution its activities 
had caused, as an ‘absurdly and needlessly wide demand.’38  
 
3.2.1.2 Corruption of state officials 
The ability of host states to effectively regulate the activities of TNCs and sanction erring 
companies is evidently compromised by economic considerations of the states. Consistent with 
this trend is the fact that the immense value that host states place on the economic gains of 
TNC activities have influenced corrupt state officials to engage in unscrupulous practices that 
affect human rights.39  
Corruption has serious impact on human rights, especially economic, social and cultural 
rights. The duties accepted by states to take steps to maximise their available resources to 
achieve the progressive realisation of their duties under the ICESCR invariably involve the 
provision of services that generate large public service contracts which may create 
opportunities for corruption.40 For instance, where government officials divert public resources 
from education and health care because they have been bribed or for their personal 
aggrandisement, they are thereby diminishing any improvement or progress. 
In the context of business operations especially in the natural resources and extractive 
sector, state officials are not the only facilitators of corruption. The role TNCs play is very 
critical as many public sector corrupt practices will never take place without the assistance of 
corporate entities. These patterns of corruption are very evident in resource driven conflicts in 
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developing states.41 They typically involve the bribery of public officials by TNCs in order to 
allow them free reign to adopt unchecked practices in their operations to the detriment of the 
people living within the sphere of their operations.42 Corrupt leaders who are faced with 
situations of intra-state insurgency seek to build up their power bases by accumulating wealth 
from the bribes received from the TNCs to fight off threats from insurgent factions.43 They use  
the bribes to acquire weapons, ammunitions and pay outs for the military to aid in the conflicts 
that result in mass human rights violations, at the expense of the developmental needs of the 
state.44  
In 1971 Mobil oil, a US based company and predecessor of Exxon Mobil, discovered 
large gas resources in Arun, located in Aceh province, Indonesia.45 The yields from the produce 
in the gas fields contributed billions of dollars in revenue to the Indonesian national budget at 
the time. In return for exclusive access to the fields’ natural gas deposits, Mobil provided 
Indonesia’s military dictator, General Suharto, blank shares in Mobil Oil, among other forms 
of payment.46 Mobil oil continued its operations at the Arun site which, until 2001, was one of 
the largest and most profitable natural gas projects in the world.47 In 1976, Aceh became a site 
where violent separatists’ insurrection took place. Since then, it was held under direct military 
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control from 1990 to 1998. Military personnel stationed in the area were alleged to have 
violated several human rights of individuals living in the region including, torture, rape, 
extrajudicial execution, and forced disappearances of civilians.48 In the midst of the conflict, 
Mobil allegedly contracted with the notorious Indonesian military to supply security for its 
plant in Arun paying monthly and annual fees for their services and providing them with 
facilities and supplies.49 The situation has resulted in a long legal battle between Exxon Mobil 
and the inhabitants of the region.50 
This sort of collusion between governments and TNCs is not peculiar to Indonesia. For 
example, allegations of complicity in human right violations have also been made in South 
Sudan where the Canadian corporation, Talisman Energy, allegedly aided the Sudanese 
government in committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity against non-
Muslim Sudanese living in the area of Talisman’s oil concession by funding the Sudanese 
governments assault on the individuals in the region.51 Reports of other instances of TNC and 
host state collusion have been stated to have occurred in Burma, between the Burmese 
government and Unocal, and in Angola and Congo Brazzaville between Elf and the Angolan 
and Congolese governments, amongst others.52  
The extractive industry is replete with examples of the unwillingness of states to deal 
with corruption based human rights violations. These patterns expose the fact that victims 
would need to be able to hold TNCs directly accountable for their primary roles in initiating 
such practices. However, domestic regulation appears to be unsuitable for this purpose because 
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the state officials who are entrusted with creating an atmosphere for the realisation of human 
rights regulations engage in corrupt practices in concert with the TNCs.53 
 
3.2.2 Host states’ inability to regulate 
The perfunctory attitude towards the implementation of the host state’s duty to protect against 
human rights violations is not always due to the pursuit of economic gain or corruption. There 
are genuine circumstances where host states are unable to fulfil their human rights obligations. 
Many host states have weak institutional, legal and financial structures. Most times TNCs 
capitalise on these weaknesses to evade liability for their harmful acts.54 
 
3.2.2.1 Lack of sufficient legal, institutional and financial means to regulate 
In what has been termed, ‘the worst industrial accident in history’, a massive leak of lethal gas 
from a pesticide plant operated in Bhopal, India, by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), a 
subsidiary of the US company, Union Carbide Company (UCC) claimed thousands of lives 
and left thousands more injured.55 The gas leak resulted in the death of over 15,000 persons 
while thousands more, to this day, suffer health problems including, lung infections, 
neurological and reproductive disorders, and respiratory difficulties.56 Upon investigation, it 
was discovered that one of the major causes of the accident were technological failures.57 The 
plan for the health and safety systems of UCIL was highly substandard in comparison to that 
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of its US parent company, who owned controlling shares in UCIL.58 India’s general safety 
regulations were ineffective and its inability to provide safety standards for regulating the 
operations of UCIL were described as being ‘based on the paradigm of a labour intensive low-
tech industry.’59 The relevant government departments were underfunded and under staffed 
and the inspection systems were vastly inadequate to put the hazards under check.60 
The victims, in a consolidated lawsuit represented by the Government of India, brought 
a civil suit in the US District courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act, claiming against UCC, 
compensation and punitive damages to the tune of $3billion.  The hearing was focused on the 
admissibility of the suit since the events had occurred in India. The claimants’ lawyers argued 
seriously for a US hearing as US courts allowed greater opportunities for class actions and 
higher compensation for victims. They contended that:  
India had only incompletely emerged from the heritage of 
colonial rule…the Indian system is characterised by massive 
blockages of cases and enormous delays which can be 
considered a permanent feature of the Indian system…tort law 
in India is underdeveloped and (of all the tort law cases that had 
been entertained), none dealt with the problems arising from 
complex technologies…the bar in India does not possess the 
pool of skill, the fund of experience or the legal capacity to 
efficiently and effectively pursue massive and complex 
litigation… the Indian legal system contained a paucity of 
devices to prevent timely resolution of complex cases.61 
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Yet, in a decision that could be interpreted as either a deference to the Indian legal system or a 
victory for UCC, the US District Court held that the suit should be tried in India.62  
The Indian supreme court, upholding the decision of the high court, held that UCC was 
liable to pay a mere $470million in compensation against the $3billion that was initially 
claimed.63 This was for full and final settlement against all past and future claims.64 From the 
compensation sum, pay-outs of $4,000 was made for deaths, and $2,000 for serious injuries. 
These amounts were far less than the annual wages of factory workers in Bhopal.65 In other 
large class action suits in more developed states, high standards of safety regulations have been 
followed and higher levels of compensation have been paid.66 Public health disasters on larger 
scales in the US resulting from asbestosis related diseases caused by TNC activities have 
resulted in jury verdicts ranging anywhere between $1million to $20million per victim.67 
Disappointingly, the Indian courts did not refer to any international standard for determining 
damages for the class action. Rather, they justified their judgements by comparing it to the 
sums conventionally awarded in Indian personal injury and fatal accident cases.68  
The regulatory and judicial system failures in India afforded UCC the opportunity to 
get off cheaply at the expense of the victims in Bhopal. This typifies the challenges faced by 
many host states who do not have efficient legal systems to prevent MNCs from evading 
accountability. Unfortunately, MNCs have moved beyond capitalising on the regulatory 
loopholes in host states institutional set-ups. In certain situations, MNCs themselves create a 
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legal atmosphere to escape liability, rendering host states handicap when they face human 
rights violations of their citizens resulting from the MNCs activities.  
 
3.2.2.2 Deliberate action by TNCs to evade liability 
Chevron, (which succeeded Texaco), is one transnational corporate entity that has long been 
accused of causing an environmental and human rights catastrophe while conducting oil 
operations in the Ecuadorian Amazon for many decades.69 The attempt by the indigenous 
people in the region to pursue litigation and obtain redress and compensation for the harm done 
to their homelands has been met by several obstacles that have been placed in their path by 
Chevron.70 The suits had moved back and forth between the US and Ecuadorian courts since 
1993.71 Finally, in 2011 the indigenous people as claimants, won an $18 billion award in 
2011.72  
In a bid to evade liability resulting from the suits, Chevron initiated investment 
arbitration proceedings against Ecuador before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 
The Hague in 2009.73 The arbitration proceedings were based on two agreements that formed 
the US-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that was signed between the US and 
Ecuador while the suits against the corporation were ongoing.74 The Agreements were 
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concluded in secret, and key documents were withheld from the affected communities.75 They 
provided that the Ecuadorian government was to release Texaco from all current and future 
suits in exchange for remedial work and the payment of compensation.76 In its claim against 
Ecuador, Chevron stated that the proceedings against it were unfair and in contravention of the 
BIT.77 It requested that the arbitral panel stop Ecuador from pursuing the litigation or indemnify 
it from damages accrued as a result of the suits in the Ecuadorian court.78 The PCA issued an 
Interim Measures Order in favor of Chevron ordering Ecuador to take all measures to suspend 
enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment.79 Thereafter, it gave a ruling in favor of Chevron 
stating that Ecuador had not abided by its obligations under the BIT. Chevron was awarded 
$77.70 million.80 
The acceptance of Chevron’s arguments was disastrous to the indigenous people 
affected by the activities in the Amazon. It did not provide any avenue for the affected 
communities, who suffered the direct effect of the harmful activities, to become parties to 
arbitral the proceedings. The fact that they were blindsided by the arbitration proceedings 
exposes the fact that Chevron acted deliberately to circumvent the ongoing domestic 
proceedings without the participation of its adversaries in the relevant litigation. And Ecuador, 
being bound by the BIT to abide by any arbitral award made against it could not risk 
jeopardizing its reputation with regard to foreign investment generally.81 
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The legitimization of the harmful activities carried out by TNCs, coupled with the 
institutional, legal and technical difficulties involved in seeking redress for human rights abuse 
in developing host states enable TNCs to perpetrate human rights violations with impunity. 
Under these circumstances of unwillingness and incapacity of host states, victims of human 
rights violations resulting from TNC activities have to look elsewhere for ways of obtaining 
redress when their human rights are violated.82  
 
3.3 Home states and extraterritorial regulation of TNCs 
Home states are usually known to have higher human rights standards, functioning and non-
corrupt legal systems, financial and personal resources, and the necessary technology to 
conduct efficient investigation and prosecution.83 These factors make home states more 
attractive for victims to seek remedies for corporate human rights abuses.84  
Although jurisdiction is primarily territorial, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Lotus case espoused the principle that states are free, in principle, to legislate on 
any situation beyond their territorial boundaries, that they deem necessary so long as there is 
no recognized prohibitive rule to the contrary.85 However, after the Lotus decision, and 
beginning with the ‘Harvard Research on International Law’s Draft Convention on 
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Jurisdiction’, the international community has taken a more restrictive approach.86 It is now 
generally accepted that when a state intends to legislate on any issue extraterritorially, it must 
rely on a permissive principle for the exercise of such jurisdiction.87 Hence, home states must 
possess the capacity to regulate the conduct of their TNCs abroad under an internationally 
recognized principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to perform their due diligence duty 
to protect human rights. Five international principles are recognized in this regard.  
First, according to the ‘nationality principle’, a state can adopt legislation which 
governs the conduct of its nationals that are carried out in a foreign state.88 Because jurisdiction 
is exercised over a national who is allegedly the perpetrator of an offence, it is also referred to 
as the ‘active personality principle’.89 Second, the ‘passive personality principle’ which is a 
reverse of the nationality principle provides that a state can legislate extraterritorially where 
the victim of a harmful act is the national of the legislating state.90 Under the third principle, 
the ‘protective principle’, states can establish extraterritorial legislation over persons located 
abroad for engaging in acts that affect the internal or external security of the home state.91  The 
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fourth head of prescriptive jurisdiction is the so-called ‘effects doctrine’. This doctrine may 
apply where an extraterritorial offence causes some harmful effect in the legislating state, 
without representing an interest sufficiently vital to the internal or external security of the state 
in question to justify invoking the protective principle.92 Although the effects doctrine is 
controversial, it has been acknowledged by states and international judicial bodies.93 According 
to the fifth basis for extraterritorial legislation, the ‘Universality principle’, extraterritorial 
legislation is permitted in relation to offences committed by foreign nationals against foreign 
nationals.94 Such offences are however limited to a certain category of crimes that the 
international community recognizes as extremely prejudicial to the interests of all states. They 
include, torture, genocide, war crimes, piracy, slavery and crimes against humanity.95  
In the area of business and human rights, States have focused on the ‘nationality 
principle’ as a basis for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the subsidiaries of their 
TNCs operating abroad. However, doubts have been expressed as to the propriety of allowing 
a state to treat as its national, a foreign subsidiary incorporated under the laws of a host state, 
but managed, controlled or owned by TNCs registered in the state concerned.96 In the 
Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), appeared to exclude basing 
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the nationality of the TNC on that of its shareholders, at least in relation to diplomatic 
protection. In deciding that Belgium could not exercise diplomatic protection of shareholders 
in a Canadian TNC with respect to measures taken against that corporation in Spain, the ICJ 
recalled that under domestic law, there is a separation of the rights of the company and those 
of its shareholders, and that ‘the concept and structure of the company are founded on and 
determined by a firm distinction between the separate entity of the company and that of the 
shareholders, each with a distinct set of rights’.97 However, the ICJ in the same case 
acknowledged that ‘the law has recognized that the independent existence of the legal entity 
cannot be treated as an absolute’.98 It asserted that the veil separating the legal personalities of 
the company and that of its shareholders may be lifted in order to prevent the misuse of the 
privileges of legal personality both in national and international law.99  
Although the courts holding concerns the legal personality of the corporation and its 
individual shareholders, the same exception to the separate legal personality would apply where 
a shareholder is a corporate entity.100 It therefore follows that the independent existence of 
TNC subsidiaries and their parent companies cannot be treated as an absolute.101 Separate 
incorporation will be discarded to prevent the misuse of the legal personality in order to protect 
third persons or to prevent the evasion of legal requirements or of obligations.102 Thus, where 
the operations of a foreign subsidiary of a TNC go beyond the purposes for which it was 
originally intended to serve and results in human rights harm, the home state may exercise 
jurisdiction over such subsidiary in pursuance of its international human rights obligation to 
protect. 
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Based on the nationality principle, the United States of America, Australia, the United 
Kingdom and Canada had made efforts at setting extraterritorial legislation to ensure that their 
TNCs do not act contrary to the standards set by international human rights law abroad, 
unfortunately, their efforts failed.103 Taking a seeming universal approach towards the 
repression of certain internationally condemned acts, the US Alien Tort Claims Act has 
recorded some success in holding TNCs accountable for their human rights violations overseas. 
However, its increasingly narrowing extraterritorial reach has threatened its efficacy.104 
European states have taken a different approach which has a territorial focus. Using tort law, 
they typically look for a territorial connection with the host state where the human rights abuses 
occurred.105 This is usually the case when negligence of the TNC parent company can be 
established.106 As the parent company usually organizes its subsidiaries operations, its failure 
to live up to its duty of care has a structural connection. The identification of this connection 
is the basis upon which the extraterritorial regulation is established. Nevertheless, this too is 
not without its limitations.107 The following sections will address the attempts and 
accompanying limitations faced by the US, Australia, the UK and Canada, the US ATCA, and 
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3.3.1 Failed legislative attempts at extraterritorial regulation in Australia, US, UK and 
Canada  
In June 2000, the United States Corporate Code of Conduct Act (US Bill) was introduced to 
the US Congress.108 The US Bill required US nationals (including US based TNCs) employing 
more than twenty persons in a foreign state, either directly or through foreign subsidiaries, to 
implement the Corporate Code of Conduct covering a wide range of standards for protecting 
human rights in the foreign state. For instance, the Bill mandated the corporations to provide 
safe and healthy working places, provide fair employment including the prohibition of child 
and forced labour, respect international human rights standards and uphold responsible 
environmental protection and environmental practices. 109 The US Bill was referred to three 
congressional committees on the day of its introduction and was subsequently referred to 
subcommittees of each committee. After the US elections in 2000, the Bill was reintroduced in 
identical form in August 2001 and then in 2006 and again referred to various committees. 
However, none of the congressional committees took final action on the Bill. 110   
The US Bill was closely followed by the introduction of the Australian Corporate Code 
of Conduct Bill (Australian Bill) to the Australian senate in September 2000.111 The Australian 
Bill sought to impose and enforce internationally recognized standards in the areas of human 
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rights, the environment, labour and occupational health and safety on the conduct of any TNC 
incorporated in Australia with more than 100 employees in a foreign state.112 It also sought to 
regulate the activities of  the subsidiary of Australian TNCs, whether or not the subsidiary was 
incorporated in Australia.113 The Australian Bill included a requirement for all companies 
captured under its provisions to submit reports that included independent auditing of 
environmental impacts, statements of foreseeable risks in relation to overseas operations, 
statement in relation to any violation of environmental, employment, health and safety or 
human rights law standards of host states and ‘any other matter related to environmental, health 
and safety, employment and human rights standards observed by the corporation.’114 Following 
the recommendation by the Australian Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee for 
Corporations and Securities, the Bill was subsequently abandoned.115  
Later in 2003, a Corporate Responsibility Bill (UK Bill) was introduced in the UK 
Parliament.116 The UK Bill was to place obligations on MNCs incorporated in the UK whose 
annual turnover is £5million or more to carry out their activities in accordance with 
international standards as well as the laws of host countries with respect to environmental 
protection, public health and safety, employment and human rights.117 It required that directors 
of targeted TNCs to take all reasonable steps to minimize any negative environmental, social 
and economic impacts of their operations or proposed operations.118 The UK Bill also provided 
that parent companies would be directly liable for damages for the actions of their subsidiaries 
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where such actions resulted in serious environmental and human rights damage overseas.119 
The Bill, however, lapsed after it did not reach a second reading during the time allocated for 
debate.120  
Six years later, the Canadian Bill C-300 (Canadian Bill) was introduced to the Canadian 
Parliament in response to the increasing consensus over the attitude of its TNCs.121 The purpose 
of the Canadian Bill was to ensure that TNCs engaged in mining or oil or gas activities in 
developing states, and receiving financial support from the Government of Canada acted in a 
manner consistent with international environmental best practices and with Canada’s 
commitment to best environmental practices and international human rights standards.122 The 
Bill sought to introduce an individual complaints system from victims (including foreign 
victims) of corporate abuse, and an analysis of these complaints and decision from the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Trade.123 However, in a close vote of 140 
to 134, the Bill was defeated.124  
Although the different legislative attempts placed human rights obligations on the 
extraterritorial activities of TNCs in various ways and degrees, the failure of the Bills were 
based on a common ground. The US, Australian, UK and Canadian legislatures feared that 
unilateral extraterritorial regulation would place their MNCs at a competitive disadvantage. 
The Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee for Corporations and Securities in Australia 
expressed this concern when it stated that it was unacceptable that any legislation should imply 
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restrictions on only certain corporations.125 Critics of the Canadian Bill argued that if the 
Canadian bill had been successful, it would have put Canadian companies at a disadvantage in 
the mining, oil, and gas markets in comparison to their international competitors.126 This was 
so because provisions of the bill were not applicable to foreign controlled companies operating 
in Canada and it did not extend to Canadian companies operating in non-developing states.127 
The US business community has been generally averse to the idea of adopting unilateral 
extraterritorial regulations because of its tendency to grant superior bargaining power to non-
US TNCs in the global market.128 This issue was raised when the business community fiercely 
opposed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), claiming that it granted superior bargaining 
power to non-US competitors in international markets because they were unconstrained by the 
laws criminalizing transnational bribery.129 The failure of the UK Bill has also been attributed 
to the UK’s general lack of support for the idea of enacting legally binding instruments 
circumscribing the activities of its TNCs abroad because of its unfavourable effects on 
business.130 
In the light of the limitations to domestic extraterritorial legislation, victims of corporate 
human rights abuse have sought out other accountability mechanisms. A beacon of hope 
presented itself in form of the US Alien Tort Claims Act. 
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3.3.2 Human rights under the United States Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 
The ATCA is a US domestic statute that was adopted as early as 1789 by the US Congress. It 
grants the US Federal courts jurisdiction ‘over any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a  treaty of the United States.’131 For almost 200 
years, the ATCA lay dormant until the Filartiga v Pena-Irala132 decision which set the 
precedent for US courts to punish non-American citizens for tortious acts in violation of the 
law of nations or any treaty which the US is a party, that were committed outside the US. In 
that case, the Filartiga family contended that their son, Joelito Filartiga was kidnapped and 
tortured to death by Pena Irala, who was inspector general of Police in Paraguay at the time. 
Although the Filartiga family did not consist of US nationals and the crime was committed 
outside the US, the court held that ‘an act of torture committed by a state official against one 
held in detention violates established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence 
the law of nations’.133 And that under the clear language of the Alien Tort Statute, it could 
consider any claim that met three conditions: an action by an alien, for a tort, committed in 
violation of the law of nations.134 
The Filartiga decision had concerned alleged torture by a state official, but in a latter 
decision in the Kadic v Karadzic case, the court explained that the ATCA cannot only be 
invoked against state actors, but also against private individuals (i.e., non-state actors) for 
purely private acts.135 The court stated that the law of nations could be determined by looking 
at the works of jurists of public international law, general practice of states and judicial 
decisions recognising and enforcing the law of nations.136 Following this, the court found that 
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private persons indeed violate the law of nations including genocide and war crimes.137 The 
court went on to state that although customary international law recognises the violation of 
torture, it only does so when it is perpetrated under the colour of state authority.138 Kadic 
introduced a wave of ATCA litigation in which plaintiffs’ lawyers sought to hold TNCs 
responsible for human rights abuses that amounted to violations of the law of nations. Two of 
the most prominent of these cases are Doe v Unocal and Wiwa v Shell. 
In Doe v Unocal,139 the plaintiffs brought an action under the ATCA against the US 
based Unocal. It was alleged that Unocal, which hired the Burmese army to secure and protect 
its construction project in Burma, knowingly assisted the military in perpetrating violations of 
international human rights including, torture, murder, rape, pillage and forced labour.140 
Upholding the ATCA’s reach, the court found that because Unocal knowingly benefited from 
the forced labour and was well aware that the military had a record of abusing human rights, it 
either knew or should have known that the army units were committing human rights violations 
on its construction site. Doe v Unocal was settled in 2005 for an undisclosed sum. In Wiwa v 
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Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell),141 the plaintiffs alleged that Shell had collaborated with the 
Nigerian government in committing torture and murder, summary execution and other grave 
violations of international law of some of the leaders of the Ogoni people in Nigeria. The US 
Court of Appeal declared its competence to hear the case despite the fact that the wrongful acts 
were committed abroad, the plaintiffs were not resident in the US and Shell had its principal 
office in the United Kingdom. It stated that it had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the 
suit under the ATCA. On the eve of the trial, the case was settled out of court with Shell 
agreeing to pay $15.5 million as compensation to the plaintiffs.  
 
3.3.2.1 Limitations of the ATCA 
Although the courts in Doe v Unocal and Wiwa v Shell embraced wide ranges of subject matter 
jurisdiction over the defendant MNCs, the broad application of such jurisdiction was short-
lived.  
In 2004, the US Supreme Court considered the scope of the ATCA in its decision in 
Sosa v Alvarez-Machain.142 It found that the ATCA was merely a jurisdictional grant which 
did not give rise to new causes of action.143 The court suggested that there are limits to what 
the law can construe as violating the law of nations for the purpose of the Statute. It held that 
courts should not recognize claims under federal common law for violations of any 
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than 
in the 18th century paradigms when the ATCA was enacted.144 The court explained that the 18th 
century paradigms it referred to are violations of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors and piracy.145 However, it did not provide a specific test  to determine when a 
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norm has attained sufficient ‘content and acceptance among civilized nations’ to reach the 
stated paradigms in order to create a cause of action that can be brought under the ATCA.146  
Following the decisions in Kiobel v Shell, the overall application of the ATCA to 
transnational litigation involving TNCs and human rights violations has been threatened.147 In 
that case, a suit was brought against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and their joint subsidiary 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. The case can be traced back to the 
activities that took place in the 1990’s where the Ogoni people stood against the environmental 
and human rights violations resulting from the oil exploration activities of Royal Dutch Shell 
and its subsidiaries. In the midst of severe repression by the Nigerian government, nine leaders 
of the group including Dr Barinem Kiobel, were arrested and charged with specious crimes.148 
The leaders were tortured and eventually executed. Upon seeking asylum in the US, Dr 
Kiobel’s widow along with eleven others who were victims or the relatives of the victims, 
instituted and action under the ATCA in US district court against Shell and its subsidiaries. 
They contended, amongst other things, that Shell and its subsidiaries, were complicit with the 
Nigerian government in perpetrating the human rights abuses.149 After granting a certiorari for 
oral arguments on the question on whether TNCs could be sued under the ATCA, the court 
stated that under its existing precedent in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, it had to consider whether 
under international law, ‘corporate liability for a violation of the law of nations was well 
established by the civilised world and established with a specificity sufficient to provide a basis 
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for jurisdiction under the ATS.’150 The court went on to hold that it was not.151 The entire 
complaint was subsequently dismissed. The court’s rationale was that corporations have never 
‘been subject to any form of liability…under the traditional international law.’152 Based on this, 
it concluded that corporate liability could not be a ‘basis of a suit under the ATS’.153 
Granting an order of certiorari, the US Supreme Court ordered that the case be reargued. 
After the oral arguments had been heard, the court raised a different question- whether and 
under what circumstances the ATCA permits a cause of action for the extraterritorial conduct 
by TNCs which amount to violations of international law. 154 It did not however, rule on the 
question of whether international law recognised corporate liability, which could have 
answered whether corporations could be sued under the ATCA. Rather, it went on to hold that 
the ATCA was subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality, which provides that ‘when 
a statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial application, it has none.’155 It stressed that 
the mere fact that the ATCA refers to suits by aliens for torts in violation of international law 
does not imply an extraterritorial reach since such torts could occur either within or outside the 
US, and that the mere presence of a US corporation on US territory was not enough to rebut 
the presumption.156 Based on the facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the territory 
of the US, therefore, it was beyond the ATCA’s reach.  
It should however be noted that the presumption against extraterritoriality was 
previously based on the idea that the application of US law extraterritorially may amount to a 
violation of international law rules limiting the reach of domestic law.157 At the time of the 
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presumption, international law imposed jurisdictional limitations on the application of 
domestic legislation beyond the territorial boundaries of a state.158 However, the international 
law rationale for the presumption is no longer tenable because international law now recognizes 
several bases for the extension of domestic legislation extraterritorially.  
As an initial matter, it had been previously established in Sosa that the ATCA does not 
give rise to new causes of action. Rather it allowed federal courts to recognize causes of action 
based on sufficiently prescribed norms of international law.159 If the plaintiffs were merely 
asking the court to apply international law, it is unclear why the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is even applicable.160  
Even if the Supreme Court’s argument that international law prohibited the application 
of domestic laws extraterritorially were to be considered, it does not seem to justify the 
application of the presumption in Kiobel. Based on the international law principles of 
nationality, passive personality, the protective principle, the effects doctrine and the 
universality principle, extraterritorial legislation is permitted.161 However, since none of the 
parties in Kiobel were US nationals and none of the acts complained of had direct bearing on 
US territory, the first four principles cannot be relied on to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is general acceptance of the fact that there is a 
‘procedural agreement’ amongst States to criminally prosecute a limited group of universally 
condemned activities, including torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes-  
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crimes which are also considered as human rights violations.162 In light of this consensus 
concerning universal criminal jurisdiction, Justice Stephen Bryer in the case of Sosa v Alvarez 
Machain noted: 
The fact that this procedural consensus exists suggests that recognition 
of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms is consistent 
with principles of international comity. That is, allowing every nation’s 
courts to adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such 
cases will not significantly threaten the practical harmony that comity 
principles seek to protect. That consensus concerns criminal 
jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself 
suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening. 
That is because the criminal courts of many nations combine civil and 
criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by criminal conduct to be 
represented, and to recover damages, in the criminal proceeding itself. 
Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a 
significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.163 
Justice Breyer was obviously referring to the practice of civil law states, which allow victims 
of crime to attach civil claims for compensation to criminal prosecution (referred to as action 
civiles), to conclude that the international community’s consensus regarding universal criminal 
jurisdiction ‘necessarily contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well’.164 At 
the international level, this assertion is supported by the fact that pursuant to Article 75(2) of 
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the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ICC has the power to ‘make an 
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.’165 ‘Punishment and 
compensation represent two distinct, but complementary ways of condemning past, and 
deterring future, wrongdoing’.166 Thus, the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction is consistent 
with the justifications put forward for the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction under 
international law.  
The provision of appropriate reparation to victims of international crimes corresponds 
with the right to effective remedy in international human rights law. The various human rights 
treaties prescribe obligations for State parties to provide effective remedy for victims of human 
rights in the form of compensation, restitution or rehabilitation, according to the circumstances 
of each case.167 This requirement also finds expression in the general obligation to protect 
human rights, which has been interpreted by the various treaty bodies to include the 
responsibility of States to exercise due diligence to not only regulate, and investigate violations, 
but to also provide remedy to human rights victims.168 
Assuming the Kiobel allegations were true, the ATCA’s extraterritorial application 
would be consistent with international law because it falls within the scope of the universality 
principle as a basis for providing remedy for internationally condemned acts that also amount 
to human rights violations. This would be the legitimate starting point for the  petitioners in 
Kiobel to claim their right to remedy.  
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Nevertheless, the court stressed that the presumption against extraterritoriality could 
only be displaced where the claims ‘touch and concern the US…with sufficient force’, and that 
mere corporate presence was insufficient to displace the presumption.169 But no interpretation 
of what will touch and concern the US with sufficient force was given, leaving it open for lower 
courts to decide in subsequent litigation.  
The lower courts have already been quick to base their judgements on the Kiobel 
decisions to dismiss pending cases. In Balintulo et al v Daimler et al, the second circuit of the 
US court of Appeal held that corporate citizenship could not displace the presumption. It stated 
that ‘if all the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under 
Kiobel’.170 In Cardona v Chiquita Brands International the court held that the suits were barred 
under the presumption because the relevant conduct and the alleged torts occurred outside the 
US.171 However, in December of 2015, the second circuit of the Court of Appeal gave its ruling 
in the Arab Bank case.172 In considering the liability of the foreign defendant company for 
alleged harmful acts committed abroad, the court did not consider the touch and concern 
standard that was articulated in the Supreme Court decision in Kiobel, rather it confirmed the 
position in the first Kiobel decision, that corporations cannot be held liable for violations of the 
law of nations.173  
Upon its rehearing, it was acknowledged that when the court in Kiobel stated that mere 
corporate presence is insufficient to discharge the touch and concern requirement, it implied 
that corporate presence could perhaps ‘in combination with some other fact alleged’ be 
sufficient to confer ATCA jurisdiction over TNCs, suggesting the possibility of liability under 
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the ATCA.174 However, it failed to consider whether the case before it would have passed the 
touch and concern requirement. Judge Pooler, who wrote the lead dissenting judgement in the 
Arab Bank case rightly stated that the court may have erroneously framed the question when it 
asked whether there was a norm of corporate liability under international law applicable to 
corporations so as to bring claims against corporations within the ambit of the ATCA.175 The 
court was probably searching for a direct rule of corporate responsibility applicable to 
corporations.  
Besides the fact that corporate liability for human rights violations had long been 
recognised since the revival of the ATCA in Filartiga, it is also certain that the law of nations 
does not provide norms of liability that are applicable to specific actors.176 Rather, there are 
established norms of international human rights law for which every state is obligated to 
protect. According to the various human rights monitoring the implementation bodies, the 
obligation to protect requires that States adopt a standard of due diligence in discharging their 
obligations.177 This necessarily requires that States adopt regulatory, investigatory and punitive 
measures, and that these measures should be used diligently, to the best of the States’ abilities. 
In other words, States should use all the means reasonably available to them to protect human 
rights violations by third parties, regardless of whether the conduct occurs inside or outside of 
the their territories, as long as they have the capacity to effectively influence the activities or 
persons likely to commit or already committing the violation.178   
Although it is no secret that the views of the human rights treaty bodies lack an 
expressive formal binding character under international law, it is, however, also well known 
that in applying human rights treaty provisions, human rights courts refer to the general 
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comments of these bodies.179 Besides this, the duty of the various international human rights 
treaty bodies is to interpret the provisions of the treaties to ensure that States effectively 
discharge their human rights obligations. If the obligation to protect individuals against third 
party abuse, including TNCs is internationally recognised, it is necessary that this obligation 
applies in a way that the transnational character of a third party would not water down the 
content of the obligation. If States have the capacity to and are in a position to discharge their 
obligation to protect human rights beyond their national boundaries, the obligation should not 
be limited.  
Applying this reasoning to the Kiobel case, if the obligation to protect individuals 
against third party abuse, including TNCs is internationally recognised, and the ATCA, based 
on the permissive rules of international law provides jurisdictional means for which the 
obligation may be exercised, then the US courts are clearly in a position to effectively influence 
the activities of TNCs in such cases and should, therefore, do so. 
While some have expressed the view that the decisions in Kiobel and its progeny signal 
the end of ATCA litigation and probably the end of transnational litigation against TNCs for 
human rights violations, others have argued that the decisions have provided an opportunity 
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3.3.2.2 The Brussels Regulation 
No other domestic regulation is comparable to the US ATCA. However, there is an alternative 
that can achieve similar results. This involves the use of ordinary tort law to hold TNCs 
accountable for their harmful activities that amount to human rights violations. The EU 
Parliament through its resolution in 2002 and 2007 on the issue of foreign direct liability 
referred to the Brussels Regulation, (which became the Brussels Convention and now the 
Recast Brussels Convention), as providing the necessary judicial basis for cases involving 
foreign direct liability of TNCs before EU member states.181 The Regulations provide that, all 
EU States may entertain suits against corporations who have their principal place of business 
or registered offices domiciled within their territory.182 The cause of action is to be founded 
based on the law of each individual EU state, where the case is instituted.183 For the action to 
be maintained in relation to a human rights violation, such a claim must be actionable as a well-
established tort.184 For instance, in the case of torture, claimants would need to allege a 
domestic tort of assault, wrongful death for disappearance and killings, and negligence for 
injuries from unsafe working conditions and environmental damage.185  
Although the torts alleged are not labelled ‘torts in violation of international law’, suing 
under them can ensure liability and compensation for harmful conduct, just like in cases under 
the ATCA.186 The courts in the Netherlands have successfully applied the Brussels Regulation 
to transnational litigation involving harmful TNC actions abroad. In Akpan v Shell,187 a farmer 
and fisherman living in the village of Ikot Ada Udo in Akwa Ibom State in Nigeria claimed 
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that his farmland and fish ponds had been destroyed as a result of oil leaks from an oil 
installation belonging to Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), a 
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) incorporated in Nigeria.188 After about 629 barrels of 
oil had been spilled, an employee of SPDC stopped the leak.189 Upon its failure to compensate 
Akpan for the losses suffered as a result of the leak, Akpan sought to initiate proceedings in 
the District Court of the Hague against both RDS and SPDC. Akpan claimed that SPDC had 
breached its duty of care to prevent leaks and thus had committed a tort of negligence, and 
RDS, the Dutch parent company had violated the law by failing to enact guidelines instructing 
SPDC to prevent and adequately react to oil leaks.190 However, the defendants contended that 
the external nature of the claims required a stronger connection. In response to this, the court 
confirmed its jurisdiction over both SPDC and RDS citing the Brussels regulation.191 Given 
that SPDC is not domiciled in an EU state the court turned to the interpretation of Article 7(1) 
of the Dutch Civil Procedure Code, which provides that if a court has jurisdiction over one 
defendant it would be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction over the other, provided the rights 
of action are connected and a joint hearing would promote efficiency.192  Based on this, it found 
that the connection between the claims against both defendants was sufficient to justify a joint 
hearing.193 
 With the narrowing of the ATCA’s reach, and the decision in Akpan’s case, the EU 
state courts may appear to be viable fora for instituting cases against TNCs for their harmful 
activities abroad. Nevertheless, cases brought under the Brussels Regulations lack one crucial 
element- human rights. The necessity for cases under the regulations to be couched under the 
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law of tort forces claimants into a very small box. Plaintiffs have to fit all their cases within 
certain restrictive legal parameters.194 For instance, a violation of the right to food or to water, 
or even the right to life as in the Akpan case had to be brought as a claim in tort law for 
negligence. While the effects of the litigation may seem the same as ATCA cases, couching 
human rights claims as torts diminishes the significance of the harm. Framing the claims in 
human rights language sends a message that best interprets the views of the victims which 
causes the TNCs to reflect on the gravity of their acts. Also, the lack of legal expression in 
human rights terms diminishes the normative content of the state’s duty to protect human rights 
as it suggests that TNCs may not be liable for violations of human rights resulting from their 
harmful activities. 
 
3.3.3 The Doctrine of Forum Non-conveniens 
Even where it is established that a court has jurisdiction, it may not always exercise such 
jurisdiction in practice. In some instances, claims against TNCs in foreign states continue to be 
dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. 
Under the doctrine, the court is vested with the discretion to resist jurisdiction when the 
convenience of the parties and ‘the ends of justice’ dictates that the case should take place 
elsewhere.195 However, the doctrine has been used as a tool by parent companies of TNCs to 
defeat, delay and frustrate suits brought against it for alleged violation of human rights by its 
subsidiaries.196 Cassels describes the doctrine as a ‘shield from liability for injuries abroad.’197 
The shield has become almost infallible as most of the cases in which forum non conveniens 
was invoked by the courts have either been abandoned or settled out of court for small amounts 
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of compensation.198 The parameters of the doctrine have been addressed in many domestic 
courts, especially in US ATCA cases  and cases instituted against TNCs in the UK and EU 
member states. In order to illustrate the difficulties posed by the doctrine some of these 
decisions will be cited.  
 
3.3.3.1 Application of forum non conveniens in US courts 
In the US, the basis for dismissal of a suit on forum non conveniens grounds is twofold.199 First, 
the defendant must show that there is an adequate alternative forum, and second,200 the 
defendant has to show the court that certain public and private factors tilt in favour of a 
dismissal.201 In Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert,202 the public and private interest factors were 
listed as including, access to proof, availability of witnesses and means to secure their 
attendance, proximity of the premises if relevant to the action, and considerations of the 
enforceability of a judgement.203 Public interest factors include, congestion of courts, 
appropriateness of having localised cases litigated in their home states, and burden of jury 
actors. Because Gilbert concerned choice between two domestic fora (New York and Virginia), 
the court did not give any guidance as to the weight to be attached to the factors for cases where 
the alternate forum is a foreign country.204 In the case of Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno,205 the 
Court explained the factors in their application to foreign forums where it stressed that no 
decision of a foreign plaintiff to bring a case in a US court should receive substantial deference 
than the same decision by US citizens or residents. The court did not, however, emphasize on 
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any of the forum non conveniens requirements. Rather it stated that ‘if central emphasis was 
placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very 
flexibility that makes it so valuable.’206 The court left it to lower courts to apply the doctrine 
and weigh the competing factors in individual cases. As a result, many TNCs have taken 
advantage of the doctrine to limit their liability in suits brought by foreign plaintiffs.  
In the Bhopal case,207 the forum non conveniens doctrine was a major basis for 
dismissal in the US courts. Following the plaintiff’s contention about the unsuitability of the 
Indian legal system to entertain the suit, the defendants argued that nearly all records relating 
to liability were in India and not in the US.208 Also, important safety inspection documents and 
inspection officers themselves were located in Bhopal, India.209 But the main focus of the 
courts final analysis was based on the nationality of the plaintiffs. The court stated that ‘the 
additional presence in India of all but less than a handful of claimants underscores the 
convenience of holding the trial in India and because plaintiffs are not US nationals, their forum 
choice was not entitled to much deference.’210 
In Aguinda v Texaco211 Ecuadorian plaintiffs sued Texaco Inc. for severe contamination 
and destruction of their communities. They alleged that Texaco’s transnational harmful 
environmental activities in the region negatively impacted on the lives of thousands of people 
in Ecuador and Peru. The US District Court approved the Ecuadorian forum because tort claims 
similar to those alleged in this case had been successfully prosecuted in Ecuador. Furthermore, 
several United States courts had previously found that Ecuador was a reasonable venue to 
address similar claims. With this support, the first portion of the Piper v Reyno test had been 
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satisfied. The second-stage of the test required the defendants to demonstrate that the Gilbert 
factors weighed so heavily in their favour as to tip the plaintiff-biased scale in their direction. 
First, the defendants argued that all plaintiffs were foreigners. Based on past precedent, this 
type of plaintiff is granted less deference. Secondly, relevant governmental officials lived in 
Ecuador. These key witnesses would be silenced in a US trial because the Government of 
Ecuador refused to waive sovereign immunity. Thirdly, they stated that only minimal and 
insignificant ties linked the US owned Texaco to its Ecuadorian subsidiary. The court noted 
that the dispute was primarily between Ecuadorian citizens and the Republic of Ecuador, and 
that Ecuador’s interest in the case was more substantial than that of the US. In the court’s 
opinion, this case has everything to do with Ecuador and nothing to do with the United States.’ 
The trial was dismissed from the US. 
The dismissal of cases based on FNC grounds is complemented by the high probability 
that the plaintiffs will not be able to pursue their claim elsewhere. A penurious plaintiff may 
face difficulties reinitiating the litigation in another forum as many states do not offer 
contingent fee systems. Therefore, where a plaintiff cannot afford a lawyer in another state, 
such a plaintiff will be forced to forfeit his case. 
Even in instances where the plaintiff can afford a lawyer, the substantive law in the 
alternative forum may prevent the plaintiff from seeking compensations. Piper v Reyno 
suggests that the court has the discretion to dismiss an action from the US even where the 
plaintiff shows that the law of the forum is less favourable. A decision to dismiss on forum non 
conveniens grounds not only denies the plaintiff the power of choosing a forum but may also 
cause him to forfeit his cause of action.  This thwarts the very goals of fairness and convenience 
that the forum non conveniens doctrine was designed to achieve. The courts ought not to 
dismiss cases on grounds of forum non conveniens unless they are satisfied that such 




of involved corporations.212 A decision to dismiss when this is not the case may cause the 
claimant to forfeit his cause of action denying him his access to effective remedy which is a 
corollary of the states’ duty to protect.213 As previously stated, states are required to take all 
necessary measures in ensuring that victims of human rights are adequately protected, 
including measures of prevention and remediation. Failure of the courts of a state to provide 
adequate remedy when it is in a position to do so means that it has failed to carry out its duty. 
 
3.3.3.2 Forum non Conveniens in the UK and EU 
The English courts have demonstrated their willingness to entertain matters that involve 
liability of TNCs for their acts abroad. In fact, English courts have taken more favourable 
positions to the claimant when faced with similar jurisdictional issues like the cases under the 
ATCA. Of note is their treatment of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
In the United Kingdom, the contemporary doctrine of forum non conveniens is derived 
from the Judgement of the House of Lords in Spiliada Mar. Corp v Consulex Ltd.214 In this 
case, the House of Lord provided a two-stage test for the establishment of forum non 
conveniens. The defendant must show that there is an alternative forum that is ‘clearly or 
distinctly’ more appropriate than the English Court, premised upon connecting factors showing 
that the alternative forum demonstrating that the alternative forum has the closest and most 
substantial relation to the dispute.215 Where the court is satisfied that the defendant has carried 
out this task, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff who will then show that the court should not 
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dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds because justice cannot be achieved in the 
alternative forum.216  
This approach was taken in Connelly v RTZ Corp Plc,217 where the plaintiff instituted 
an action against a UK parent company for its failure to adequately control working conditions 
at its Namibian subsidiary. The working conditions allegedly led to the plaintiff contracting 
laryngeal cancer.  The plaintiff was unable to obtain legal aid in Namibia and the technical and 
legal issues could not be litigated in Namibia. Whereas, in England, he could either obtain legal 
aid or get a lawyer on a ‘no win, no fee’ basis.218 The House of Lords allowed the case to be 
brought before a UK court on the basis of the practical obstacles he faced in Namibia.219  The 
court stated that: 
The availability of financial assistance in this country coupled 
with its non-availability in the appropriate forum, may 
exceptionally be a relevant factor in this context. The question, 
however, remains whether the plaintiff can establish that 
substantial justice will not in the particular circumstances of the 
case be done if the plaintiff has to proceed in the appropriate 
forum.220 
The decision in Connelly enabled the plaintiffs in Lube and others v Cape Plc,221 to conclude 
their claim in England which was continuously traced up and down the court system for three 
years. In that case, the plaintiffs who suffered from asbestosis related diseases due to their 
exposure to health and safety hazards while working for a South African subsidiary of the 
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British owned Cape Plc, sued the company in the English High court, asking for compensation. 
The defendant subsequently altered its corporate structure in South Africa and soon thereafter 
it no longer had assets in South Africa. After an application to stay the proceedings on grounds 
of forum non conveniens had been granted at the trial stage, the decision was upturned on 
appeal. The House of Lords, following the line of reasoning similar to that used in Connelly 
held that, under Spiliada, England was the appropriate forum to settle the matter, since under 
the relevant factors, substantial justice will not be obtained in the alternative forum.222 
Similarly, in Lulongwe and others v Vendata plc,223 the Supreme Court found that the 
claimant group of penurious Zambian villagers could proceed with their claim in England, 
notwithstanding that Zambia was overwhelmingly the proper place for the claim to be tried.224 
The court stated that the crucial factor to be considered in allowing such a case is that ‘there is 
a real risk that the claimants would not obtain substantial justice in the alternative foreign 
jurisdiction, even if  it would otherwise have been the proper place or the convenient or natural 
forum’.225 The court went on to note that ‘if there is a real risk of the denial of substantial 
justice in a particular jurisdiction,’ then it is obvious ‘that it is unlikely to be a forum in which 
the case can be tried most suitably for the interests of the parties and the ends of justice.’226 
The above decisions reflect the idea behind the doctrine of forum necessitatis, where a 
court other than that which has the strongest nexus to a claim could consider the claim in order 
to avert a denial of justice.227  The doctrine exists as a separate jurisdictional category in a 
considerable number of domestic legal systems, notably in Europe and Canada.228 However, 
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the forum necessitatis doctrine is rarely applied in practice, even less so in business and human 
rights cases, where the victims’ right of access to justice is nonetheless crucial.229 From the 
design and practice of the doctrine in European and Canadian legal systems, there are two 
apparent conditions for its application: (1) the impossibility or unreasonableness of the plaintiff 
bringing his case in an alternate forum; and (2) a connection between the case and the 
jurisdiction where the plaintiff requests the assertion of forum necessitatis. Although these two 
elements are common to most provisions on forum necessitatis, their precise content and the 
threshold that have to be met differ between states, with some still being a matter of internal 
debate.230 
There are other in the UK and EU that may explain why the EU and the UK still present 
challenges for extraterritorial litigation. In relation to the procedural rules and the types of claim 
brought by claimants, the United States offers more advantageous procedural rules, including 
extensive discovery options, class action suits, and punitive damages. In English and Dutch 
courts on the other hand, the losing party typically pays the other side’s substantial litigation 
costs. This serves as a source of serious discouragement to potential plaintiffs who are usually 
penurious. The Connelly, Cape PLC and Thor Chemicals cases were all publicly funded by the 
UK Legal Services Commission. This means that the lawyers representing the claimants had a 
steady stream of funding for their expenses and legal fees. However, in the UK, obtaining such 
public funding is no longer realistic. Cases are now run on a no-win no fee basis.231 Although 
NGO’s may be allowed to litigate on behalf of the victims, class actions are not generally 
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facilitated, not even for transnational human rights and environmental claims that usually 
involve many victims. 
 
3.3.4 The twin principles of separate legal personality and limited liability 
Even where the victims of human rights violations resulting from TNC operations are able to 
overcome the forum non conveniens obstacle, there is no guarantee that they will be successful 
in getting remedies for their violations. In the very limited situations where prosecution can be 
secured, the foreign subsidiary who committed the harmful act may not have the economic 
capacity to compensate the victims, especially as TNC related violations usually involve a large 
number of victims. Some parent companies wilfully keep their foreign subsidiaries 
economically deficient, as a result, the subsidiaries are incapable of compensating the victims. 
In other instances, the subsidiaries, who are the apparent actors may just be following the 
instructions, policies and decisions of the parent company which result in human rights 
violations. When faced with these situations of uncertainty, it is more feasible for victims to 
sue the centre of control, which is the parent company. However, two principles that regulate 
the corporate system make this difficult: The ‘separate legal personality’ of the corporation 
from its shareholders or owners, and the ‘limited liability’ of investors, protecting them from 
business risks to the amount of their investments.232  
These twin principles developed at a time when the concept of parent and subsidiary 
corporations was unknown, and corporations where prohibited from acquiring or holding 
shares in other corporations unless express permission was granted by statute.233 Nevertheless, 
the principles were extended to govern the relations of parent and subsidiary corporations of a 
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corporate group based on the assumption that if they were applicable to shareholders, they 
should also be applicable where shareholders are corporations.234 This extension causes an 
anomaly because it makes no distinction between TNCs as investors and investors simpliciter. 
Parent companies are not passive investors like in simple corporations. In the multinational 
corporation setting, both the parent and the subsidiary companies carry out business in 
common, with the parent maintaining central control.235 The twin doctrines as applied to TNCs 
are stretched beyond their original intent of protecting investors to protecting the TNC itself.  
By appropriating the doctrine of separate legal personality of simple corporations to the parent-
subsidiary relationship within a corporate group, the parent company can misappropriate the 
fiction of separation and shift the liability to those shoulders which cannot bear it.236 This 
inappropriate extension results in situations of irresponsibility for human rights violations. 
It means that no matter how much environmental damage a 
corporation causes, no matter how much debt it defaults on, no 
matter how many Malibus explode or tires burst or workers and 
consumers die of asbestosis, no matter how many people it puts 
out of work without their pension benefits or other protections; 
in short, no matter how much pain it causes, the corporation is 
responsible for paying damages (if at all) only in the amount of 
assets it has.237 
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The results stemming from the misapplication of the twin principles of separate legal 
personality and limited liability are alarming when it is used by parent companies to restrict 
and even avoid altogether, liability for its actions that cause human rights violations.238 
However, it is fair to note that states have recognised the difficulties presented by the 
twin principles and have set out various techniques to limit their effects.239 Three major 
methods are employed; piercing the corporate veil, the enterprise theory, and the direct liability 
of parent companies. 
 
3.3.4.1 Piercing the corporate veil 
Piercing the corporate veil is a judicially imposed approach, applied mainly by US courts to 
evade the obstacles presented by the separate legal personality principle. Upon incorporation, 
the principle of separate legal personality places a conceptual veil distinguishing the TNC from 
its subsidiaries, preventing the parent company from being held liable for its subsidiaries’ 
wrongful acts is set up. But in certain situations, ‘when the court finds that the subsidiary 
corporations’ existence is under the control of the parent to the extent that it has no independent 
reason for its own existence, the subsidiary would be found to be a mere agent or 
instrumentality of the parent company.240 The courts will pierce the corporate veil, disregarding 
the separation between the parent and subsidiary corporations, and treat them as a single 
economic unit allowing the acts of the subsidiary to be imputed to the parent company.241 
Following this reasoning, the court in Bowoto v Chevron Texaco held that Chevron was 
responsible for the alleged complicity of its Nigerian subsidiary, Chevron Nigeria limited, with 
the Nigerian military in violently supressing protests against the country’s activities in the 
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region.242 It stated that due to the volume, content and timing of communication between 
Chevron Texaco and Chevron Nigeria limited especially on the day of the protest, it was 
evident that chevron ‘exercised more than the usual degree of direction and control which a 
parent exercises over its subsidiary’.243 Chevron Nigeria Limited was therefore held to be an 
agent of Chevron Texaco. 
Apart from the circumstances stated in the Bowoto case, courts consider an unlimited 
variety of factors to establish that the subsidiary was actually under the control of the parent 
company. They look at whether there was any form of misrepresentation or fraudulent or 
wrongful conduct; whether there was an intermingling of funds; whether there was a failure to 
follow corporate formalities; the independence of the company’s board of directors; whether 
there was common decision making between the parent and the subsidiary; common policies; 
common policy makers; and whether the parent and subsidiaries share directors and officers.244 
However, there is no laid down criteria or hierarchical order in which these factors may be 
applied.245 This could serve as a major disincentive for claimants to pursue claims against 
TNCs as it creates uncertainty in pleading their case. The requirement of control necessary 
implies the provision of some sort of evidence (such as minutes of meetings and account 
statements, etc.) which is in the custody of the TNCs.246 It is highly unlikely that the TNC will 
release such information to claimants to be used against them during trial. 
Another limitation of this approach is that it may discourage parent companies from 
exercising strict control over the activities of their subsidiaries even where they are in a position 
to do so.247 As the corporate veil will only be pierced when it is established that the subsidiary 
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has no independent existence of its own, abandoning the subsidiaries to monitor and supervise 
their own day to day operations will serve in parent companies’ best interests. 248This will 
however be detrimental to the interest of those communities that are host to subsidiary 
companies with inefficient and ineffective health and safety technology and equipment. 
 
3.3.4.2 The single economic entity theory 
The single economic entity theory is a variation of the piercing the corporate veil approach. In 
situations where a parent company and its subsidiaries are not operated as wholly separate 
entities but instead combine their resources to achieve a common business purpose, the courts 
will treat both the subsidiary and parent as a single economic entity. Flowing from this 
reasoning, the TNC is regarded as a ‘conglomeration of unity of a single entity, each unit 
performing a specific function, the function of the parent company being to provide expertise, 
technology, support and finance. In so far as there is any result from negligence in respect of 
any of the parent company functions then the parent will be held liable.’249  
The enterprise theory appears to be a more viable approach but it has its limitations. In 
order to establish that the subsidiary is part of a conglomeration of entities functioning under 
the guidance and support of the parent company, it would be necessary to show that the parent 
has some form of functional or behavioural control over the subsidiary. 250Just like in the case 
of piercing the veil, requiring control can serve as a disincentive to parent companies and 
encourage them to distance themselves from the subsidiaries so as to avoid liability instead of 
taking steps to ensure that harmful practices are avoided.251 
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3.3.4.3 The direct liability of the parent company 
Rather than impute the action of the subsidiaries to the parent company of a multinational 
corporation, some courts have focused on the direct negligence of the parent company for 
failing to exercise due diligence over its subsidiaries activities where it is in a position to control 
such activities.252 The main allegation is that the parent company breached its duty of care that 
it owed to those affected by the activities. In the case of Cape v Chandler,253  the Court of 
Appeal in the UK gave a ruling on the issue of parent company liability. The court stated that 
the recognition of the parent company’s liability did not result in the piercing of the corporate 
veil. Cape plc was not liable for the acts of its subsidiary, but it was liable for its own failure 
to ensure that the working conditions were safe when all indications showed that it was in a 
position to do so.  
The Chandler decision was considered in the Dutch court in Akpan v Shell, when it 
rendered its judgement against RDS for failing to prevent the oil spillage caused by its Nigerian 
subsidiary SPDC.254 Unlike in the Chandler decision, the Akpan case did not relate to an 
employee of the subsidiary, it related to the communities situated within the vicinity of its 
operations. In determining the liability of RDS, the district court found that the special relations 
or proximity that exists between a parent company and the employees of its subsidiary that 
operates in the same state, cannot be considered to be equivalent to ‘the proximity between the 
parent company of an international group of oil companies and people living within the vicinity 
of its pipelines and oil facilities of its subsidiaries in other countries.’255 Otherwise, the duty of 
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care will be extended to a virtually unlimited group of persons in many countries.256 The court 
released RDS from responsibility for negligence.257  
This decision has served as a setback to victims of corporate human rights violations. 
The test of proximity that was set based on the facts of the Chandler case will most likely not 
apply to a large number of cases where corporate violations are alleged, as interference by 
TNCs with the rights of communities represent a large percent of cases of corporate human 
rights violations.258 Though the Chandler decision is a positive one, it is the only one of its 
kind that has been decided on the merits.259 All other cases were either dismissed on 
technicalities or settled out of court.260 If there were clearly set decisions regarding direct 
liability of parent companies for acts and omissions of victims of corporate human rights abuse, 
TNCs will be more conscious of the human rights impact of their activities. In the absence of 
such clear decisions, victims are one more step behind in obtaining remedies for violations of 
their human rights. 
 
3.3.5 Sovereignty and non-intervention 
Apart from the setbacks presented by the complexities of the corporate structure, home states 
are faced with the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. According to the basic tenet 
of the principle, a state has the prerogative to make decisions on their individual economic, 
social or political matters without the interference by other states.261 As previously noted, the 
different TNC subsidiaries may be subject to uniform control but legally, they form separate 
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entities upon incorporation abroad. Accordingly, in relation to their legal personality, 
subsidiaries operating abroad are independent from their parent companies as separate 
corporate bodies.262 What this means is that the foreign subsidiaries are primarily subject to the 
legal order of the host state. Developing host states use this as a common argument in defence 
of their lax human rights regulations.263 As a result, home states are reluctant to regulate the 
conduct of their TNCs abroad as they feel that the exercise of such jurisdiction could be a direct 
way criticizing host state regulations and of impinging on the host state sovereignty, resulting 
in a strain in diplomatic relations between and among states.264  
But it has since been acknowledged that certain internationally recognized human rights 
impose limits to state sovereignty, and that such matters cannot be said to belong to the 
exclusive national jurisdiction of the territorial state.265 The aftermath of the second world war 
which led to the adoption of the UN Charter, the Bill of Rights and subsequent human rights 
treaties, emphasize this fact by stressing that the way in which a state treats persons within its 
territory is no longer its exclusive prerogative.266 It is now the concern of the entire international 
community. This was confirmed by the ICJ in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v 
Uganda, where it restated its opinion in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, that human rights law may extend 
beyond a state’s boundaries in respect of core human rights instruments.267  
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Since all states are obligated to protect, respect and promote human rights and are duty 
bound to ensure that all persons and entities within their territory or control comply with human 
rights standards, it is necessary that certain laws with some extraterritorial flavour are set in 
place.268 By seeking to regulate the activities of foreign subsidiaries in host states through the 
adoption of extraterritorial legislation, home states are not foisting their legislation on host 
states themselves, rather, they are regulating the specific activities carried out by the 
subsidiaries so that they do not cause harm to the individuals in the host state.269 These sort of 
regulations only affect the parent company operating abroad through its subsidiary, meaning 
that the extraterritorial regulation of TNCs is even less extraterritorial in nature than it may first 
appear. Rather than being seen as criticizing host state regulations, such extraterritorial 
regulation should be regarded as a way of securing the rights of individuals when the host state 
is unwilling and unable to do so.270 Home state regulation is better seen as a matter of 
cooperation amongst states rather than a source of conflict and criticism of host state 
regulations.  
This notwithstanding, the principle of sovereignty continues to pose an obstacle to 
extraterritorial regulation. Although the concept of sovereignty is not absolute, it is limited by 
a set of international human rights law norms. The international community agrees, for 
example, that torture, slavery, forced labour, and genocide form intolerable violations of 
international human rights.271 These limited set of fundamental human rights norms have 
become part of customary international law, which all states are mandated to prevent or take 
steps to protect.272 Unfortunately, the myriad of economic, social and cultural rights’ violations 
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that are usually attributed to transnational corporations (for example, the contamination or 
destruction of the environment resulting in a deprivation of the right to food, water and 
adequate living standards) receive far less attention. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The general agreement that states are obligated to protect human rights which could be 
threatened by the activities of TNCs faces serious challenges. The preliminary obligation rests 
on the territorially competent host states where the potential violations occur. Unfortunately, 
the power of TNCs coupled with the economic interests of host states make efficient human 
rights protection almost impossible. Home state regulation could offer an alternative to host 
state regulation, however due to the twin corporate principles of limited liability and separate 
legal personality, state sovereignty and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, home state 
extraterritorial regulation has been ineffective. The US Alien Tort Claims Act which was 
considered the most powerful transnational litigation tool has been severely limited by the 
decision in Kiobel and preceding judgements. Although the EU Regulations have abrogated 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, serious procedural impediments prevent victims from 
instituting actions in EU states. Besides, it cannot be the duty of a single national jurisdictions 
to solve problems that concern the entire international community. States are understandably 
reluctant to establish this kind of jurisdiction because of the fear of placing their TNCs on a 
competitive disadvantage in relation to the TNCs of other states. This further explains why 
home states are also unable to tackle the problem human rights violation by TNCs. It is evident 
that the existing domestic mechanisms alone are incapable of controlling the conduct of TNCs. 
This has made the realization of the state’s duty to protect almost impossible. A viable option 
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that may be applied to ensure that human rights are protected is to impose regulations at the 
international level. This way the exact contents of the state’s duty to protect will be spelt out 
and there will be uniform human rights standards for TNCs that will eliminate the competitive 
disadvantage feared by states. The international community has made attempts at setting up 
such standards through the adoption of various voluntary and soft law initiatives. The next 
chapter discusses these initiatives and examines their effect on the protection of human rights 





CHAPTER FOUR  




The circumstances leading to the inadequacy of current state-based mechanisms in addressing 
corporate abuse of human rights demonstrate that the state has lost some of its status as both 
the primary threat to human rights as well as the primary agent that can effectively protect 
them.1 In the face of this reality, the international community has sought ways in which to 
improve the regulation of corporate activities.  
The 20th century saw the introduction of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
movement.2 Rather than focus on the state-based indirect method of holding corporations 
accountable for their human rights abuse, this movements sought to place certain societal 
expectations and demands directly on businesses, while encouraging them to integrate such 
demands and expectations into their normal operational strategies.3 However, the focus on 
societal expectations in the international CSR initiatives present challenges as to what criteria 
TNCs should adopt in addressing societal demands, especially as they operate in transnational 
contexts and these demands would invariably differ from state to state. Following this, there 
has been a proliferation of a myriad codes of conduct, reporting initiatives and principles which 
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have sought to provide a common baseline whose violation must be prohibited irrespective of 
where the violation occurs.4 This is said to be where the CSR initiatives and human rights 
intersect.5  
There is practical consensus on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its 
related UN Documents on human rights. Apart from the fact that the UDHR is based on an 
explicit agreement of all but few states in the world, there is also consensus that all major 
cultures and moral traditions contain norms that are supportive of the idea of human rights.6 
Thus, several CSR initiatives have adopted human rights standards as the baseline for the 
application of some of their provisions to corporate entities. However, the fact that these 
voluntary international initiatives seek to apply human rights standards contained in 
internationally recognised human rights documents directly to corporate entities does not attest 
to their adequacy in regulating corporate activities in relation to human rights.  
The adequacy of a regulatory initiative rather lies in its ability to achieve the objectives 
for which it is established.7 Thus, a regulatory initiative which seeks to ensure corporate 
responsibility for human rights may be considered adequate or effective when it provides the 
necessary standards that encourage or persuade TNCs, as far as possible, to adopt human rights 
standards in the course of their operations, and, when it also provides appropriate sanctions or 
redress where the TNCs are not so encouraged.8 This chapter argues that the international 
corporate responsibility initiatives face several challenges that prevent them from meeting the 
adequacy criteria. 
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In establishing this argument, the chapter begins with a survey of the six most 
prominent international initiatives, which include; the Draft United Nations Code of Conduct 
on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC),9 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines),10 the 
International Labour Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of principles concerning 
multinational enterprises and social policy (ILO Tripartite Declaration),11 the United Nations 
Global Compact,12 the United Nations Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights (UN Norms),13 and 
the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles).14 
Then, the specific challenges that they present will be discussed with a view to introduce the 
discussion on the possibility of a more viable system of accountability for corporate abuse of 
human rights.15  
 
4.2 The United Nations Draft Code of conduct for Transnational Corporations 
Discussions on the emergence of international regulatory initiatives concerning the human 
rights impacts of corporate activities usually begin with the UNs failed effort at developing an 
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international code of conduct for TNCs.16 In 1972, the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) requested the Secretary-General in consultation with governments, to appoint from 
public and private sectors a group of eminent persons to study the role of TNCs and their impact 
on the process of development and submit recommendations for appropriate international 
action.17 Based on the group’s recommendations, the ECOSOC, in 1974, adopted resolutions 
to establish the United Nations intergovernmental Commission on Transnational Corporations 
and the United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) to assist the ECOSOC 
in dealing with the issue of transnational corporations.18 The intergovernmental commission 
and the UNCTC launched the creation of a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 
formulating various drafts over a period of fifteen years, and eventually producing its last draft 
in 1990.19 
The 1990 Draft Code was composed of four sections. The first focused on the regulation 
of the activities of TNCs in host states, which included various general rules addressed to TNCs 
to ensure respect for the national sovereignty of the state, adherence to economic and 
development goals of host states, respect for human rights, and to avoid corruption, and non-
interference with the host states internal affairs.20 The second part concerned the treatment of 
TNCs and asserted certain rights of host states but also described certain protections to be 
accorded to TNCs, such as the right to fair and equitable treatment.21 The third part focused on 
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cooperation amongst states in the form of exchanges of information and consultations, whilst 
the fourth part called on states to disseminate the code, to observe its provisions within their 
territories, and to report to the United Nations on their implementation.22 The UNCTC was to 
receive the state reports and conduct periodic assessments of the implementation of the Draft 
Code.23  
Although states shared a common support for the Draft Code, their interests and 
objectives varied with their experiences as sources or recipients of TNC investment. The 
developed states advocated for focused attention on provisions that would protect TNCs from 
discriminatory treatment or other behaviour of host states (developing states) which would be 
in violation of certain minimum standards, while the developing states wanted regulations that 
concentrated on ensuring that TNCs would be prohibited from interfering with their political 
independence or their national defined economic objectives.24 Developing states emphasised 
reliance on host state national laws and regulations and resisted having the code impose 
constraints on host governments.25 Conversely, developed states regarded the national laws of 
the host states as often too complex, inadequate or non-monolithic and advocated having the 
code refer to international law as the relevant body of law.26 Regarding the conduct of TNCs, 
developing states pushed for detailed and mandatory rules regulating their operations, while 
developed states preferred more general language to which TNCs would voluntarily adhere.27 
A compromise on these issues could not be reached and the Draft was never adopted. 
By 1994, the UN significantly downgraded the intergovernmental commission and terminated 
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the UNCTC.28 Nevertheless, the Draft Code made a significant contribution by providing 
guidance for other international regulatory initiatives that followed, even outside the UN. 
 
4.3 The OECD Guidelines 
One such non-UN groups that pursued the establishment of codes to regulate the activities of 
TNCs is the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).29 The OECD 
which was created in 1961, consists of 35 states who have a shared commitment to democratic 
government and market economy.30  Since 1961, the OECD has focused on building strong 
economies in its member states in order to ‘improve efficiency, hone market systems, expand 
free trade and contribute to development’ in both developed and less developed states.31 In 
furtherance of its objectives, the OECD agreed upon a Declaration on International Investments 
and Multinational Enterprises in 1976.32 The Declaration is package of agreements which, 
amongst others, consists of a set of Guidelines for multinational enterprises which was revised 
in 2000, 2006 and 2011.33 The Guidelines establish standards jointly addressed by governments 
to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering states to observe certain principles 
relating to taxation, finance, employment, industrial relations and consumer interests and the 
environment. In its 2000 revision, the Guidelines included provisions on human rights in its 
general policy section.34 The provision on human rights was captured in a single sentence 
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which provided that TNCs should ‘respect the human rights of those affected by their activities 
consistent with the host governments’ international obligations and commitments.’35 
The 2000 revision appeared to address the problem of the complex corporate structure 
by calling on TNCs to ‘encourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers 
and subcontractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines.’36 
It also introduced recommendations prohibiting forced labour and had provisions on improving 
internal management and contingency planning for environmental impacts.37 Sections on 
disclosure and transparency were also updated to encourage social and environmental 
accountability.38 Additionally, it required TNCs to ‘refrain from seeking or accepting 
exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related to environment, 
health, safety, taxation, financial incentives or other issues.’39 This can be considered as a very 
useful provision as it aims to prevent TNCs from seeking special exemptions which in some 
cases may indirectly contribute to human rights violations from the regulatory framework in 
force in host states.  
In spite of these provisions, the real impact of the Guidelines in the sense of making 
TNCs accountable for human rights abuses is doubtful. This is principally due to the lack of 
strong enforcement systems where TNCs do not follow the provisions of the Guidelines. It 
expressly states that the ‘observance of the Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and not 
legally enforceable,’40 but rather represent a political commitment on the part of OECD 
governments to foster such corporate conduct, as they reflect the values and aspirations of 
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OECD members.41 As of 2019, 36 of the OECD member states together with 12 non-OECD 
states have subscribed to the Declaration, thus, only 48 states are adherents’ of the Guidelines.42  
The efficacy of the implementation of the provisions depend on the establishment of 
National Contact Points (NCPs) and the Committee on Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.43 However, the NCPs and Investment Committee lack any enforcement powers 
and merely carry out advisory, consultative, recommendatory and clarification functions.44 The 
complaint against Vedanta Resources is a case in point which exemplifies the effect of the 
absence of enforcement systems in the Guidelines. 
Vedanta Resources, a British mining company, built a refinery and planned to conduct 
mining operations on Niyam Dongar Mountain in Orissa, India, to feed the refinery.45 
However, the mountain was reportedly sacred for the Dongria Kondh tribe, one of the most 
isolated tribes in India. Its culture, identity and livelihood are inextricably tied to the 
mountain.46 The complaint alleged that the Dongria Kondh tribe was not consulted in the 
process, and that the people’s livelihoods were in danger as the operations would affect arable 
land and pollute the local streams.47 Vedanta allegedly failed to consider the potential negative 
implications of its activities because it refused to accept that there were any. 
The UK NCP made recommendations to Vedanta to bring its activities in line with the 
OECD Guidelines and asked that they should immediately work with the Dongria Kondh 
people to explore alternatives to the resettlement of the affected people. The NCP also 
recommended that Vedanta should include human rights impact assessment in the management 
of its programmes. However, several NGOs and members of the Dongria Kondh reported that 
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Vedanta had not initiated any discussion or contact with those affected by the project and has 
refused to alter its conduct in any way.48 The NCP could not make Vedanta comply or 
cooperate with the procedures or the recommendations.49 It is against this background that the 
OECD Watch concludes that ‘the vast majority of OECD Guidelines cases have unfortunately 
not led to any significant improvement in the respective company’s behaviour or the situation 
that led to the complaint’.50 
In 2011, the Guidelines were updated. Its notable improvements particularly in the area 
of human rights is the expansion of its recommendations on human rights. It expanded the one-
liner reference to human rights to a chapter, which requires TNCs to respect human rights, have 
a policy commitment to this effect, carry out ‘risk-based due diligence’, and provide for 
legitimate processes for remediation of adverse human rights impact.51 These 
recommendations draw from the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) 
framework and the Guiding Principles and thus suffer the same potential and face the same 
hazards as the Guiding Principles discussed later in this chapter. The 2011 update enhanced 
the role of the NCP and investment Committee by requiring that the NCPs, supported by the 
Investment Committee, make initial assessments, offer good offices and publish results of 
procedures whenever disputes relating to the Guidelines ensue. However, no improvements on 
enforcement were made as the outcome of the procedures remain non-binding.52 Thus, NCPs 
remain helpless where their recommendations are not heeded and TNCs manifestly breach the 
provisions of the Guidelines.  
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4.4 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
Soon after the OECD Guidelines in 1976, the ILO Tripartite Declaration was negotiated 
between governments and employers and workers organisations.53 The Declaration was 
adopted by the governing body of the International Labour Office on 16 November 1977, and 
amended in November 2000, in March 2006 and in March 2017.54 The Declaration adopted a 
tripartite (government, employer, worker) structure to encourage TNCs and other stakeholders 
in the development of policies directed toward economic and social progress.55 Its Preamble 
states that ‘multinational enterprises can…make an important contribution…to the enjoyment 
of basic human rights.’ Thus, it affirms the importance of human rights in the Declaration’s 
aims, which includes, encouraging ‘the positive contribution which multinational enterprises 
can make to economic and social progress…and to minimize and resolve the difficulties to 
which their various operations may give rise.’56 
The first paragraph of the Declaration dealing with General Policies provides that ‘all 
the parties concerned by this Declaration should respect the sovereign rights of States, obey 
the national laws and regulations, give due consideration to local practices and respect relevant 
international standards.’57 It then goes on to mention the relevant international standards to 
include international obligations contained in the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the corresponding International Covenants adopted by the UN General Assembly.’58 
A significant feature in the 2017 Declaration, which was absent in the 1976, 2000 and 
2006 versions, was the adoption of the Guiding Principles ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ 
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framework in outlining specific responsibilities for the respective stakeholders. The 
Declaration provided that TNCs had the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
wherever they operate.59 This, according to the Declaration would include the responsibility to 
‘avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts through their own activities’ and the 
responsibility to address such impacts when they occur and to seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts resulting from the operations, products or services by their 
business relationships even when they have not contributed to them.60 The Declaration 
provided for the need for TNCs to exercise due diligence and meaningful consultation with 
potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the size of the 
enterprise and the nature and context of its operation.61 
Despite the fact that the Declaration refers to the UDHR and other relevant international 
covenants adopted by the General assembly, its scope is limited to labour rights.62 It does not 
deal with other important facets of human rights such as the right to life and security of persons, 
cultural rights and the rights to a clean environment which are often infringed in the course of 
TNC operations, particularly in the extractive industries.63  
Regarding the implementation of the Declaration, the Governing Body of the 
International Labour Office has the overall responsibility for the promotion of the Declaration’s 
principles.64 The governments, employers and workers are required to use surveys to request 
data and reports from companies in order to draw better conclusions, examine policies and 
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measures and to give effect to suggestions and changes.65 These reports are gathered, 
synthesized and submitted to the Governing body for review.66 However, the responses of the 
organisations and the governments reveal very little about any concrete failure on the part of 
the companies to respect the Declaration’s provisions.67 For example, in describing the reported 
behaviour of companies, the names of the companies are omitted from the survey results.68 To 
illustrate this point, the entry form of the National Confederation of Dominican (CNTD) 
Workers is quoted: 
CNTD further reports that participation by MNEs (names of MNEs 
given) in what were state industries but have now been privatised or 
deregulated has created labour problems. Unions were closed down 
before privatisation (names of cases in utilities sector given), or 
liquidated after privatisation (name of MNE and cases in agricultural 
manufacturing given).69  
This clearly defeats the purpose of having an implementation mechanism in the first instance 
as the corporation complained against is shielded, compromising the interests of the parties 
who brought the request. 
Acknowledging that dialogue lies at the heart of the implementation of its provisions, 
the Declaration gives effect to the need to support dialogues involving TNCs and the 
representatives of the workers affected.70 The parties may voluntarily agree to take advantage 
of the facilities of the Labour Office to meet and talk, without prejudice, facilitated by the 
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Office.71 The process and results of the dialogue are strictly confidential and are not to be used 
for any binding procedure.72 The Governing Body may only consider requests concerning the 
interpretation of the Declaration.73 Even so, as a rule, it is the governments of member States 
that may submit requests for interpretation.74 Employers or workers’ organisations may only 
submit requests when the governments have declined to do so, or, when the government fails 
to act three months after being informed by the workers’ or employees organisations.75 This 
would mean that the Governing Body cannot deliver decisions on infringements of the 
Declaration to grant relief to victims of the infringement, or shame the perpetrators of the 
infringement. 
Thus, the ILO Declaration ends up being a mere aspirational Declaration without any 
legal enforceability, or even the possibility of market coercion considering its confidentiality 
requirements.76 Delinquent companies may easily act contrary to the Declarations provisions 
and renege on agreements reached during voluntary negotiations with little or no consequences. 
 
4.5 The UN Global Compact 
In an attempt to revive the relevance and role of the UN in ensuring corporate responsibility, 
the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) was launched in 2000 following the then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call to business leaders to work with the UN to ‘initiate a 
global compact of shared values and principles, which will give a human face to the global 
market.’77 Unlike the previously discussed regulatory initiatives, the UNGC does not 
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established a formal code of conduct. Rather, it serves as a dialog forum among a range of 
actors including, the UN, state governments, businesses, civil society organisations, academics, 
think-tank and corporate social responsibility organisations.78 The dialogues aim to promote 
mutual learning and problem solving, whilst facilitating discussions on the best business 
practices. 79  
The underlying goal for the UNGC is to gain commitments by the business community, 
which is regarded as the principal driver of globalisation, to help ensure that its basic activities 
will move forward in ways that benefit economies and advance societal goals.80 In furtherance 
of this objective, the Compact enjoins all participating companies to embrace, support and 
enact, within their sphere of influence, ten broadly stated principles on which it is based, and 
they are to report annually on the activities they had taken to ensure those principles as part of 
their operations in the form of ‘Communications on Progress’ (COP).81 These ten principles 
cover the fields of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.82 They articulate 
behavioural norms that the Global Compact Organisation refer to as ‘enjoying universal 
consensus’, which are grounded in internationally accepted instruments, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and the Rights 
to Work, the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, and the UN Convention 
against Corruption.83 The first two principles, which focus on human rights, are captured in a 
single sentence: ‘Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
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proclaimed human rights and’84 ‘make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
(Principle 2).85 
Initially, the Global Compact process had no mechanism to verify compliance by the 
participating companies with the principles that they pledged to uphold. This brought the 
Compact under harsh criticisms from NGOs, who were quick at denouncing the risks of ‘blue 
washing’.86 However, in 2003 a Communication in Progress policy was introduced, whereby, 
companies participating in the Global Compact who do not communicate progress for two 
successive years are expelled from the UN Global Compact, and their name may be made 
public, which can involve significant reputational costs.87 More importantly, the Global 
Compact office introduced a mechanism to entertain allegations of systemic or egregious abuse 
of the Compacts principles through a ‘dialogue facilitation mechanism’ between the TNC 
concerned and the party alleging violations.88 Where the Compact Office considers the 
allegation to be non-frivolous, it will seek explanation from the concerned TNC and assist it in 
the adoption of measures that would ensure that its conduct is aligned with the principles of the 
Compact. If the TNC fails to cooperate, it is considered as ‘non-communicating’.89 The 
company can also be delisted from the participating companies if, ‘based on the review of the 
nature of the complaint submitted and the responses by the participating company, the 
continued listing of the participating company on the Global Compact website is considered to 
be detrimental to the reputation and integrity of the Global Compact’.90 
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The Global Compact has recorded a large increase in the number of participants from 
fewer than 50 in 2000 to over 13,000 as at April 2019.91 However, in spite of its largely 
increasing acceptance by the business community, several deficiencies limit its efficacy in 
terms of preventing and redressing corporate human rights abuses. The language in the Global 
Compact is so generally worded and vague that companies can easily circumvent them or 
comply with them without doing anything to protect human rights.92 Its principles on human 
rights aim to reflect the norms contained in the UDHR, yet, the Compact does little towards 
clarifying what the key human rights issues are for business.93 It asks companies to support and 
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of 
influence, and ensure they are not complicit in human rights violations, but does not state the 
exact human rights they should support and respect.94 Presumably, the rights contained in the 
UDHR are not all primarily relevant to the activities of TNCs, but the Compact provides little 
guidance on which, if any, rights are to be prioritised. This leaves a wide margin of appreciation 
to companies regarding the interpretation of the principles.  
Apart from its vaguely worded principles, the Global Compact does not have any 
stipulated standards citing reporting provisions, rather, it encourages companies to use Global 
Reporting Initiatives- a reporting system that is more about process than accessing 
performance. Companies are required to:  
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• Send a letter signed by the chief executive officer to the Secretary-General of the UN 
expressing continued support for the Global Compact and renewing the participant’s 
ongoing commitment to the initiative. 
• A description of practical actions the company has taken or plans to take to implement 
the Ten Principles in each of the four areas (human rights, labour, environment, anti-
corruption) ... 
• A measurement of outcomes.95 
Based on the company’s self-assessment, each COP falls into three levels: GC Learner, which 
are for COPs that do not meet one or more of the performance criteria; GC Active, for COPs 
that meet the minimum requirements; and, GC Advanced, which apply to COPs that qualify as 
GC Active and also cover the company’s implementation of advanced criteria and best 
practices.96  
As soon as participants submit the COPs, they are published on the UNGC website. 
This enables companies to demonstrate their efforts to support and uphold the principles 
contained in the Compact.97 It is assumed that the published information would provide 
stakeholders with necessary information to make informed choices about the companies they 
interact with and, may also serve as a means of driving performance of the companies.98 
In spite of these improvements, the risk of ‘blue washing’ is still imminent. The COPs are 
designed, administered, and composed solely by the companies.99 The UNGC allows each 
company to (i) select the particular issue for improvement (only one per area is required); (ii) 
design the metrics for measurement of progress in that area; (iii) measure movement against 
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the metrics; and (iv) write the report.100 In the absence of any monitoring or review mechanism, 
the COPs are accepted at face value. The downsides of this system of self-reporting is 
exemplified by the fact that the UNGC has not so far included any complaint or criticism of a 
COP on its website. The COP of each company is unchallenged, thus, there are no means of 
knowing for sure if the Companies are adhering to the Compacts principles.101 Their progress 
reporting systems may prove to be a mere ritual or a public relations exercise.  
Irrespective of the fact that the Global Compact expressly denies being a regulatory 
initiative, in effect it does try to regulate, using the disguise of voluntary self-regulation.102 
With the introduction of the annual reporting requirement coupled with the threat of delisting, 
and the Global Compact office’s role in addressing credible allegations of egregious or 
systemic abuses of the Compacts principles, the compact can hardly be said to be a purely 
voluntary initiative. Nevertheless, as previously noted, the reporting system without 
implementation mechanisms does little or nothing to improve compliance with the Compacts 
Principles. Even the working of the Global Compact Office shows that it takes a very cautious 
and conservative approach in dealing with documented abuses of Compact Principles. An 
example of this is the alleged complicity of PetroChina in the human rights abuses by the 
government of Sudan. 
In 2008, a campaign of over 80 civil society groups sent a letter to the UN Global 
Compact Office concerning PetroChina’s role as Sudan’s largest oil industry partner, arguing 
that its financial links to the government there helped to perpetuate a human rights crisis in 
Darfur.103 They demanded that the Compact should seek the company’s engagement with the 
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government of Sudan to end the troubles, and if it refused, to expel it.104 The Global Compact 
Office refrained from doing much, but more striking is its rationale for its hands off attitude. 
In its response the Office stated that the matters raised in the letter ‘could equally apply to a 
number of companies operating in conflict prone countries…PetroChina has been singled out 
largely because it…has recently taken steps of joining the Global Compact. Since we are a 
learning initiative, this is a step that should be welcomed instead of criticized.’105 The Compact 
Office could have refrained from taking action on the allegations for several other reasons but 
its decision not to act because PetroChina was not the only company indulging in such conduct 
seems illogical, as the complaint could not have been tendered before the Global compact in 
respect of a non-participating company, neither is it relevant that allegations were not made 
against other participants.106 
Similarly, in June 2009, Baby Milk Action, a UK civil society organisation, laid a 
complaint against Nestlé, a leading advocate of the UNGC alleging that the reports posted on 
the UNGC Office site were misleading and that Nestlé was, in fact, responsible for egregious 
violations of the Compacts principles.107 Baby Milk Action cited the integrity measures that 
accompany the principles and called for the allegations to be investigated and the possible 
delisting of Nestlé for bringing the GC to disrepute by using its COP as a public relations 
campaign to divert criticism so that violations may continue.108 The Compact Office declined 
to review the submitted evidence and delist Nestlé, claiming that it ‘is not a mediation, dispute 
resolution, or adjudicative body, nor is it an enforcement agency. Rather, its integrity measures 
are designed to facilitate communication and dialogue’.109 Baby Milk Action explained that it 
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had already joined other organisations to engage in dialogue with Nestlé and that Nestlé had 
refused to make the necessary changes. Baby Milk Action asked the UNGC Office to review 
the evidence submitted and its communications with Nestlé as called for under the Integrity 
Measures, with a view to excluding Nestlé. Arguing that it was not its role to conduct such a 
review, the Global Compact stated, ‘abuses of the ten principles do occur, however we believe 
that such abuse only indicates that it is important for the company to remain in the Compact 
and learn from its mistakes.’110 
The correspondence between Baby Milk Action and the Global Compact Office 
demonstrate that the Office was incapable or unwilling to take any actions to stop the violations 
and that far from improving corporate behaviour, it was complicit in in allowing violations to 
continue by providing legitimacy to misleading reports 
To conclude, although, the Global Compact may raise awareness of issues involved in 
the corporate world through dialogue and learning which is an important first step, it does no 
more than this. In the end, it serves as little more than an instrument of rhetoric.111 
 
4.6 The UN Draft Norms 
Following consultations from all relevant stakeholders, the UN Sub-Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved in Resolution 2003/16 of 14 August 
2003, the set of Norms on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises’.112 
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The UN Norms presented a promising framework for establishing the accountability of 
TNCs for human rights abuses. Unlike some of the previous attempts at corporate 
accountability, the Norms were not limited to labour and/ or environmental rights, rather, they 
presented a comprehensive set of human rights obligations. Apart from the general obligation 
to ‘respect, ensure respect for, prevent abuse of, and promote human rights recognised in 
international as well as national law’, they listed specific obligations regarding: the right to 
equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment, the right to security of person, respect for 
national sovereignty and human rights and consumer and environmental protection.113 
The Norms made progress over other regulatory regimes in the depth of human rights 
responsibilities of TNCs. As TNCs could abuse human rights in different ways, it went beyond 
the prevailing conventional ‘negative’ conception of TNC responsibility and imposed positive 
obligations on corporate entities. The UN Norms provided that even though ‘States have the 
primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and 
protect human rights’, TNCs, ‘within their respective spheres of activity and influence have 
the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human 
rights’.114 The preamble of the Draft Norms provided that TNCs and other businesses, ‘as 
organs of society, are also responsible for promoting and securing human rights set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, hence, TNCs and other businesses, ‘their officers and 
persons working for them are also obligated to respect generally recognized responsibilities 
and norms contained in the United Nations treaties and other international instruments.115 
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The Draft Norms apparently adopted the view that the phrase ‘organs of society’ as 
contained in the UDHR incorporated TNCs as holders of human rights obligations.116 
However, the fact remains that the UDHR was never drafted to apply directly to TNCs as the 
threat of TNC abuse of human rights as experienced today was not yet contemplated at the 
time. Hence, international human rights instruments never provided for enforcement 
mechanisms for when TNCs fail to observe their supposed obligations. However, the fact that 
there is a move towards framing human rights norms specifically directed at TNCs 
demonstrates a progressive step towards filling the existing gaps in the prevailing state-based 
international regulatory system. Thus, beyond restating existing human rights law, the Norms 
indicated the change required in the character of international law by deducing obligations for 
TNCs with reference to the existing international covenants and laying down provisions for 
their enforcement. 
The Norms delimited the extent of TNC obligations to their ‘respective spheres of 
activity and influence’, but they did not provide any guidance as to what this actually means.117 
For example, would a TNCs sphere of influence or activity include its subsidiaries and 
affiliates, and/or, would sphere of influence or activity of an TNC engaged in natural resource 
extraction extend to promoting the right to education, or the right to privacy outside the 
boundaries of its activity? As TNCs and human rights activists are bound to present conflicting 
interpretations, this aspect requires clarification.118 
The UN Norms substituted the conventional approach of ‘should’ with ‘shall’ in terms of the 
standard for compliance with its provisions.119 This terminological change together with the 
provisions on implementation demonstrated a tacit acceptance that the prevailing ‘dialogue-
                                               
116 ibid, preamble. 
117UN Draft Norms (n13), principle 1. 
118 This was not the first time that the term ‘sphere of influence’ had been used in a regulatory instrument as the 
Global Compact had relied on it at a time but eventually abandoned it in later updated versions of its Compact 
Principles.  




cooperation’ based approach of voluntary compliance with human rights norms is proving to 
be inadequate.120 Thus, in connection with adopting a ‘non-voluntary’ approach to compliance, 
the Norms proposed specific provisions for the implementation of human rights norms.121 First, 
it called upon businesses to adopt the UN Norms as the standards for their internal codes of 
conduct or rules of operation and adopt specific mechanisms for their implementation.122 
Secondly, and in addition to asking TNCs to internalise its provisions, the UN Norms asked 
states to ‘establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring 
that the Norms’ are implemented by TNCs.123 Thirdly, the Norms proposed independent and 
transparent periodic monitoring and verification by national and international (including UN) 
mechanisms. Again, this was a departure from the prevailing indirect mode of implementation 
where the responsibility for implementation rested solely and exclusively on states. In 
connection with the implementation provisions, the Norms also provided for prompt, adequate 
and effective reparation to persons and communities adversely affected by the failure of TNCs 
to comply with their responsibilities under the Norms.124 
The Norms also required that TNCs ensure that their contracts or other arrangements 
with business affiliates incorporate its provisions.125 It placed a direct obligation on the TNCs 
to ensure that the norms where so incorporated and implemented. This was a positive approach 
as many situations of corporate abuse involve TNC subsidiaries or business partners over which 
the TNC exercised considerable control or influence.126 
The UN Norms made good progress in terms of formulating and implementing 
corporate human rights obligations. However, a number of issues were raised by the 
                                               
120 Mahmood Monshipouri, Claude Welch, Jnr and Evan Kennedy, ‘Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of 
Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities’ (2003)25 Human Rights Quarterly 4, 979-983. 
121 David Weissbrodt (n 113), 915-921. 
122 UN Draft Norms (n 13), para 15.  
123 ibid, paras 15-19. 
124 ibid, para 18. 
125 ibid, paragraph 1 and 15. 




International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Organisation of Employers 
(IOE)-bodies that represent some of the largest TNCs.127 The ICC and IOE asserted that the 
Norms provided an overly broad set of human rights obligations for TNCs. In this regard, 
particular reference has been made to paragraph 12 of the Norms which provides that TNCs 
shall, among others, contribute to the realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights as well 
as civil and political rights, ‘in particular the rights to development, adequate food and drinking 
water, the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, adequate housing, privacy, 
education, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and freedom of opinion and 
expression’.128 They also asserted that the imposition of legal responsibilities on business could 
‘shift the obligation to protect human rights from Governments to the private sector and provide 
a diversion for states to avoid their own responsibilities.’129 The Norms also frequently placed 
responsibilities on TNCs based on several international treaties that were signed and ratified 
and directed at states.130 It appeared to expect TNCs to go through every one of the instruments 
to deduce their specific obligations.  
Although the Norms were couched in obligatory terms, they were presented as neither 
voluntary nor mandatory, but non-voluntary. This was explained as a logical progressive step 
from soft to hard obligations, however, it created uncertainty with relation to compliance.131 
Beyond the ambiguity in the distinction between mandatory and non-voluntary, the UN Norms 
have been criticised for having underdeveloped implementation mechanisms. Although it 
provides for parallel implementation both at the national and international levels, no 
ascertainable viable framework for such implementation is established. Rather it called on the 
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Sub-Commission on Human Rights and other UN Bodies ‘to develop additional techniques for 
implementing and monitoring the Norms’.132 
Apart from the provision for reparations, there were no other sanctions against non-
compliant corporations. Reparation is useful especially from the standpoint of the victims of 
the human rights abuse, but it is doubtful whether reparation on its own will be enough to deter 
future wrongful conduct on the part of TNCs especially as it appears to be used as a civil 
remedy. There is lack of clarity as to whether it is also intended to be used as a criminal 
sanction. Although it provided for reparation in favour of the victims of corporate human rights 
abuses, the Norms did not deal with the two procedural issues- forum non conveniens and 
separate legal personality that have often been misused by TNCs to prevent individuals from 
gaining access to remedies. The Norms’ silence on these two procedural aspects makes it very 
difficult for any implementation effort to deliver justice to victims, even if such mechanisms 
are equipped with multiple sanctions.  
Generally, the Draft UN Norms promoted the agenda to clarify and elaborate on 
corporate human rights responsibilities, highlighted the need to move beyond state-centric 
regulation and emphasised the importance of implementation mechanisms. Nevertheless, its 
inadequacies prevented it from establishing a robust international regulatory regime of 
corporate human rights responsibilities. Instead of seeking to rectify its shortcomings, the 
Norms were heavily criticized especially among the business community. They were ultimately 
abandoned. However, they succeeded in placing the question of the accountability of TNCs for 




                                               




4.7 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
Following the initiative of the Sub-Commission, the Commission on Human Rights requested 
the appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) to identify 
ways through which the accountability of TNCs for human rights violations may be 
improved.133 Professor John Ruggie, who was also closely involved with the process of the UN 
Global Compact, was appointed as special Representative of the UN Secretary General in July 
2005 and given the mandate to clarify the duties and responsibilities of States and companies 
in the business and human rights sphere.134 
The SRSG found that the nature of the duties under the Draft UN Norms were too wide. 
Consequently, he selected only the obligation to ‘protect’ with respect to States and the 
responsibility to ‘respect’ with reference to companies, elements from the well-established 
tripartite respect, protect and fulfil human rights duty typology.135 The choice of the word 
‘responsibility’ instead of ‘obligation’ was purposeful so as to denote that a breach of the 
responsibilities may not entail legal consequences for TNCs.136 The SRSG began by 
developing the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ in 2008, which was built on three 
pillars: First, the States’ duty to  protect against human rights abuses by third-parties, including 
companies, affecting persons within their territory or jurisdiction through the application of 
policies, regulation and adjudication; second, the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights which is defined by social expectations, is to be achieved through the exercise of due 
diligence to avoid infringements on the rights of others, and; third, the improvement of access 
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to remedies through the formal judicial systems, non-judicial mechanisms and company-level 
grievance mechanisms.137  
The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework was unanimously adopted by the Human 
Rights Council and the SRSGs mandate was extended in order to develop guidelines intended 
to assist States and companies operationalise the Framework.138 After six years of reports and 
consultations, the Human Rights Council, successor to the Commission on Human Rights, 
adopted a set of Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.139 These Guiding 
Principles are now considered as the most authoritative statement of the human rights duties or 
responsibilities of States and corporations, adopted at the UN level.140 The SRSGs activities 
leading up to the Guiding Principles have been characterised by broad consultations involving 
many different stakeholders, an approach he called, ‘principled pragmatism’.141  However, his 
pragmatic approach has been criticised as presenting ‘a minimalist take’ on the issue of 
corporate responsibility for human rights abuses reflected in the Guiding Principles.142 Thus, 
in spite of its achievements, several weaknesses can be identified in the final document. 
The SRSG determinedly steered clear from the concept of human rights obligations for 
corporations and instead placed exclusive emphasis on the State as the sole duty-bearer. This 
may be understood when one considers the deadlock that followed the rejection of the Draft 
Norms. However, the Guiding Principles’ outright dismissal of the notion of corporate duties 
is regrettable as it appears to be at odds with the intention that the Guiding Principles are to 
become ‘a common global platform for action on which cumulative progress can be 
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built…without foreclosing any other longer-term development’.143 Furthermore, it is difficult 
to see how the states’ duty to protect in Pillar 1 of the Framework for the Guiding Principles 
would operate without corresponding obligations on TNCs.144 How can States enforce the 
obligation against corporations if the corporations merely have the responsibility (not 
obligation) to respect human rights in the first place? If international law requires that states 
ensure that third-parties, including TNCs, comply with binding international human rights 
requirements, then it means that the third parties themselves are necessarily obligated to 
comply with such requirements.145 If third parties did not have prior obligations to individuals, 
‘the state’s derivative responsibility to hold them accountable would be empty and 
meaningless’.146 The state can only be expected to enforce human rights obligations that are 
already expressly or implicitly recognised by the international treaties themselves.147 
It should be noted that the state’s responsibility to protect is not absolute, in the sense 
that it is obligated to take steps to prevent or punish human rights abuses as far as it can. Thus, 
if human rights abuses are committed by an TNC, but are adjudged unforeseeable or beyond 
the managerial capacity of the state, it would mean that the TNC, who was primarily 
responsible for the harm is not capable of being held to account. 
The non-recognition of corporate obligations also affects the application of the third 
pillar of the Framework. While the Framework recognises the rights of victims of corporate 
abuse to have access to remedy, the non-recognition of binding legal obligations of 
corporations for abuse of human rights in the second pillar obscures the possibility for the 
victims to claim access to any legal remedy against TNCs. Access to remedy is on its own, a 
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right in international law, but it is difficult to see how a legal remedy can be granted without 
the recognition of a prior legal obligation.148 
Apart from placing an artificial limit on the States’ human rights obligations, the 
Guiding Principles clearly lower the current standard on the issue of extraterritorial obligations 
of States to control the corporations they are in a position to influence, wherever such 
corporations operate. The Guiding Principles provide that ‘States should set out clearly the 
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect 
human rights throughout their operations.’149 The Commentary to the Guiding Principles then 
qualifies this principle by stating that  
at present, States are not generally required under international human 
rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses 
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally 
prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional 
basis. Within these parameters some human rights treaty bodies 
recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse abroad by 
business enterprises within their jurisdiction.  
There are strong policy reasons for home States to set out clearly the 
expectation that businesses respect human rights abroad, especially 
where the State itself is involved or in support.150 
This statement does not, however, represent the current legal position. As has been previously 
discussed, the United Nations treaty bodies have repeatedly maintained that States are obligated 
to take steps to prevent human rights abuse by business entities that are incorporated under 
their laws, that have their main seat or their main place of business under their jurisdiction, or 
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where they can otherwise influence the corporate entities by way of legal or political means.151 
These statements made by the UN treaty bodies were even reiterated after the Guiding 
Principles were endorsed.152 By adopting such a cautious approach to the extraterritorial 
obligations of States, the Guiding Principles may in fact be encouraging States reluctant to 
accept such obligations to challenge the interpretation of human rights treaty bodies, despite 
the support the position of these bodies received from legal doctrine and civil society, and from 
even the International Court of Justice itself.153 
Another area in the Guiding Principles which could be improved concerns the 
responsibility to respect placed on corporations. The SRSG rejected the Norms use of ‘sphere 
of influence’ for being vague and imprecise and used ‘due diligence’ instead.154 Principle 15 
provides 
In order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, business 
enterprises should have in place policies and processes appropriate to 
their size and circumstances, including:(b) A human rights due-
diligence process to identify, mitigate and account for how they address 
their impacts on human rights. 
Although it is further explained in Principle 17, the due diligence criteria remains uncertain in 
some important respects.155 The Guiding Principles state that corporate entities should, as part 
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of the due diligence component of their responsibility to respect human rights, ‘cover adverse 
human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own 
activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business 
relationships.’156 This is indeed a major step forward as it places the responsibility of due 
diligence beyond the core company, down the supply chain, to include the conduct of 
subsidiaries and other affiliates. However, it is unclear to which extent exactly the company 
should accept responsibility for the human rights impacts of the activities of such affiliates. 
Human rights due diligence may appear to be a more workable concept than ‘sphere of 
influence’ because the latter concept takes as given that a particular corporation has a sphere 
of influence to which its responsibility extends, while due diligence is more explicitly 
normative and does not depend on a finding of fact but on the reality of the influence the 
corporation does have.157 However, until the ambiguities are adequately addressed, it may 
remain relatively elusive and may not escape the very vagueness that led to the criticisms 
levelled against its predecessor. 
 
4.8 The inadequacies of the corporate responsibility initiatives 
Having highlighted the specific limitations of the six major international regulatory initiatives 
on corporate responsibility in relation to human rights, three general conclusions can be made. 
First, although their provisions on human rights address TNCs directly, they do not provide 
substantive rationales for their application. Second, they contain vague and sweeping human 
rights provisions, which offer no guidance to TNCs on how the principles are to apply in their 
operations. Third, the international initiatives do not provide adequate or effective mechanisms 
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to monitor the proper implementation of their provisions. These general limitations will now 
be discussed in some detail. 
 
4.8.1 Direct corporate human rights obligations 
The importance of establishing a sound rationale for the imposition of direct international 
human rights obligations on TNCs in a regulatory instrument is crucial to its adequacy and 
acceptance. This is especially so when considering the argument that corporations are 
established primarily to maximise profits-a factor that was at the fore of the arguments against 
corporate social responsibility initiatives. Thus, any international regulatory initiative, which 
aims to directly regulate the activities of TNCs as they affect human rights, should provide 
logically sustainable and concrete rationales for doing so. The existing regulatory initiatives 
however, do not address this important aspect but rather offer contestable rationales. 
The OECD Guidelines and ILO Tripartite Declaration offer identical justifications as 
to why TNCs should have human rights responsibilities. According to these initiatives, TNCs 
are urged to observe human rights standards in their operations because of their potential to 
make important contributions to economic and social progress and to resolve the difficulties to 
which their various operations may give rise. 158  These rationales have been referred to as the 
‘business case’ for corporate responsibility.159  
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with a ‘doing well by doing good’ approach, 
which the business case for corporate responsibility seems to suggest. After all, ‘treating people 
well is conducive to productive long-term relationships, and productive long-term relationships 
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are conducive to profits.’160 But, the question that arises is whether observing human rights 
standards is always conducive to maximising profits? The answer to this question has to be 
answered in the negative. In the UCC-UCIL incident in Bhopal, it was alleged that the safety 
standards in the gas plants were deliberately lowered following cost saving measures 
undertaken by UCC that ultimately resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. In Ecuador, 
Chevron purportedly used substandard equipment and defective waste disposal methods with 
the aim of increasing their profit margins. Of course, this resulted in severe contamination of 
the environment and loss of livelihood of indigenous peoples. Similar situations were alleged 
to have resulted from the activities of Shell in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta region.161 
These examples demonstrate that there will often be times where a TNC can increase 
profits by engaging in behaviour that risks the lives of its workers and the individuals in the 
local communities in which they operate. It may not be realistic to focus on a business case that 
establishes a determinate connection between human rights and profit. Other than the fact that 
it may sometimes be impractical, the business case also threatens to undermine the entire fabric 
of human rights. As Langlois states, ‘a right is not something that can be assigned on efficiency 
grounds,’ it is ‘precisely an individual’s trump against the claims of efficiency’.162 Thus, any 
initiative that ‘attempts to place a calculable value on human with a view to encouraging some 
sort of trade-off between human rights and other goals’ is untenable.163  
The Global Compact and the Guiding Principles, find their rationale for corporate 
human rights responsibility in social expectation and the public-private partnership.164 
However, this will only be feasible where partnerships with the various stakeholders in society 
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are necessary for the TNCs to achieve their own corporate objectives. The incorporation of 
human rights standards into the corporate system of operations would necessarily mean that 
TNCs would have to formulate new policies, train employees, monitor conduct, and take 
certain other actions- all, which would involve some extra expenditure on their part. It is 
unlikely that they would be inclined to conduct their operations according to societal 
expectations if such expectations will affect their businesses. After all, the maximisation of 
profit is still part of the ultimate objective of the corporation. The social expectation rationale 
is thus exposed to the same limitations as the business case as it places the ultimate decision 
on TNCs to choose whether or not it would respect internationally recognised legal rights.  
Moreover, in a complex international society with varying levels of development, the 
social expectations will invariably differ from State to State. In fact, it was this same issue of 
differing expectations in developing and developed States that led to the demise of the UN 
Code of Conduct and the Draft UN Norms. Developing States will always focus on standards 
that push for the increase in foreign direct investment, while developed States will advocate 
for corporate friendly standards for their corporate nationals. Standards including those relating 
to impacts of corporate activities on health and the environment would be relegated to the 
background. Thus, it would be difficult to determine appropriate expectations of corporate 
responsibility regarding human rights.  
Also, persons in States that have been subjected to long years of systematic corruption 
and tyrannical rule may have adapted to the status quo and may have developed low 
expectations concerning compliance with human rights norms. In Nigeria, for example, 
systemic corruption of government officials has been widely documented.165 As a result of such 
widespread and long-term corruption, individuals within the country have developed lax 
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attitudes in relation to the harmful activities of TNCs in the oil producing regions. The 
agitations of the people have greatly subsided as community leaders have been silenced by 
large pay-outs by these government officials. Thus, the system of corruption and abuse has 
become the norm.166 Yet, they are internationally recognised human rights norms proscribing 
these very situations as unacceptable despite the reduced social expectation of the people living 
therein. If human rights standards are accepted based on low societal expectations, then what 
will be obtainable would be a replication of the status quo that encourages human rights harm, 
rather than seeking to develop a world in which the human rights of individuals are fully 
protected, which is the single overarching objective of international human rights.167  
This objective ‘derives from the inherent dignity of the human person’, as enshrined by 
the basic international human rights legal documents.168 These international legal documents 
articulate human rights from the perspectives of all individuals as beneficiaries of those 
rights.169 The rights are not particular as to who the agents required to realise them are, instead, 
they call on all others to both refrain from behaviour that would infringe on the rights and to 
assist in their realisation.170 However, early historical frameworks for the protection of human 
rights came up at a time when the State was generally assumed to be the only agent obligated 
to meet human rights claims.171 This was primarily due to the position the State occupied vis-
à-vis individuals as the primary provider and controller of public goods, by virtue of which the 
State had the power and the opportunity to both promote and violate human rights.172 
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Nevertheless, the early assumptions have proved to be too simplistic. Due to the wave 
of globalisation the situation is now more complex. The position of the State as the primary 
violator and promoter of human rights is not absolute as non-state actors, including 
multinational corporations, have acquired similar position. In the quest for foreign investment 
and its attendant benefits in a globalised and free market economy, States have delegated and 
outsourced powers and functions to TNCs. As a result, the wealth and influence of TNCs have 
greatly increased, dwarfing that of many States. Consequently, TNCs also have the power as 
well as the opportunity to both promote and threaten human rights.  
The ECOSOC resolution establishing the UN Draft Code has also noted that ‘while 
corporations are frequently effective agents for the transfer of technology as well as capital to 
developing countries, their role is sometimes viewed with awe, since their size and power 
surpass the host country’s entire economy’ and, ‘the international community has yet to form 
a positive policy and establish effective machinery for dealing with issues raised by the 
activities of these corporations.’173 The Draft UN Norms also hinged the need for the 
implementation of international human rights standards on the dual capacity of TNCs to foster 
economic well-being whilst at the same time causing harmful impacts on the human rights of 
individuals through their core business practices and operations.174 Thus, if the main objective 
of human rights is indeed the protection of the fundamental interests of individuals, then 
logically, there must be binding consequences for all agents who have the capacity to impact 
on them.  
However, rather than placing obligations on TNCs, the international initiatives were 
couched in voluntary terms, merely encouraging and not compelling TNCs to comply with 
human rights in their activities. The UN Draft Norms was the only initiative that suggested 
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obligations for TNCs.175 As noted, it was criticised for watering down the state obligations 
under international law- a criticism that has been referred to as the ‘dilution argument’.176 Apart 
from the fact that TNCs must necessarily have obligations in order for the effective application 
of the states’ obligation to protect, the idea that conferring international obligations on TNCs 
presents a shift in international law is unfounded. 
Certain long-established multilateral treaties directly impose obligations on 
corporations. The 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage provides that 
the owner of a ship (which may be a company) shall be liable for any pollution damage caused 
by it.177 The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea prohibits not only states but also 
natural and juristic persons from appropriating parts of the seabed for its minerals.178 
It has not been suggested that by adopting these provisions, states have diluted their 
own international obligations, contrarily, the drafters of these treaties have apparently 
considered companies to be such important international actors that in order to actualise the 
objectives of the treaty they had to be considered directly, in addition to states.179  Thus, even 
if the idea of imposing direct human rights obligations on TNCs may be seen as innovating, it 
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4.8.2 The content of the human rights obligations of TNCs? 
Even if international law recognises that TNCs have binding human rights obligations, the 
contents of these obligations are not clearly developed. As the primary objective of 
international human rights is to safeguard the rights of individuals, it is necessary to determine 
not only who must be responsible for the realisation of the objective, but what such parties are 
required to do must also be specified. However, the international initiatives do not sufficiently 
articulate the obligations of TNCs. 
The ILO limits its provisions to labour rights and does not contain specific standards 
on many of the rights which TNCs are known to infringe.180 The Global Compact enjoins 
corporate entities to adopt into their practices standards in the international Bill of Rights and 
the International Labour Convention, whilst the OECD Guidelines provide that TNCs should 
respect human rights ‘within the framework of internationally recognised human rights, the 
international human rights obligations of the countries in which they operate as well as relevant 
domestic laws and regulations.’181 However, the content and application of the human rights 
standards may vary from State to State. Moreover, the application of State focal human rights 
standards to TNCs may be problematic. 
TNCs may generally not face difficulties when it comes to implementing the universal 
mandate contained in these international documents on the prohibition of for example, slavery, 
forced labour, torture or genocide to which there are internationally agreed standards on.182 
However, the precise contour of several other universal human rights is likely to vary from 
State to State. For example, the exact scope of what constitutes the right to a clean environment, 
the right to health, the right to privacy, the right to fair trial or the right to fair wages as they 
are not universally fixed. In situations where, different standards derived from the rights are 
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applied by the host States certain challenges will ensue, especially where the host State lacks 
commitment to protect human rights or where such a State is under an oppressive regime. The 
existing regulatory regimes do not offer suitable solutions to these instances and rather, they 
further compound the problem. For example, the ILO tripartite Declaration provides that TNCs 
comply with the safety standards of the host country. This might result in situations where the 
TNC complies with minimal or no safety standards when it operates in developing States. This 
is precisely what happened with shell in Nigeria, UCC in Bhopal India and Chevron in Ecuador. 
The TNCs all operated in accordance with the host States’ standards, but not in accordance 
with the highest standards of health, say, as prevailing in their home States.  
Instead of expatiating on the nature and content of the corporate responsibility with 
regards to human rights, the international initiatives limit this responsibility by couching it in 
negative terms.  
However, the SRSG in charge of drafting the Guiding Principles soon realised that 
couching TNC responsibilities in a purely negative nature would create an incentive for TNCs 
to adopt a completely ‘hands-off’ approach to situations where they could influence human 
rights harm. As a way out of this impasse, the notion of ‘due diligence’ was adopted. It provides 
as part of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights that companies should set up 
appropriate policies and processes ‘including a human rights due diligence process to identify, 
prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights’, and to 
‘cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may be directly linked to its 
operations, products services or relationships’.183 The recognition of the fact that TNCs are 
expected to identify, prevent mitigate and account for the impacts of their activities 
presupposes that positive obligations necessarily flow from the negative obligation to respect.  
                                               




The due diligence provision also presupposes that corporate responsibility may also involve 
situations where there is indirect involvement by companies in human rights abuses where the 
actual harm is caused by third parties including its affiliates, governments and other non-state 
actors. If the corporate responsibility to respect, as envisaged by the Guiding Principles 
presupposes a due diligence duty to prevent and mitigate human rights abuse by TNC 
subsidiaries and affiliates, then it would not be different from the states obligation to protect 
under international human rights law, which includes the positive obligation to prevent and 
punish human rights abuse by third parties. Yet, the SRSG still criticised the Draft UN Norms 
inclusion of positive human rights obligations for TNCs. 
However, applying the full range of human rights obligations of states to TNCs would 
be problematic. Even though TNCs have attained prominent positions in the international 
community, they cannot replace the State as the primary unit of official power.184 Therefore, 
caution needs to be taken so as not to detract from the distinctive nature of TNCs for which 
profit is still a significant motivation.185 While TNCs can be powerful institutions in improving 
the realisation of international human rights, their human rights obligations, whether positive 
or negative need to be determined with sufficient specificity according to their distinct nature. 
A good starting point would be to clarify the content and application of the doctrine of due 
diligence. This is especially important with the increasing interaction between human rights 
and other areas of international law. One of such areas is international investment law, where 
corporate investors are increasingly being involved in BITs with host states. Such BITs 
ostensibly promote development but, their practical effect is the conferment of strong rights 
upon corporate investors. In the absence of firmly established corporate human rights 
obligations applicable to corporate investors, when conflicts arise between international 
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investment obligations and human rights-with most statements on international human rights 
standards in voluntary terms, international commercial obligations are likely to trump those 
flowing from fundamental human rights in most cases.186 
 
4.8.3 Absence of sufficient implementation and enforcement mechanisms 
Apart from the fact that the international initiatives provide contestable rationales for direct 
human rights responsibilities of TNCs which are not properly articulated, they do not provide 
mechanisms that effectively implement the standards that they enunciate. The initiatives, over 
rely on dialogue and cooperation between governments and TNCs to ‘encourage’ TNCs to 
make their standards integral to their business operations.187 While dialogue and cooperation 
may be useful in internalising human rights in TNC operations, excessive focus on such 
strategy trivialises human rights. It gives the impression that human rights are not rights but 
are dependent upon the cooperation of TNCs.188  
Even where the initiatives provide for implementation mechanisms, the lack of the 
necessary monitoring and enforcement backing of such mechanisms renders them moot. These 
mechanisms are merely recommendatory, and only provide clarification where disputes arise. 
Thus, TNCs may flaunt the human rights standards without fear of repercussion. Moreover, in 
spite of the fact that all the initiatives encapsulate human rights standards that are directly 
applicable to TNCs, they still refer to the indirect state-centric compliance measures without 
addressing the major issues that they present to the individual’s ability gain access to adequate 
remedy. 
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The principle of separate legal personality and forum non conveniens still present major 
challenges to individuals seeking redress for harm caused by TNCs. It is true that in relation to 
the former, the unique nature of corporations and the reason why it is established is to attain 
some social advantages by encouraging people to take risks, facilitate innovation and create 
competition.189 However, if the advantages of the separate legal personality are accompanied 
by grave human rights harm, there should be a need for legal restrictions on companies to guard 
against such harms. Focusing entirely on achieving value without imposing full responsibility 
for a TNCs harmful actions creates a structure which is ‘pathological in the pursuit for 
profit,’190 a result which could not have been part of the idea behind the doctrine of separate 
legal personality in the first instance. Similarly, it is necessary that forum non conveniens does 
not leave victims without any other recourse to another judicial forum. Without adequate access 
to remedies, the essence of implementation is lost. 
Furthermore, and also linked to the state-focal nature of implementation, in-spite of the 
recognition in several of the initiatives, of the fact that TNCs operate through several 
subsidiaries and affiliates that are linked through a complex web of interconnection and profit 
sharing, there are no clear pronouncements on the extraterritorial nature of the states’ obligation 
to protect against harmful activities of TNCs. Yet, the international initiatives do not address 
these pertinent issues. Instead, the Guiding Principles purport to limit already established 
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The failure of State based mechanisms to adequately address the issue of corporate human 
rights harm has made it imperative for the international community to step in to fill in the gaps. 
However, as this chapter has argued, the current corporate responsibility initiatives have not 
adequately addressed this issue. These inadequacies spring from a number of lacunae and 
ambiguities within their provisions which are summarised:  
First, they lack a common concrete rational basis upon which corporate obligations 
should lie, giving room for serious criticism and challenges. Their reference to the major 
international human rights documents as a basis for common human rights standards applicable 
to TNCs may appear to be a legitimate cause, however, they fail to recognise and acknowledge 
the fact that these international human rights instruments were concluded at the time where 
TNCs had not gained the sort of influence in the international legal community as they have 
today. Furthermore, they lay claim to human rights standards and yet rob them of their 
normative content by presenting human rights norms as voluntarily applicable to TNCs. 
Secondly, even where some ethically conscious TNCs may be moved to adopt the 
human rights standards as part of their operations, the international initiatives provide little or 
no direction on the nature and the extent of the application of these standards. Although it may 
be too much of a stretch to require that an international initiative provides detailed industry-
wide or State-wide human rights obligations, it should at least provide sufficient guidelines 
from where TNCs or States may formulate obligations.  
Thirdly, the implementation mechanisms are seriously inefficient as they have no 
power to ensure that TNCs conduct their operations in accordance with human rights standards. 
With little or no provisions on sanctions, non-compliant TNCs do not face any repercussions. 




victims of corporate abuse to claim redress for the infringement of their rights and TNCs are 
left to perpetrate human rights abuse with impunity.  
Thus, it can be said that the current international corporate responsibility initiatives 
have not succeeded in adopting necessary standards to encourage or persuade TNCs, as far as 
possible, to adopt human rights standards in the course of their operations have also failed to 
provide adequate redress mechanisms where TNCs are not so encouraged. Hence, they have 
been inadequate. 
Notwithstanding their grave shortcomings, the international corporate responsibility 
initiatives are not without any utility. The gaps left by the regulatory initiatives have formed 
the basis for renewed calls for yet another international regulatory mechanism. This time, the 
focus is on the establishment of an international legally binding instrument on business and 
human rights to fill in the gaps left by the voluntary soft law initiatives. Chapter five will 
consider whether such an instrument would provide any feasible solutions to the current 
















FILLING IN THE GAPS? ROAD TO A BINDING INSTRUMENT ON BUSINESS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
5.1 Introduction: The call for an international legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
Previous chapters of this thesis have captured the human rights challenges resulting from the 
activities of TNCs, the inability and unwillingness of states to comply with their obligation to 
protect and the ineffectiveness of existing regulatory initiatives in filling the protection gaps. 
As a result of these lapses, TNCs are still left largely unregulated and victims are without 
adequate access to remedies for corporate related human rights abuse. Considering this, several 
states and civil society organisations made renewed calls for the establishment of an 
international instrument to go beyond the voluntary regulatory initiatives and provide legally 
binding rules to regulate TNCs.1 
In 2013, an alliance was formed. It included several hundred civil society organisations 
representing a broad spectrum ranging from human rights organisations, to workers 
associations, environmental and development organisations, academics and human rights 
activists and local groups representing victims of corporate abuse, referred to collectively as 
‘The Treaty Alliance’.2 The Treaty Alliance led the demand for a globally valid treaty to 
regulate corporate human rights responsibilities. 
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At the intergovernmental level, on the initiative of Ecuador, 85 countries subscribed to 
a statement published at the 24th session of the Human Rights Council.3 The statement 
recommended the drafting of a binding international instrument to regulate the activities of 
corporations as they affect human rights.4 The proposal acknowledged that soft law instruments 
such as the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) are a welcome development. 
However, it stressed that they are no more than a ‘first step’, which ‘provide only a partial 
answer to the pressing issues relating to human rights abuses by transnational corporations.’5 
According to the proposal, ‘an international legally binding instrument concluded within the 
UN system, would clarify the obligations of transnational corporations in the field of human 
rights…and provide for the establishment of effective remedies for victims in cases where 
domestic jurisdiction is clearly unable to prosecute effectively those companies.’6 
In response to the calls, the Human Rights Council on 26th June 2014, adopted 
Resolution 26/9.7 Resolution 26/9 established an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working 
Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human 
rights (OEIGWG).8 The OEIGWGs mandate is to ‘elaborate an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises.’9  
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7 UNHRC, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (14 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9.  
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Resolution 26/9 was adopted with 20 votes in favour, 14 against and 13 abstentions.10 
These numbers have been used to undermine the mandate contained in the Resolution as some 
have declared that there was no consensus to reach its adoption.11 However, it is important to 
note that the forty-seven members of the Human Rights Council adopt resolutions either by 
consensus or by vote. Consensus does not mean unanimity, rather, it demonstrates the absence 
of a public and official opposition to an initiative.12 At the UNHRC, consensus is a reflection 
of ‘a common feeling of comfort among its members, and if it is not reached, the members of 
the UNHRC may vote on a resolution, with a single majority needed for its adoption’.13 About 
30 percent of resolutions are adopted by vote at the UNHRC, and they are treated the same as 
those adopted by consensus.14 Thus, the method of the adoption of resolution 26/9, does not 
detract from its mandate. 
Resolution 26/9 further provided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG were to be 
‘dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form of 
the future international instrument’.15 The Chairperson Rapporteur of the OEIGWG was 
directed to ‘prepare elements (hereinafter ‘the Elements’) for the draft legally binding 
instrument for substantive negotiations at the commencement of the third session’ of the 
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human rights’ (2017) CICICUS State of Civil Society Reports 2017, 
<https://www.civicus.org/documents/reports-and-publications/SOCS/2017/essays/the-way-ahead-for-the-treaty-
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working group, taking into consideration the discussions held in the first and second sessions.16 
A few months after the release of the Elements in September 2017,17 the OEIGWG released a 
‘Zero Draft’ of the future treaty, which was deliberated on during the fourth session in October 
2018.18 The Elements and the Zero Draft form the basis for negotiations on the final contents 
of the future binding instrument. Thus, this chapter examines their contents in order to ascertain 
whether they present viable prospects for closing the current protection gaps, particularly in 
the light of the incapacity and unwillingness of states to execute their obligation to protect. 
 
5.2 The scope of the future binding instrument on business and human rights 
A central focus of the debates during the OEIGWG sessions was the scope of future binding 
instrument. The determination of the scope is crucial as it sets the legal basis for the application 
of the contents of the entire instrument. Two major questions relating to the scope of the future 
binding instrument were considered. Relating to the ratione materia scope of the instrument, 
the first question for determination was whether the future binding instrument should cover all 
international human rights or be limited to serious violations of human rights. In relation to its 
ratione personae scope, the question was whether the future binding instrument should apply 
to all types of business enterprises, or be limited to business entities with a transnational 
character. This section addresses the debates surrounding these questions.  
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5.2.1 Ratione materia scope: what rights should be covered by the future binding 
instrument? 
The main issue for determination under the ratione materia scope of the future binding 
instrument was whether the treaty should cover all human rights or be limited to a specific set 
of rights. The Elements proposed that ‘the objective scope of the future legally binding 
instrument should cover all human rights violations or abuses.19  This proposition was endorsed 
by the Zero Draft, which provided that the future instrument should extend to ‘all human rights, 
and those rights recognized under domestic law.’20 This proposal has been the subject of 
criticism. 
According to John Ruggie, former Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG), the category- ‘all human rights… has no legal pedigree’ and the ‘phrase, regarding 
human rights recognized under domestic law, requires elucidation of how possible tensions and 
contradictions between international and national standards are to be addressed…’21 In relation 
to the former category of rights, Ruggie had advised against adopting a broad interpretation. 
He warned that an instrument with a wide scope ‘would have to be pitched at so high a level 
of abstraction that it would be of little if any use to real people in real places’.22 He advised that 
for international instruments to be successful, they must be ‘carefully constructed precision 
tools, addressed to specific governance gaps that other means are not reaching’.23 Thus, he 
suggested that the scope of the future binding instrument should focus on ‘gross violations’, 
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including those that qualify as international crimes, such as genocide, slavery, forced labour 
and extrajudicial killings.24  
There is some plausibility in Ruggie’s suggestion as focusing on a limited set of 
violations which are already firmly recognised by the international community may be easier 
for its legal formulation and may influence wider acceptance. However, as argued by Surya 
Deva in his statement as a Panellist during the OEIGWGs first session, ‘there is no certainty or 
consensus yet about the meaning of the term “gross”.’25 The term ‘gross’ under international 
human rights law, is influenced by several factors, which include, but are not limited to, the 
type of the victims, the magnitude of the violation and the impact of the violation.26 If such a 
broad interpretation of the term is adopted, ‘the very purpose of building a consensus around 
selected worst forms of human rights violations might be lost.’27 Moreover,  the way ‘gross 
violations’ have traditionally been used in international human rights law relate to violations 
of civil and political rights. Yet it is a well-known fact that due to the nature of corporate 
activities, economic, social and cultural rights are often the first set of rights that are impacted.28 
After analysing over 300 reports of alleged corporate abuses, Ruggie had himself stated that 
‘there are few if any internationally recognized rights business cannot impact-or be perceived 
to impact-in some manner. Therefore, companies should consider all such rights.’29 If the scope 
of the binding instrument is to address the governance gaps in the business and human rights 
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sphere, a wider scope which contemplates both civil and political rights as well as economic, 
social and cultural rights would have to be adopted. 
 This was the basis of the consensus that was built right from the first session of the 
OEIGWG.30 Delegates reiterated the statement in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action that human rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.31 Focusing on 
violations primarily related to civil and political rights would be to deny justice for instance, 
for victims of Shell’s operations in Nigeria or victims of India’s Bhopal disaster, whose 
economic, social and cultural rights were mostly impacted.32  
Considering this, there was a general agreement on the adoption of a scope that focuses 
on all human rights. However, in order to provide legal certainty for the operationalisation of 
the future treaty, the adoption of a ‘minimum package’ as contained in Principle 12 of the 
UNGPs was recommended.33 Principle 12 recognises the business responsibility to respect at 
a minimum, all rights articulated in the International Bill of Human Rights (IBR) and the ILO 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.34 The IBR includes, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),35 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),36 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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(ICESCR).37 Together, these instruments cover a broad range of widely recognised and 
accepted rights.  
However, they include provisions on general human rights that may not cater for 
specifically vulnerable individuals or situations that require particular attention. As noted by 
several delegates at the fourth session, the IGWG could draw from the Commentary to Guiding 
Principle 12, which explains that 
Depending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to 
consider additional standards. For instance, [UN] instruments have 
elaborated further on the rights of indigenous peoples; women; national 
or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; children; persons with 
disabilities; and migrant workers and their families. Moreover, in 
situations of armed conflict enterprises should respect the standards of 
international humanitarian law.38 
Although all human rights instruments could be traced to the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, due 
to the nature of corporate activities, specific groups of persons are more vulnerable.  
In most Niger Delta communities, women are responsible for clothing and feeding the 
family. The women rely on farming and fishing as the few formal jobs are mostly undertaken 
by the men in the community.39 It is no surprise that they are most affected by harmful corporate 
activities in the region.40 Another set of vulnerable persons in the context of corporate activities 
as they affect human rights are indigenous peoples. They continue to face marginalisation, 
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discrimination and suffer human rights abuse. According to the Chair of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), 
 
they are increasingly being displaced and challenged by major 
investment and development projects that are encroaching on their 
lands, territories and resources. When indigenous peoples stand up to 
protect their lands, they are faced with harassment, violence and 
assassination. Over the past two years, we have seen an alarming rise 
in the killings of indigenous human rights defenders. In many ways, 
indigenous peoples are facing even greater struggles and rights 
violations than they did 10 years ago.41 
 
In the face of this, it is fair to say that human rights ‘require a particular “lens” and 
“specification” when dealing with specific groups of people’ like women, indigenous peoples 
and other specially affected groups of persons.42   
It has been suggested that in addition to the IBR and the ILO Declaration, other core 
human rights instruments should be included within the scope of the binding instrument.43 This 
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option may be more desirable as it may provide ‘more clarity and specific guidance about the 
contours of specific human rights’.44 While the rights of women and children have been 
captured in specific human rights treaties, the rights of indigenous peoples, which are directly 
and routinely impacted by corporate activities have not been codified in comparable human 
rights instruments. 45   
In 2007, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) 
was adopted to enshrine rights that ‘constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity 
and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.’46 Article 29 of the UNDRIP provides 
that ‘indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment 
and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources’ and that ‘states shall 
establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation 
and protection, without discriminations.’47 Article 10 provides that ‘indigenous peoples shall 
not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories,’ and ‘no relocation shall take place 
without free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned’.48 The UNDRIP 
also declares that states shall provide mechanisms for prevention and redress for ‘any action 
which has the aim of dispossessing’ indigenous peoples of their lands, territories or 
resources’.49 These provisions cover many important issues confronting indigenous peoples 
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dealing with corporate activity in their territories. However, they are non-binding. The 
UNDRIP merely represents an authoritative statement on the rights of indigenous peoples.  
Thus, it is essential that the future legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises captures the relevant provisions of the UNDRIP 
within its scope in order to ensure better protection for indigenous people. This is particularly 
important as the world’s resources are often located on land owned or controlled by 
approximately 370 million indigenous peoples, who bear the brunt of a significant proportion 
of corporate-related human rights abuse.50 
 In ensuring that individuals are adequately protected from corporate activities affecting 
land and resources, it is important to also recognise that the enjoyment of human rights is 
dependent upon an enabling environment that recognises the complexity of human rights 
protection. Particularly in relation to the extractive industry, corporate activities usually have 
a direct impact on the environment causing damage, which in turn affects the human rights of 
the individuals living within the given environment. For example, the oil spills and gas flaring 
by corporations result in pollution of land, water and air. For communities who depend on the 
natural environment for their livelihood this can lead to serious human rights issues affecting 
their rights to health, food, adequate standard of living, and life.  
The duty to protect requires that states take steps towards preventing third parties from 
causing human rights harm.51 Given the nature of corporate violations, which invariably begin 
with environmental impacts and ultimately human rights harm, it is necessary that 
environmental regulations are set in motion to prevent potential human rights abuse. 
The idea that environmental regulations should be included within the scope of the 
binding instrument was criticised by some delegates at the OEIGWG sessions who felt that 
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issues related to the environment were better dealt with under other UN specialised agencies 
and fora.52 Yet, the pollution and resulting human rights disasters in Bhopal, the contamination 
of farmlands and waterways by Shell’s oil spills in Ogoni, and the Ok Tedi mine waste dumping 
incident and its resultant human rights impact were all attributed to either the lack of, or non-
implementation of environmental regulations.53 The fact remains that there is an intrinsic link 
between the environmental damage caused by corporate activity and human rights violations. 
This fact should be reflected in the future binding instrument.  
Recognising the importance of environmental protection in guaranteeing the protection 
of human rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights stated that states’ 
compliance with article 16 (right to health) and 24 (right to general satisfactory environment) 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples rights 
 
recognise the importance of a clean and safe environment that is closely 
linked to economic and social rights in so far as the environment affects 
the quality of life and safety of the individual….government 
compliance with the spirit of articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter 
must include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific 
monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and publicising 
environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial 
development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing 
information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and 
activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be 
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heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their 
communities.54 
The decision by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights demonstrates how the 
implementation of environmental protection measures could directly impact on and improve 
the protection of human rights. In terms of formulating concrete provisions, the IGWG could 
draw from the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.55 The Rio Declaration 
contains important principles on the adoption of cost-effective methods to prevent 
environmental harm, and the need for environmental impact assessments for proposed 
activities that are likely to have significant adverse impact on the environment.56 However, it 
focuses on environmental issues, which may or may not impact human rights. The ultimate 
goal for the future treaty should be the identification, prevention and mitigation of human rights 
harm and improving accountability of TNCs for their adverse impacts on human rights. Thus, 
any impact assessment in this regard should be done with international human rights law as a 
basis and benchmark. The IGWG may draw from the provisions of the Rio Declaration to set 
up a framework for which states and businesses could identify, prevent and mitigate corporate 
activities that impact the environment in ways that affect human rights.  
 
5.2.1.1 All human rights recognised under domestic law  
Article 3.2 of the Zero Draft did not only propose that the scope of the instrument should 
include all human rights, it also indicated that its scope should extend to ‘human rights 
recognized under domestic law’.57 This phrase has also been criticised. It has been argued that 
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‘the volume and content of human rights in domestic systems vary in a variety of legal systems. 
Thus, business enterprises will be subject to different standards in different states, so that even 
human rights conscious business enterprises would be confused on the exact standards to apply 
in their various operations.’58 Related to this was the criticism raised on the possible tension 
between international and national standards. According to Ruggie in his comment on the Zero 
Draft, ‘the second phrase regarding human rights recognized under domestic law, requires 
elucidation of how possible tensions and contradictions between international and national 
standards are to be addressed, as they are under the UNGPs’.59 
It should be recalled that the very reason for establishing an international regime of 
human rights is precisely to set an international standard to which national systems must 
conform.60 Although states are free to choose their modalities for effectively implementing 
their international legal obligations, the goal is to bring their national law into compliance with 
these obligations. Thus, irrespective of the variances in rights currently recognised under 
domestic systems, the purpose of the future instrument is to create a general standard, which 
states across domestic systems must require their TNCs to undertake. This is with the view to 
creating a level playing field among states and TNCs, and reducing the temptation for both 
actors to lower their standards in order to attain a competitive advantage in global business. 
The UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines both reiterate the fact that respect for 
international human rights is the ‘global standard of expected conduct for multinational 
enterprises independently of states ability or willingness to fulfil their obligations and does not 
diminish human rights’.61 Thus, the recognition or non-recognition of an international human 
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rights rule in a given domestic legal order does not detract from the efficacy of such a rule. The 
binding instrument should clarify the standards that TNCs must that in executing their 
obligations to protect, states must ensure that their domestic human rights regulations conform 
to the provisions of the future treaty.  
In situations where, domestic systems have developed more advanced systems of 
human rights protection that present a higher standard than international human rights 
standards provided in the future treaty, the higher standard should be adopted.62 This has been 
reflected in several UN Conventions and other international agreements. For example, the 
Convention  
on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals gives the State Parties the right to 
‘adopt stricter domestic measures…’ to fulfil their obligations under the convention.63 Article 
2 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco control encourages state parties to implement 
measures beyond the Convention and its protocols. It provides that parties are free to impose 
‘stricter requirements that are consistent’ with the provisions of the Convention and are in 
accordance with international law.64 
In essence, when setting standards for the application of human rights with respect to 
corporate entities, the ultimate focus should be on ensuring optimum protection for human 
rights.  
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5.2.2 Ratione personae scope: what type of businesses will the future binding 
instrument focus on? 
Debates on the ratione personae scope of the future binding instrument stem from a foot note 
in the preamble of Resolution 26/9, which explains that the Resolution applies only to business 
enterprises that have a ‘transnational character in their operational activities’ and excludes 
‘local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law.’65 The debate stemming from 
this footnote has been central to all the IGWG sessions. Some delegates maintained the firm 
position that the footnote should be applied literally. They argued that unlike local businesses, 
the transnational activities of TNCs pose specific challenges due to the complexity of the 
corporate structures, jurisdictional relations and divergent legal systems and levels of 
enforcement.66 They stressed that addressing these accountability gaps posed by transnational 
activities is and should remain the focus of the treaty.67 According to the Indonesian delegate 
 
Extending the scope of the instrument to all business 
enterprises…will not only go beyond the mandate given by the 
resolution, but would mean to open a long negotiating process 
with uncertain outcomes. If the objective of the instrument is to 
address the gaps in the international legal system the negotiation 
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must focus on the elaboration of elements regulating TNCs. 
Aiming at a broad scope including domestic businesses would 
allow us to deviate from the basic purpose of the instrument.68 
 
It was further argued that considering the size and influence of transnational corporations it 
would be a ‘travesty of justice to equate locally registered businesses with other business 
enterprises who evade their human rights responsibilities on jurisdictional grounds’.69 
On the other hand, others argued that the footnote in the preamble of the resolution 
should not be interpreted as limiting the scope of application of the future binding instrument. 
According to this group, business enterprises that have little or no transnational activities can 
and do get involved in human rights abuses that are as severe and wide spread as those caused 
by transnational businesses. In its oral submission during the third session, CETIM stated: 
 
Our experience in documenting business related human rights 
abuses and working with affected communities in all regions of 
the world points to the necessity of an international instrument 
reaffirming that all businesses enterprises must respect human 
rights. Situations we investigate are often complex and involve 
both domestic and transnational corporations. In the past years 
we have investigated countless cases of corporate 
involvement…in human rights abuses…and environmental 
destruction and found that the transnational and local companies 
involved often operate in and benefit from a regulatory and 
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enforcement void leaving the victims of abuse without access to 
remedy.70 
 
This statement expresses the realities of Niger Delta communities and the activities of Shell 
and the Nigerian National Development Petroleum Company (NNPC)- a Federal Government 
owned oil company.71  
Since 1956, when oil was the discovered in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, several 
transnational oil corporations have sought and obtained concessions and exploration licences 
in order to operate in the region. After the indigenization policy that took effect in the 1970s, 
these companies were made to operate under joint venture agreements with the NNPC. The 
NNPC operates as majority partner, with approximately 55-60 percent stake, while the 
corporate multinationals have between 40-45 percent.72 Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria (SPDC), a locally registered subsidiary of Shell is one of such companies 
jointly operating with the NNPC. There are a plethora of reports chronicling the massive 
systemic human rights harm, which have resulted from the irresponsible operations and faulty 
infrastructure from the NNPC-Shell consortium. The case of Gbemre v SPDC, NNPC and the 
AG of the Federation of Nigeria,73 provides a clear picture of the way such partnerships operate 
and their impact on human rights. 
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In Gbemre v Shell, Mr Jonah Gbemre brought a suit on behalf of the Iwhereken 
community in the Niger Delta region against the respondents for engaging in continuous gas 
flaring in the Iwhereken community in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This resulted in the 
poisoning and pollution of the environment, exposing the community to premature deaths and 
respiratory illnesses and cancer, thus, affecting the people’s rights to an adequate standard of 
living, health and life. The victims were not interested in distinguishing whether SPDC was a 
transnational entity, neither were they inclined to excuse abuses they suffered from the NNPC 
merely because it lacks a transnational element. What they were interested in was getting 
redress for the violation of their human rights. This was the basis on which the case was 
instituted.74 
In a rare decision by the Nigerian court, it was held that the activities of the oil 
corporations disregarded the right to life as contained in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the 
Nigerian Constitution and articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter, which Nigeria has signed 
and ratified.75 However, since the court’s ruling, there has been no enforcement. Both NNPC 
and SPDC have continued to flare gas indiscriminately in the Niger Delta.76  
The Gbemre case demonstrates that both local and transnational corporate entities are 
capable of engaging in activities that result in human rights harm. To the victims, it is of no 
consequence whether the harm emanated from the activities of a domestic company or a 
transnational one. Their concern is that they receive redress for the harm.  
Current voluntary initiatives appear to have considered this. For example, while the 
1976 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were focused on multinational 
enterprises operating in the territories of OECD states,77 the 2000 and 2011 revisions of the 
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Guidelines state that ‘The Guidelines are not limited at introducing differences between 
multinational and domestic enterprises; they reflect good practice for all. Accordingly, 
multinational and domestic enterprises are subject to the same expectations in respect of their 
conduct’.78 In the same vein, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises provides that the ‘principles do not aim at introducing or maintaining 
inequalities of treatment between multinational and national enterprises. They reflect good 
practice for all.’79 The 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) consolidates these normative developments by abolishing the distinction between 
TNCs and other business enterprises and positing that all companies have a responsibility to 
respect human rights.80 
For its part, the current zero draft of the Binding Instrument attempts to create a 
compromise between the arguments advocating for a focus on transnational corporations and 
those that demand accountability for all business enterprises. Mirroring the provisions of 
paragraph 2 of the earlier elements document, the Draft extends its scope of application to ‘to 
human rights violations in the context of any business activities of a transnational character.’81 
Thus, rather than focussing on the nature of the business enterprise, it alludes to the 
transnational character of the activities of the enterprises. The Zero Draft goes on to define 
‘business activities of a transnational character’ as ‘any for-profit economic activity… that 
takes place or involve actions, persons or impact in two or more national jurisdictions.’82  
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These innovative provisions regarding the ratione personae scope of the draft 
Instrument appears to be wide enough to cover transnational corporations as well as locally 
based companies that have some transnational links. However, one major problem with this 
definition is that businesses may attempt to exploit the term ‘transnational character’ to find 
loopholes to avoid liability under the binding instrument. The nature of business today is such 
that global transnational companies engage intimately with a range of locally based domestic 
companies. In many of these instances, the actions, persons acting and the impact of the actions 
occur within a single jurisdiction. The relationship between the NNPC and the oil corporations 
operating in Nigeria is a concrete example of this problem.  
 The NNPC under its joint venture agreements with oil multinationals in the Niger 
Delta, contributes to and receives benefits from the production process.83 There are several 
reports on how they have allowed the oil multinationals to use substandard equipment and 
engage in harmful practices in order to reduce production costs and increase revenue at the 
expense of the lives and wellbeing of the communities in areas of their operations.84 A majority, 
if not all of the corporate human rights abuses in the Niger Delta region result from these sort 
of arrangements. However, the activities of the NNPC take place within the national boundaries 
of the country, without any transnational links. This situation is a practical representation of 
one of the major arguments put forward by the European Union (EU) in the negotiation process. 
From the beginning of the treaty process, the EU has made its participation in the drafting 
process dependent on the extension of the future instruments scope to national companies. 
Reason being that there are many instances (just as with the NNPC joint venture agreements) 
where serious human rights violations result from purely domestic activities of national 
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companies.85 These realities must be taken into consideration to set the grounds of what should 
constitute the scope of the binding instrument.  
In order to address the NNPC and oil multinationals joint venture type situations, article 
4.2 of the zero draft should be extended to cover business entities that are involved with goods, 
materials and resources that are produced or extracted not only for domestic use but for 
contributing supplies to markets that cross international boundaries. It should also include 
economic activity that takes place as a network of relationships that cross international 
boundaries. In order to avoid ‘fancy footwork’ which TNCs may employ to avoid this 
definition, it is important that the binding instrument provides for the general corporate 
obligation to respect human rights. In its preamble, the zero draft provides that ‘all business 
enterprises, regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure shall 
respect human rights, including by avoiding causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impact through their own activities…’86 The inclusion of the word ‘shall’ is generally 
understood to provide mandatory flavour, indicating the existence of an obligation. However, 
the provision is located in the preamble, which is usually serves to provide context to the treaty 
and does not on its own have obligatory force. Thus, it is important that this provision is 
included in its general obligations section. This, together with the already established 
obligation of states to protect human rights abuse by third parties, including ‘all’ businesses 
will ensure that domestic enterprises are not exempted from responsibility under the Binding 
Instrument. The Binding instrument can then go on to focus on the specific jurisdictional 
challenges that are peculiar to transnational business entities.  
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This thesis will now turn to the specific operational provisions of the zero draft that 
deal with the accountability of TNCs, particularly in light of the previously identified 
regulatory gaps.87 
 
5.3 The zero drafts response to the current regulatory gaps 
The operational provisions of the zero draft strongly focus on the issue of access to justice and 
remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse. These represent the areas where 
urgent action is needed to fill in the protection gaps left by previous regulatory initiatives.88 
Some of these key issues include insurmountable obstacles to obtaining justice in many host 
states, ambiguities related to human rights due diligence, lack of jurisdiction in home state 
courts over subsidiaries of TNCs, the obstacles of forum non conveniens and the corporate veil, 
and problems related to the implementation and enforcement of human rights rules.  
With respect to these current gaps, the most significant proposals of the zero draft are 
contained in Articles 5, 9, 10.6 and 10.4, 14 as well as the Draft Optional Protocol to the zero 
draft. While reference will be made to other draft articles, the aforementioned will be the main 
focus of the following sections. 
 
5.3.1 The duty to prevent 
The first step to improving access to justice involves setting up preventive human rights 
mechanisms. The prevention of human rights abuse by third parties is a strong aspect of the 
states’ obligation to protect.89 States are required to identify and assess potential adverse human 
rights impact that may cause or contribute to human rights abuse. The process of identifying a 
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potential human rights harm is on one hand to prevent it from happening, and on the other, to 
cease it or mitigate it when it has happened or is in the course of happening.90  
In furtherance of this preventive aspect of the obligation to protect, Article 9.1 of the 
zero draft sets out the obligation of states to ‘ensure in their legislation that persons with 
business activities of a transnational character’ that are domiciled within the states’ territory, 
jurisdiction or that are under their control, ‘shall undertake due diligence obligations 
throughout such business activities’.91 The use of the term ‘due diligence’ as it relates to 
commercial business entities may, however, be misleading. 
Due diligence generally related to business entities involves a single process of 
investigation conducted by businesses to identify and manage its own commercial risks. It is a 
‘one off’ and often a ‘tick box’ process.92 The UNGPs use the term ‘human rights due 
diligence’.93 This was deliberately chosen as an innovative term to integrate with international 
human rights law. It is distinct from due diligence related to business. Human rights due 
diligence is an ongoing process that is focussed on the human rights impact of the business 
activities and not just on the business itself. Initially, it is not the risk to the business that is in 
focus. The risk to the business is in how it manages and prevents these human rights risks.94 
Thus, it is pertinent that the drafters of the binding instrument take these differences into 
consideration for the sake of clarity. 
The Zero Draft specifies that the scope of the due diligence obligation extends over the 
activities of subsidiaries and other entities directly or indirectly controlled by the TNC and 
those that are directly linked to its operations, products or services.95 This directly recalls the 
notion of ‘business relationship’ put forward by the UNGPs and by the OECD Guidelines, 
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which is interpreted as including the whole value chain.96 In proposing that states have an 
obligation to require, by law, that their corporate entities apply due diligence standards 
throughout their value chain, the zero draft takes into consideration the difficulties with host 
state regulation. By providing a legal basis for the duty of home states to apply their domestic 
legislations in a way that would produce extraterritorial effect, the Zero Draft avoids any 
infringement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of host states- principles that have 
always been put up in arguments against the extraterritorial regulation of corporate entities.97 
In keeping with the UNGPs, whose human rights due diligence provisions are premised on the 
corporate responsibility to respect,98 the due diligence obligation in the Binding Instrument 
should be premised on the obligation of businesses to respect human rights. 
Objection has been raised concerning the way the obligation to prevent is phrased in 
certain areas in the current draft article. The wording of Article 9.2.C provides that states parties 
shall ensure that their transnational corporations ‘“prevent” human rights violations within the 
context of its business activities, including the activities of its subsidiaries and that of other 
entities under its direct or indirect control or linked to its operations…’99 This has been 
criticised as positing human rights due diligence as a standard of results, thereby presenting an 
‘extremely tall order for any due diligence requirement (such as the UNGPs), which typically 
is expressed as ‘seek to prevent’, placing human rights due diligence as a standard of 
conduct.100  
Contrary to the above argument, Article 9.2.C of the zero draft is in conformity with 
the UNGPs. Principle 13(a) of the UNGPs provides that ‘the responsibility to respect human 
rights requires that business enterprises avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
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impacts through their own activities’. Principle 13(b) then provides that they seek to prevent 
and mitigate adverse human rights impacts that result from business relationships, which 
include entities within its value chain.101 It is in keeping with Principle 13 that the zero draft 
requires business enterprises to “prevent” human rights harm from its own activities and from 
those entities within its control.  
However, if the scope of article 9.2.C is extended to include business relationships 
outside the entity’s control,102 it may unnecessarily engage the liability of businesses even 
where they have tenuous connections to entities within their business relationships.103  
In order to circumvent this problem, the IGWG could consider including a due diligence 
defence to the treaty provisions. Where a TNC can prove that it took all reasonable precautions 
within the circumstances and had an effective policy and procedure in place to prevent adverse 
human rights impact, liability may not arise.104 Thus, in situations where there is an unforeseen 
adverse human rights impact caused by a third party, i.e., entities in the business relationship 
and the TNC can establish that it has conducted human rights due diligence appropriately, the 
business enterprises could be considered to have done all they could to prevent it. This has the 
effect of moving the burden of the victims to show a ‘causal connection’ or ‘business link’ to 
businesses who would have the burden of showing that it is serious in its implementation of 
effecting human rights due diligence for its own activities. It may also present and provide a 
business incentive for compliance with due diligence. 
Other important provisions in Article 9 of the zero draft include obligations on pre and 
post environmental impact assessments covering the TNCs activities and that of its subsidiaries 
and entities under its control.105 These are important additions that cover the extensive effect 
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of corporate activities especially for those operating in the extractive sector. Violations like 
those of Shell in the Niger Delta Region and Texaco in Ecuador may have been prevented if 
such environmental assessments were mandated.  
The zero draft also requires that ‘meaningful consultations with groups whose rights 
are potentially affected by the business activities and other relevant stakeholders’ should be 
carried out.106 This is similar to the provision of free prior and informed consent contained in 
the UNDRIP.107 The requirement of meaningful consultations should give indigenous 
communities a say in what happens to their lands and property in the event of impending 
corporate activities that may affect such rights. However, in order for such consultations to be 
‘meaningful,’ the positions expressed by individuals and communities during the consultation 
process need to be transparent and considered by the company when making its decisions. An 
important point was raised by the Mexican delegate at the fourth IGWG session on this point. 
He stressed that consultations and consent should be an ongoing process to avoid situations 
where corporations deviate from previously agreed terms in the course of their activities 
without the approval of the concerned individuals and communities.108 This would be a good 
addition to strengthen the provisions of the Binding Instrument.  
However, any meaningful negotiation would have to secure the interests of all the 
negotiating parties. It is therefore important that the drafting committee considers situations 
where the communities themselves withdraw previously given consent after corporate 
activities have commenced. Such situations may place TNCs at a disadvantaged position and 
could work as a disincentive in the negotiation process. Thus, the provision of free prior and 
informed consent should be fashioned in a way that effectively addresses all these concerns.  
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Two major aspects that are crucial to the success of a corporate human rights due 
diligence regime are absent in the zero draft. The first is the absence of a basis for the company 
to mitigate or remediate adverse human rights impact. Identifying potential human rights 
violations on one hand helps to prevent it from happening, however, the cessation or mitigation 
of the harmful activity when it has already occurred is also of crucial importance.109 When the 
company has identified that it has contributed to or caused human rights harm, it should address 
such harm and provide remedy or cooperate in the remediation process to prevent further 
abuses.110 Mitigation and remediation are an important element in the UNGPs and are 
comprehensively discussed in the OECD Guidance on Responsible Business Conduct in 
Relation to Human Rights Due Diligence, which were adopted by the OECD Council in May 
2018.111  The OECD Guidance sets out a due diligence framework to be used by enterprises to 
avoid and address adverse impacts in their operations, supply chains and business relationships. 
It gives corporate entities guidance on practical actions concerning embedding responsible 
business conduct into policies and management systems, identifying and assessing actual and 
potential impacts of their activities, cessation, prevention and mitigation of adverse impacts, 
communication on how impacts are addressed, and provision of remediation when 
appropriate.112 The OECD Guidance provide a very good template on how draft Article 9 could 
be improved. If taken into consideration by the IGWG, they would provide clarity for 
businesses and states in implementing due diligence requirements under the Binding 
Instrument. 
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Another area of concern in the Article on prevention is Article 9.5 which includes the 
discretion of states to exempt small and medium enterprises (SMEs) from compliance with 
human rights due diligence obligations. While it is acknowledged that the due diligence 
obligations provided by the zero draft may prove to be too cumbersome for some of these 
entities, leaving their exemption to the discretion of single state parties may not be the best way 
to overcome this. It can lead to the creation of new legal structures by transnational corporations 
of a series of SMEs which would undermine the purpose of the Binding Instrument. There 
should rather be some general uniform criteria and procedural rules set out in the Binding 
Instrument or by the Conference of State Parties113 in line with the principle of non-
discrimination. Businesses should know that human rights due diligence is an integral part of 
business rather than an additional administrative burden. 
Although some aspects of the provisions on prevention need further development, it 
holds promise for victims of corporate related human rights abuse given its establishment of 
home state obligations to institute domestic regulation with extraterritorial effect. However, if 
business enterprises do not comply with these regulations, the situation will be no different 
from the previous regulatory initiatives. According to article 9.4 of the zero draft, ‘failure to 
comply with due diligence duties shall result in commensurate liability and compensation in 
accordance with the articles of this Convention.’114 Article 10 of the draft spells out the basis 
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5.3.2 The basis for the imposition of liability in the future binding instrument as 
proposed by the Zero Draft 
Article 10 of the Zero Draft requires all state parties to ‘ensure through their domestic laws that 
natural and legal persons may be held criminally, civil or administratively liable for violations 
of human rights…such liability shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal and non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.’115 The UNGPs and other 
regulatory initiatives on business and human rights lacked hard consequences for human rights 
abusers. This article provides one of the strongest impetus for a legal instrument. 
With respect to civil liability, corporate entities to which the instrument applies will be 
liable for harm caused by human rights abuses in the context of their business activities in 
various circumstances, namely: 
a. to the extent it exercises control over the operations, or 
b. to the extent it exhibits a sufficiently close relation with its subsidiary or entity in 
its supply chain and where there is strong and direct connection between its conduct 
and the wrong suffered by the victim, or 
c. to the extent risk have been foreseen or should have been foreseen of human rights 
violations within its chain of economic activity. 
In essence, article 10 of the zero draft prescribes the parameters for establishing the connecting 
link between a given parent company and a subsidiary for the purpose of determining liability. 
It suggests that parent companies would be liable for the harm resulting from the extraterritorial 
acts or omissions of its subsidiaries ‘to the extent that it exercises control over their operations’, 
or when it has a ‘close relation’ with its subsidiary or entity in its supply chain and when its 
                                               




own conduct is ‘directly connected’ to the harm caused, or when the risk ‘have been foreseen 
or should have been foreseen’.116 
These parameters for establishing parent company liability in relation to the wrongs 
perpetrated by their subsidiaries are very flexible in their definition. Their alternative 
application demonstrates the effort put in by the drafters to ensure that they cover all possible 
ways in which a company may be involved in the human rights harm caused by corporate 
entities. However, they may not have solved the existing difficulties with establishing such a 
link. There is still the problem of the parent companies deliberately relinquishing control over 
the activities of their subsidiaries, even in situations where they could exercise such control, so 
as to escape liability. Parent companies could decide to adopt a hands-off attitude to avoid 
‘strong direct connections’ with their business affiliates. The difficulty for victims to prove 
such connections is one of the most recurrent obstacles that impede access to justice in such 
cases, as the necessary evidence will invariably be in the possession of the TNC in question.117  
Article 10.4 appears to mitigate this problem by providing that ‘subject to domestic 
law, courts may require, where needed, a reversal of the burden of proof for the purpose of 
fulfilling the victim’s access to justice.’118 A reversal of the burden of proof is generally 
classified as either placing a legal or an evidentiary burden on the defendant.119 Legal reversals 
require the defendant to prove a fact which is essential to the determination of his or her 
innocence on the balance of probabilities. As a result, they may significantly encroach on the 
presumption of innocence. However, evidential reversals have been found to be compatible 
with the presumption of innocence because the defendant is only required to raise exculpatory 
evidence, leaving the prosecution with the ultimate burden of proving the defendant’s guilt 
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beyond reasonable doubt.120 Thus, if the victims of alleged corporate human rights abuse can 
prima facie establish that they have suffered harm that results or is likely to result from the 
activities of a given TNC, shifting the evidential burden of proof to the defendant TNC would 
provide relief to the victims from getting the necessary information to prove that the TNC had 
control or sufficient proximity. The CESCR supports the proposal in Article 10.4 of the zero 
draft. It notes in General Comment 24, that, ‘shifting the burden of proof may be justified where 
the facts and events relevant for resolving a claim lie wholly or in part within the exclusive 
knowledge of the corporate defendant.’121  
Nevertheless, any excitement over this provision is dampened by its vague and 
discretionary wording and that it is made expressly ‘subject to domestic law’.122 Leaving the 
reversal of the burden of proof to states’ discretion would greatly undermine the scale of this 
innovative provision. It would be more effective if the drafters make the draft article 
compulsory subject to standards that are set in the binding instrument in order to ensure its 
uniform application.  
The criterion of foreseeability on the other hand builds on existing international 
obligations that have been restated by the UNCESCR General Comment Number 24 and has 
also been applied in some domestic and legislation.123 It presents a more plausible way of 
framing the criteria for parent company liability. It would require that state parties establish the 
liability of parent companies for their failure to react to risks resulting from the acts or 
omissions of their subsidiaries that they have foreseen or should have foreseen. This way, it 
will be in the interest of the company to closely monitor the activities of its subsidiary in order 
to avoid liability or to provide an insurance against the risk of being accused of being negligent 
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in exercising oversight over the subsidiary’s activities. This approach would help in 
sidestepping the problems posed by the separate legal personality doctrine as liability would 
not attach for the harm resulting from the activities of the subsidiary, but for the failure of the 
parent company to prevent or react to the harmful activities.  
However, it is important that the drafters of the binding instrument clarify this criterion 
by linking article 10 to article 9.4 This is because under the foreseeability requirement, the 
liability of the parent company will arise from the failure to exercise due diligence in 
controlling the acts and omissions of their subsidiaries. 124 Obviously, ‘control’ still plays a part 
in the foreseeability requirement. However, for the purpose of the application of the 
foreseeability requirement, control should not be defined on a case by case basis in a bid to 
determine whether the parent companies have been in fact involved in formulating the policies 
of the subsidiary or whether they are closely involved in the operations of the subsidiary. 
Rather, liability should only be excluded when the parent company can show that despite their 
best efforts, they were unable to seek information or react to the harmful practices of its 
subsidiaries.125 
This mode of establishing liability could also extend to other corporate activities in the 
transnational process, which rely on the establishment of contractual relationships with 
suppliers, sub-contractors and related business affiliates. Where a company sources supplies 
from other countries or subcontracts parts of its production process to contractors in other 
states, establishing the degree of control or influence it may have over such subcontractors 
becomes a herculean task. Thus, it is easier and more advantageous to establish the potential 
liability of the subcontracting company on its obligation to ensure that it seeks to identify the 
human rights impacts of its policies and it prevents and mitigates such impacts accordingly. 
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This duty is not dependent on the reality of the control and influence exercised on the other 
corporate entities that it interacts with. 
In relation to criminal liability, the Zero Draft proposes that state parties ‘provide 
measures under domestic law to establish criminal liability for all persons with business 
activities of a transnational character that intentionally, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, commit human rights violations that amount to a criminal offence’. 126 There 
are cogent reasons for establishing corporate criminal liability in the context of business and 
human rights. Corporate criminal liability can have a strong deterrent effect. It attracts 
reputational damage and costly monetary sanctions, which TNCs may not be prepared to deal 
with.127 The Zero Draft, however, does not address key questions that arise with establishing 
the intention of corporate entities for the purpose of establishing criminal liability. For example, 
will the intent of any employee of the corporation be imputed to the corporate entity, or would 
it rather be that of an employee in a position of authority or control?128 The zero draft leaves 
these questions to be determined by the different national legal systems.  
Recognising that some national legal systems do not recognise criminal liability of 
corporate entities, the Zero Draft proposes that corporate entities should be made ‘subject to 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions 
or other administrative sanctions.’129 Although the Zero Draft’s current approach would not 
provide for universal standards regarding corporate criminal liability, states will be less 
opposed to a general obligation to provide for the criminal liability of TNCs in their national 
regulations. 
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However, the Zero Draft limits the imposition of criminal liability to situations where 
corporate entities are involved in ‘business activities of a transnational character’. This may 
present some difficulty. If the scope of criminal liability is limited to business activities of a 
transnational character it would mean that no matter the severity of the criminal conduct (even 
in cases of crimes against humanity), it will not be punishable if committed by businesses 
acting only within one jurisdiction. This is reflective of the problems that exists with the general 
scope proposed in the zero draft, particularly in relation to state owned companies that act 
within the territorial boundaries of a state.130  
 
 
5.3.3 The implementation and enforcement of the binding instrument 
5.3.3.1 Jurisdiction 
An important step towards the implementation and enforcement of the proposed binding 
instrument is to identify the courts with competence to determine the liability of the business 
entities when they have allegedly breached their due diligence obligations. 
The current reality in relation to access to justice for victims of corporate related abuse 
is that the host states on whose territory such abuses occur do not have the necessary national 
structures to ensure that the victims obtain adequate remedies.131 Home states which are usually 
the domicile of the parent companies are known to have the necessary regulatory structures to 
ensure remedy despite the complexity of the corporate structure and operations. Parent 
companies have been known to contribute to such abuses or at least make decisions that result 
in human rights harm in host states. The evidence of such decisions is located within the home 
states, where the parent companies are registered or domiciled. Moreover, assets of the 
                                               
130 See section 5.2 of this thesis. 




company are usually located in the home countries, making it more likely for victims of human 
rights abuse to gain access to remedy if they bring a claim before homes state courts.  
Notwithstanding the facts contained in the above paragraph, jurisdiction is considered 
as an expression of the state’s sovereignty in international law. Thus, it has notoriously 
presented a doctrinal bar to the recognition of an extraterritorial obligation to protect human 
rights.132 In this connection, the critical issue has always been the determination of the 
jurisdiction of a state over the activities exercised by its corporate entities or their subsidiaries 
abroad.133 With respect to the business and human rights debate, it is necessary to establish 
whether states have an obligation to  protect human rights outside their national territory. This 
entails two aspects: i) whether the state has prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction, i.e., can 
states adopt legislation with extraterritorial effect and ii) whether states should allow national 
courts hear claims about situations that occurred abroad. 
The various UN treaty bodies have repeatedly expressed the view that States human 
rights obligations do not stop at their territorial borders.134 Rather, states should take steps to 
prevent human rights abuses committed abroad by business entities domiciled in their 
territories and/or jurisdiction (whether they are incorporated under their laws, or have their 
statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business on the national territory), 
without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the human rights obligations of host states.135  
This position on the extraterritorial reach of the states’ duty to protect has been supported by 
the International Court of Justice itself.136 However, no current international human law rights 
instrument contains an express statement on the states’ obligation to protect human rights 
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extraterritorially. The UNGPs have stated that the extraterritorial regulation of the activities of 
business entities is not a legal obligation, but that states are free to do so if they choose.137 This 
has led to some form of unclarity on the issue. Perhaps a way of establishing and clarifying this 
obligation is to explicitly state it in the future binding international instrument. 
The zero draft proposes to establish such a duty. It does so by listing certain criteria in 
which to establish a connection between a corporate entity and the state in order to establish 
jurisdiction. Article 5 of the Zero Draft focuses on adjudicative jurisdiction and clarifies the 
situations where states have jurisdiction over a dispute that originates from a contravention of 
the provisions of the instrument. Thus, clarifying the extent of the states’ duty to regulate its 
business entities as well. Two categories of states are considered to possess jurisdiction over 
human rights violations covered in the draft: 
• The host states where the acts or omissions occurred 
• The home states where the TNC is domiciled 
Since human rights abuses are more likely to occur in developing host states where there are 
inadequate and inefficient national regulatory structures and where access to remedies for 
victims is usually elusive, the home state where the TNC is domiciled will be the focus. 
In defining the home state where a TNC may be domiciled, the zero draft considers four 
alternative criteria where the TNC has its: 
1. statutory seat, or 
2. central administration, or  
3. substantial business interest, or  
4. subsidiary agency, instrumentality, branch, representative office or the like138 
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The enlargement of the concept of jurisdiction to include subsidiaries, agencies, 
instrumentalities, branches and representative office, has not been applied in the domain of 
international human rights law. However, such enlargement is well-known and used in other 
branches of law. A good example is the European Union competition law. In De Bloos SPRL 
v Societe en commodite par actions Couyer, the European Court of Justice held that the terms 
‘branch, agency or other establishment’ do not refer to specific legal situations but imply: 
- the secondary establishment’s dependence on the parent company, and 
- the secondary establishment’s involvement in the conclusion of business transacted.139 
The ECJ has also clarified that in EU competition law, it is possible to attribute the acts of a 
subsidiary to the parent company when that subsidiary does not autonomously determine its 
conduct on the market but mostly applies the instructions given by the parent company.140 
Where the parent company holds all or most of the capital in a subsidiary which has committed 
an infringement of the EU competition rules, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent 
company exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary.141 
Article 5 proposes a very expansive and flexible interpretation of domicile for the 
purposes of jurisdiction under the binding instrument. It puts forth a broad concept of 
jurisdiction based on the most recent interpretations of legal doctrine and a coherent reading of 
other branches of the law that may be applied. This represents a big step forward in the effort 
to reduce legal gaps in access to justice in cases of violations of human rights perpetrated by 
companies. This is especially so because instead of providing a permissive rule like the UNGPs 
state, it would establish a duty on states. However, in order to be effective, the future binding 
instrument should address the barriers to justice that are linked to the corporate veil. One way 
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of doing this is to follow the recommendation of the CESCR in General comment No. 24 to 
impose a duty of care on the parent company by creating a parent-based extraterritorial 
regulation imposing direct liability on the parent company for its failure to prevent violations 
committed by companies that are part of its value chain.142 Thus, it is important that article 5 
is also linked with article 9 on prevention and article 10 on legal liability. 
Another issue which needs to be addressed in connection with the jurisdictional 
provision is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The zero draft, while giving wide 
interpretation to jurisdiction, fails to address the issue of forum non conveniens that has 
presented a serious barrier to victims accessing justice in home states. The victims of the largest 
industrial disaster Bhopal, India and the thousands of people affected by Texaco’s alleged 
complicity in human rights abuses in Ecuador were deprived access to remedy based on  
doctrine.143 Yet, the zero draft proposes in article 13.2, that ‘nothing in this convention entitles 
a state party to undertake in the territory of another state the exercise of jurisdiction and 
performance of function that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other state by 
its domestic law.’144 This provision may create a basis for the continued use of the forum non 
convinens doctrine.  
The zero draft could explicitly recognise the forum necesitatis doctrine which would 
ensure a duty of all states to ensure that victims of corporate human rights abuses are not 
deprived from accessing judicial remedy. Some EU member states and Canada have already 
included regulations on forum necessitatis in their national legal systems.145 These could serve 
as an inspiration for the future instrument to develop its own conditions for the application of 
the doctrine. 
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There is, however, an important contribution that Article 13 of the Zero Draft appears 
to make. In a move to address the asymmetrical nature of trade and international investment 
agreements, article 13 proposes that in negotiating trade and investment agreements, states 
shall ensure that human rights are upheld ‘in the context of business activities by parties 
benefiting from such agreements.’146 It further provides that states should ensure ‘that all 
existing and future trade and investment agreements shall be interpreted in a way that is least 
restrictive on their ability to respect and ensure their obligations’ under the future binding 
instrument.147 However, it does not give specific direction on how this can be achieved. The 
phrase ‘least restrictive’ is susceptible to different interpretations. This lack of certainty may 
create room for abuse. By states and corporate investors.  As suggested by delegates in the 
OEIGWGs fourth session, the binding instrument should include a provision requiring states 
to undertake human rights impact assessments and consultations be conducted prior to entering 
such agreements.148 This will ensure that potential human rights risks stemming from such 
agreements are identified and prevented. 
 
5.3.3.2 Complaint mechanisms 
The proposed introduction of extraterritorial jurisdiction, state regulations with extraterritorial 
effect, the clarification of procedures and forms of liability and the standards to be applied, 
demonstrate that the Zero Draft focuses on access to justice and remedies for victims. This is 
commendable. It reflects the desires of many who advocated for the creation of corporate 
accountability standards and what they consider as the most pressing issues in the area of 
business and human rights.  
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However, in the absence of any implementation and enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
that these provisions are effected, the binding instrument would be no different from previous 
regulatory initiatives. Without an effective international remedial mechanism with 
investigative and sanctioning powers to ensure that corporate human rights abuses are 
prevented and remedied, there would be no need for a binding treaty on business and human 
rights. 
The international institutional arrangements proposed in the zero draft to ensure the 
implementation of its provisions present one of the major weaknesses of the draft. Article 14 
of the Zero Draft proposes a traditional treaty monitoring body, a Committee composed of a 
limited number of experts whose competence would be limited to: 
 
a. Make general comments on the understanding and implementation of the 
Convention based on the examination of state reports and the reports from other 
stakeholders. 
b. Consider and provide concluding observations and recommendations on reports 
submitted by state parties 
c. Provide support to state parties in the compilation and communication of 
information required for the implementation of the convention 
d. Submit an annual report on its activities under the convention to the state parties 
and the UN General Assembly 
e. To possibly recommend to the UNGA to request the Secretary-General to 
undertake on its behalf studies on specific issues relating to the convention149 
 
                                               




Article 14(5) further provides for a conference of state parties which will also review 
implementation, including, any ‘further development’ needed to fulfil the purpose of the 
treaty.150 
The international oversight mechanism contemplated by the zero draft combines the 
self-reporting and non-binding review characteristics of early human rights treaties governing 
states, with the more recent innovation of a conference of states parties. The limitations of these 
state reporting systems are already well known.151 It is even more regrettable in the case of 
corporate abuses as the lack of expertise that is characteristic of Committee members of the 
existing treaty bodies could represent a major problem in the case of the binding instrument on 
business and human rights.152 This is because it relates to an inherently complex and 
multidisciplinary issue. Yet the drafters of the Zero Draft adopt the system without any 
modifications.153 
In August of 2018, Ecuador’s Ambassador released a draft Optional protocol containing 
provisions for a National Implementation Mechanism (NIM) and a complaints function for the 
Committee created under Article 14 of the zero draft.154 Under the OP, the NIM will be given 
the authority to carry out due diligence implementation reviews.155 This may potentially 
address an important gap in the current business and human rights regulatory framework. 
Current regulatory initiatives require business entities to report on their human rights 
performance without providing any concrete consequences for poor reporting.156 The OP seeks 
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to remedy this situation by conferring the NIM with authority to review corporate performance 
of their due diligence at the prompting of victims, other stakeholders and even ex officio.157 
The competence of the NIM to conduct these reviews would be quite broad. It would include 
visits and inspections ‘to monitor the implementation and follow up of due diligence plans or 
policies.158  
The OP provides that the NIM ‘shall, as a minimum, have competence to request all 
necessary information from the State Party in whose territory the NIM operates’.159 This 
necessarily implies that when due diligence is underway, corporate entities would naturally 
produce and publish reports on the internal policies, outcomes and indicators of environmental 
and human rights impact assessments. It presupposes that state parties actually collect or keep 
track of such information, which may not necessarily be the case. The OP would require the 
NIM to gather information but it does not indicate how the gathering of such information would 
prevent and remedy human rights abuse.  
Another proposal that the OP makes is the recognition of the competence of the NIM 
to receive and consider complaints of human rights violations by victims or a group of victims, 
their representatives or other interested parties, with a view to reaching an amicable settlement 
on the matter.160 The OP would permit the NIM to establish good offices to parties concerned 
with a view to reaching an amicable settlement.161 According to the OP, when such a settlement 
is reached, it shall discontinue the proceedings.162 The NIM is to monitor compliance by the 
parties of the agreement reached through an amicable settlement.163 However, the OP does not 
consider situations in which solutions are not amicably met. Rather, it proposes that where the 
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amiable settlements are breached, the NIM should communicate to the Committee established 
under the treaty.164 However, the rationale behind this is unclear. 
The OP gives the NIM powers and competencies that overlap with existing soft law 
bodies and their institutions. Most notable is the overlap with the National Contact Points 
(NCP) for the OECD Guidelines.165 Nearly two decades of experience in over 50 countries 
exposes the fact that the NCP system is highly flawed and often characterised by a lack of 
sanctions, power imbalances, conflicts of interests, and lack of independence.166 The irony here 
is that the OP asserts that state parties ‘shall consider the Principles Relating to the Status of 
National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (Paris Principles) when 
designating or establishing the NIM’.167 Yet apart from its focus on conciliation and mediation, 
it makes no mention of other functions contained in the Paris Principles, especially the 
possibility of issuing binding decisions.168 
The OP attempts to enhance the powers of the Committee established under article 14 
of the Zero Draft by proposing the institutionalisation of an individual complaints mechanism 
similar to what is obtainable in the committees of current human rights treaties. Yet again, it 
does not address its inherent problems. Amongst the many issues confronting the individual 
complaints system, the ability to deal with the numerous complaints brought against state 
parties is one major challenge. If the committees of current human rights treaties struggle to 
grapple with the complaints involving fewer than 200 States, how will a similar committee 
cope with complaints stemming from the conduct of thousands of business entities? 
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5.4 The issue of state complicity 
The OP and indeed the zero draft largely depend on the cooperation of the state parties for the 
implementation of the proposed provisions. States themselves engage in commercial activities 
and may very well be a part of the violations perpetrated by business entities. In Nigeria, for 
instance, all subsidiaries of foreign oil companies operate based on joint venture agreements 
concluded with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), typically on a 60/40 
percent ratio, with the NNPC owning the higher percentage.169 There are a plethora of reports 
on the NNPC’s complicity with the foreign oil companies in perpetrating human rights 
violations in the country.170 Such complicity is usually attributed to the unwillingness and 
incapacity of the states to use their national structures to implement their international human 
rights obligations.171 There is no provision in the proposed articles of the  zero draft and its OP 
where states’ complicity in corporate human rights abuses is addressed. This could very well 
lead to situations where victims of corporate related human rights abuse are left without 
recourse to remedy, defeating the purpose of a binding instrument. 
It should be recalled that the incapacity and unwillingness of states to carry out their 
obligations to hold business entities accountable for human rights abuses is the very reason for 
the initiation of this entire treaty process.172 Thus, this consideration should be at the forefront 
of any initiative for the implementation of human rights standard in the field of business and 
human rights. It would be an anomaly to let business entities ‘off the hook’ because the states 
have failed to carry out their international obligations. In such situation, the only losing party 
are the victims in a regime where they are to be the primary focus of protections. 
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One good response to this legal conundrum would be to place direct human rights 
obligations on business entities. As already argued elsewhere in this thesis, the state’s 
obligation to protect and provide remedies for corporate human rights abuse would necessarily 
mean that business entities have obligations to respect human rights.173 There is no conceptual 
impossibility for corporations to directly acquire obligations under international law, as 
demonstrated by extant provisions in conventions on the law of the sea, environmental law and 
energy law that establish direct obligations for businesses.174 Even the Elements document 
discussed at the IGWG third session contemplated the imposition of such direct obligations. 
According to the Elements ‘the core of an international legally binding instrument’ is the 
‘recognition of general obligations of TNCs and OBEs’ to comply with all applicable laws and 
respect internationally recognised human rights.175 The Zero Draft does not echo this proposal 
contained in the Elements. However, article 1 of the zero draft provides that businesses ‘shall 
respect human rights’. This leaves conceptual room for the creation of direct obligations to be 
developed in a later protocol or, perhaps, in a later revision of the binding instrument. 
It is important to note that the establishment of direct corporate obligations does not 
suggest that state obligations would simply ‘disappear’. Multiple participants in a wrongful act 
may have simultaneous and coexistent responsibilities, which require each participant to 
respond individually for their part in the wrongful act.176 Obligations of business entities are 
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independent of the state’s acceptance of human rights obligations. They are not also contingent 
on the state’s fulfilment of its own human rights obligations. The commentary to Principle 11 
of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights confirms this when it states that  
the responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected 
conduct for all Business Enterprises wherever they operate. It exists 
independently of states’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human 
rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over 
and above compliance with national law and regulations protecting human 
rights.177  
This idea is also reflected in the OECD Guidelines for multinational Enterprises, when it states 
that  
states have the duty to protect, while enterprises should, within the 
framework of internationally recognised human rights, international human 
rights obligations of the communities in which they operate, as well as 
relevant domestic laws and regulations, respect human rights, avoid causing, 
prevent or mitigate human rights harm.178 
The language used in these documents signify that the failure or inability of a state to enforce 
relevant international human rights obligations does not mean that corporations should escape 
accountability for their activities that negatively impact on human rights. Hence, the inclusion 
of such direct obligations would only clarify what is already understood as the duty of 
corporations under international human rights law, when it states that corporate entities shall 
comply with and respect ‘internationally recognised human rights wherever they operate, and 
throughout their supply chains’.179 
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It is clear from the Elements and other existing instruments on international human 
rights, that from a conceptual point of view, human rights already envisage direct obligations 
for corporations. What they do not do, however, is suggest how the establishment of these 
obligations will be achieved as a matter of law.  
In reality, the responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the obligations 
contained in the instruments fall back on the state. In essence, the corporate entities do not 
attract international responsibility for their failure to carry out the obligations, rather it is the 
state that is required to do so. Thus, it is only the state can violate the obligations or incur 
international responsibility for a breach of the obligations.180 
In some domestic systems, such international agreements have no effect on private 
actors unless it is implemented by the national legislative branch.181 While in others, 
international agreements may have domestic legal force only where the national constitutional 
provisions state so.182 The primary obligations are attached to the state parties, as they are the 
ones who are to take steps to prohibit particular private conduct or react to violations when 
they occur. In these sorts of situations, including direct obligations on corporate actors in a 
binding instrument on TNCs and OBEs may not be very effective in improving their 
accountability as long as it is the state that will still be accountable for any breach of its 
provisions. In the face of states’ unwillingness and incapacity to discharge their obligations to 
protect such an exercise may be in vain. 
There are, however, instances where international law has held private actors 
responsible for breaches of international law. These are situations where the international 
community has established mechanisms to adjudicate on the international responsibility of 
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private actors. A good example of this is in the field of international criminal law. The 
Nuremberg rules, for example, provided for individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.183 The vast majority of prosecutions at 
Nuremberg were against state officials, some however, occurred against the managers of 
certain corporations implicated in Nazi activities.184 The corporations themselves did not face 
prosecution because the tribunal possessed jurisdiction only over natural persons.185 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that  if the jurisprudential lens through which one views the trial 
of the corporate managers is broadened, it could be reasonably concluded that the criminality 
of the corporations was recognised. Although there were no corporations in the docket at 
Nuremberg, the basis upon which the corporate managers were found guilty of international 
crimes was due to their participation in the criminal conduct of the corporations. When 
examining this very issue in the Kiobel case, Justice Leval observed that ‘in at least three of 
those trials, tribunals found that the corporations violated the law of nations and imposed 
judgement on individual criminal defendants based on their complicity in the corporations’ 
violations.’186 
The legal reasoning in the Nuremberg cases was a two-step process. For example, in 
the I.G Farben Trial, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that Farben had violated international 
law and then imposed liability on individual Farben executives and employees based on their 
complicity in Farben’s violations.187 In Krupp, for example, the tribunal made repeated 
references to the collective intent of the Krupp Group, and mentioned the corporations ‘ardent 
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desire’ to employ slave labour in its factories.188 Thus, although none of the corporations were 
formally declared ‘criminal organisations’, nor subject to the Tribunals jurisdiction, it could be 
argued that the judgements in the trials of the corporate executives suggest the possibility of 
attributing liability for international crimes to the corporations themselves, not just to their 
directors and other employees.189  
More recently, there has been an institutionalisation of the Malabo Protocol, which 
entrusts the (yet to be established) African Court of Justice and Human Rights with the 
jurisdiction to receive cases of international crimes committed by corporations.190 Although 
the basis for its establishment and the criteria for corporate liability are unclear,191 the mere 
fact that such an instrument is being contemplated is an indication of the international 
community’s increasing interest and attention to the possibility and need for establishing an 
international body capable of sanctioning erring corporate entities. 
The Elements document contemplated this sort of arrangement by including a proposal 
for the establishment of an international court on transnational corporations to promote, 
implement and monitor the provisions of the binding instrument.192 Unlike the Elements, the 
zero draft does not contemplate any binding international enforcement mechanism. It will not 
create an international court where victims can sue companies or where business executives 
and corporations can be criminally prosecuted. It does not even as much as provide for a 
mechanism for sanctions via the Committee, or the NIMs proposed by the OP. The 
international oversight mechanisms contemplated by the zero draft and its draft optional 
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protocol combine the self-reporting and non-binding review characteristic of early human 
rights treaties governing states, together with their flaws. This could be the price of admission 
for a critical mass of states to ratify the treaty.193  
The value of broad state participation may supersede the value added of an international 
court, especially in the face of the disappointing performance of the International Criminal 
Court.194 The text of the zero draft should be appealing to states as it puts them in the ‘driver’s 
seat’ to adopt legislation of their own to meet broadly stated standards without any compulsory 
international oversight mechanism.195 Business entities are very likely to oppose a binding 
instrument with mandatory human rights due diligence obligations. However, they are more 
likely ‘to take a fresh look’ at an instrument which reinforces a state-based approach to its 
implementation and enforcement.196 Perhaps at this stage of the negotiations the establishment 
of an international enforcement mechanism may work against the general support of the treaty 
process. However, one important question remains. What would be the value of broad state and 
business participation if the states remain unwilling and unable to apply their national 
regulations in ensuring proper access to remedy and accountability of TNCs? Article 14.5 of 
the Zero Draft does well to leave open the possibility of ‘any further development’ needed to 
implement the treaty. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
Following the proposals in the zero draft, the binding instrument on business and human rights 
will adopt an approach focused on improving access to justice and remedy for victims of human 
rights abuses resulting from the activities of business entities. This is commendable as the 
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current gaps in the area of business and human rights stem from issues of this nature. However, 
the proposals made in the various articles of the zero draft need to be clarified and strengthened. 
The proposals relating to the rationae materia and rationae personae scope of the binding 
instrument need to reflect the fact that all business entities are capable of negatively impacting 
the entire range of human rights. It is important that the provisions of the binding instrument 
are couched in such a way that business entities do not adopt clever structures in order to evade 
liability for their harmful actions.  
The proposals requiring states to establish due diligence obligations for business 
entities and standards of liability are quite extensive. They may reduce the chances of business 
entities escaping responsibility for their conduct. However, the approach adopted in the zero 
draft ignores the fact that states may be complicit in corporate related abuse. It does not 
consider the need for legal accountability and remedies also in the context of state commercial 
activity. The fact that states are themselves involved in commercial activities may contribute 
to their unwillingness to carry out their obligations under the future treaty following the zero 
drafts proposals. This may affect the victims’ access to justice and right to remedy, which is 
the focus of the current treaty process.  
Without clear provisions on mechanisms that would ensure that victims are not left 
without recourse to remedy, what would be the value in continuing the treaty process? The 
value may not be capable of being statistically measured. Rather, it may be more symbolic.  
The binding instrument could clarify that all business entities are bound under international 
human rights law to respect human rights. This will settle the debates on whether or not 
corporations have human rights obligations, something which is still debated despite the 
numerous pronouncements by human rights bodies and even the ICJ recognising such 
obligations. In all, the proposal for a binding instrument on business and human rights 




They have now come to a point where they will be subjected to binding international principles 
and standards which would ensure that they respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Moreover, the current draft gives leeway for the development and establishment of an 
international mechanism that could ensure the implementation of the binding instrument in the 








As mentioned at the outset, the main aim of this thesis was to explore whether existing 
regulatory frameworks offer individuals adequate protection from the negative impacts that the 
activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) may have on their human rights’ enjoyment. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis began by providing a general overview of the thesis. It was noted that 
discussions would be focussed on the debates surrounding the regulation and accountability of 
TNCs, from the early human rights frameworks, to current international regulatory initiatives 
and then the ongoing regulatory initiative by the Human Rights Council, which set up the open-
ended intergovernmental working group (OEIGWG) to establish a legally binding instrument 
to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of TNCs and other business 
enterprises. The thesis analyses several international and regional human rights instruments, 
international, regional and national case law, relevant scholarly works, as well as discussions 
that took place during the OEIGWG sessions. The analysis was targeted towards answering 
certain research questions in order to facilitate the achievement of the main aim of the thesis. 
This chapter now turns to these research questions to determine whether and how the current 
regulatory initiatives have addressed the issues surrounding the activities of TNCs as they 
affect human rights.  
 
What does the states’ obligation to protect entail, particularly in respect of transnational 
corporate entities? 
It has been established that the obligation to protect entails a legal duty that is placed on states 
to take steps to prevent, investigate and redress human rights harm resulting from the activities 




include TNCs. The thesis acknowledges that the fact that the obligation to protect is placed on 
states, reflects the way and manner human rights law has developed - as affording protection 
to individuals against abuses by the state in which they were resident.  This is because states 
were considered the primary entities that were in a position to greatly impact human rights. 
However, although TNCs and their potential impact were not contemplated at the time of the 
conclusion of the early international human rights law regulatory frameworks, the thesis argues 
that TNCs do not operate in a regulatory vacuum. Therefore, states have the obligation to use 
their national regulatory structures to prevent, investigate and punish human rights abuse 
stemming from the activities of TNCs.  
Based on the interpretation of the obligation provisions of human rights treaties by their 
treaty bodies, the obligation to protect requires that states adopt a standard of due diligence in 
protecting human rights. As analysed in Chapter 2, this implies that states take positive steps 
by employing all measures within their power to prevent the occurrence of human rights abuses 
as far as they have the capacity to influence and the ability to foresee potential human rights 
harm. When such abuses occur, states have a duty to punish the offending TNCs and provide 
necessary redress to the victims of the human rights abuse. 
 
What is the scope of the obligation to protect? 
The thesis argues that the duty of the state to exercise due diligence in protecting human rights 
from abuses by third parties has no territorial limitation. Rather, it is based on the extent of the 
states’ capacity to influence and its ability to foresee the negative impact of TNC activities. In 
support of this argument, the thesis considered the rationale behind the emergence of the 
international framework for the protection of human rights by examining the earliest 
international human rights instruments (the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human 




could not have contemplated the great influence that transnational corporate business actors 
now have on human rights, the thesis argues that the very idea behind setting up an international 
framework for the protection of human rights in the first place, necessarily implies an 
extraterritorial application of the obligation to protect. The UN Charter, which was the first 
international instrument that codified international human rights recognises the fact that the 
international protection of human rights is a common ideal which is to be achieved by ‘joint 
and separate international action’.1 The drafters may not have envisaged the emergence of large 
corporate entities with the ability to operate across state boundaries, but they recognised the 
fact that the protection of international human rights could not be achieved by states acting 
alone. It was seen as necessary that states take joint and separate action in cooperation with 
one another in order to protect human rights. Thus, it is in keeping with the requirements of 
joint and separate action that when a state has difficulty in discharging its human rights 
obligation to protect within its territory, another state who is in a better position to do so may 
use its regulations to ensure that the rights of individuals within the former state are protected. 
After all, the idea for establishing an international regime for human rights was so that the 
protection of human rights was no longer the exclusive prerogative of the state where the 
human rights abuse occurred, but a matter of international concern.  
The thesis argues that the ICCPR, ICESCR and other international and regional human 
rights treaties expanded on the ideals that were expressed in the UN Charter and the UDHR. 
Therefore, they could not have intended to limit the scope of the application of their human 
rights provisions to their national boundaries.  
The thesis however, notes that most human rights law instruments that primarily focus 
on civil and political rights conceive human rights obligations as operating within a states' 
‘jurisdiction’. It is usually argued that the scope of the application of the treaties provisions 
                                               




depends on the interpretation of the term ‘jurisdiction.’ As the thesis has previously explained, 
the term jurisdiction is usually used in relation to the states capacity to exercise effective control 
or overall control of the states’ agents or organs extraterritorially.2 The thesis however, argues 
that as a consequence of the obligation to protect, the state is not only responsible for the actions 
of its organs or agents, but is also responsible for the actions of third parties when it fails to do 
all it can within its power to prevent and redress human rights harm by third parties. In this 
case, the state is not responsible for the harmful conduct itself, but for its failure to use its 
influence and foresight to prevent the harmful activities by the third party. Thus, similarly to 
the effective control or over all control requirement or the establishment of a jurisdictional link 
in the case of state organs and agents, the capacity to influence and the ability to foresee the 
potentially harmful impact are factors which link the state, though indirectly, to the 
extraterritorial harm. 
The thesis suggests that in order to prevent a situation where several states may have 
the capacity to influence and ability to foresee a particular harmful situation, there should be 
standards for identifying a particular state with the strongest connection to the situation in 
question. Thus, the thesis proposes that in terms of TNC activity, the nationality principle 
recognised under international law could be adopted in this regard. In such a situation, the state 
where the parent company of the TNC is domiciled would have the responsibility of ensuring 
that the TNCs subsidiaries and business affiliates do not engage in activities that negatively 
impact human rights. This proposal follows the statement in GC No. 24 of the CESCR which 
provides that  
States Parties are required to take the necessary steps to prevent human 
rights violations abroad by corporations domiciled in their territory 
and/or jurisdiction (whether they are incorporated under their laws, or 
                                               




have their statutory seat, central administration or principal place of 
business…3 
The thesis acknowledges that although it is possible to make a theoretical case for the 
extraterritorial application of the obligation to protect, there is currently no international 
instrument that expressly prescribes this obligation. This has led to some challenges with the 
implementation and enforcement of the obligations.  
 
What are the factors that militate against the states willingness and capacity to implement 
their obligation to protect? 
The thesis argues that the reliance on FDI, poor national legal structures and institutionalised 
corruption all render host states unwilling or unable to execute their obligations to protect. 
Home states, which are considered to have better regulatory structures have failed in extending 
their own regulations abroad. It is shown that because there is no international regulatory 
framework that expressly places extraterritorial obligations on states, states are generally 
reluctant to extend their domestic regulations abroad for fear of placing their corporate 
nationals on a competitive disadvantage. Examples from the failed attempts of the US, UK and 
Canada to carry out such regulation demonstrate this reality.4 For instance, the US Alien Tort 
Claims Act which was considered the most powerful transnational litigation tool has been 
severely limited by the decision in Kiobel and subsequent judgements.  
Beyond this, other procedural obstacles prevent victims from gaining access to remedy. 
The most prominent of which have been addressed in the thesis are - the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, the separate legal personality of the parent company of the TNC from that of its 
subsidiaries and affiliates, and the issue of sovereignty and non-intervention. The thesis argues 
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that domestic regulation of both home and host states have been unable to adequately respond 
to these human rights challenges, leaving victims of human rights abuses without recourse to 
remedy. This, according to the thesis makes it necessary to look to the international level for 
solutions that can effectively respond to the regulatory challenges resulting from the 
transnational character of TNCs. 
 
How has the international community responded to challenges involved with both host state 
and home state regulation?  
The international community has responded to the regulatory challenges by establishing a 
number of regulatory initiatives to provide standards for TNCs and states in order to improve 
the human rights situation of individuals in relation to corporate activities. Six of the most 
prominent initiatives in this regard are discussed in the thesis-  the Draft United Nations Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC),5 the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 
Guidelines),6 the International Labour Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of principles 
concerning multinational enterprises and social policy (ILO Tripartite Declaration),7 the United 
Nations Global Compact,8 the United Nations Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights (UN 
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Norms),9 and the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (Guiding 
Principles).10 The thesis argues that these international regulatory initiatives have been 
ineffective in regulating the activities of TNCs as they affect human rights.  
The thesis argues that the adequacy of a regulatory framework is measured by its ability 
to achieve the objectives for which it was established. Yet, despite the establishment of the 
various international regulatory frameworks to ensure that TNCs incorporate human rights 
standards in their operations, TNCs still perpetrate human rights abuses and escape 
accountability for their harmful actions.  
 
What difficulties do the current regulatory initiatives present in relation to the regulation of 
corporate activities and their impact on human rights?  
The thesis argues that because of the voluntary nature of the current soft law initiatives, they 
have been unable to effectively regulate the activities of TNCs. These regulatory initiatives 
merely contain principles which TNCs pledge to incorporate into their internal policies and 
practices. They require TNCs to complete and publish reports on compliance with the 
standards. However, it is contended that without the necessary threat of sanctions, many TNCs 
will readily flaunt these requirements when they present any challenges to the corporation. 
Rather than placing a legal duty on TNCs to observe the standards contained in the instruments, 
the current initiatives rely on the social expectation that the TNCs will comply with their 
provisions. This, as has been demonstrated in this thesis, is usually not the case.11  
Ultimately reliance is on the state to ensure compliance, yet the instruments do not 
address the issue of the state’s unwillingness or incapacity to execute its obligations. Although 
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the UN Draft norms presented prospects of giving individuals a basis to hold TNCs directly 
accountable for their human rights abuses, it did not clearly state how international human 
rights law, which is basically state centric would apply to businesses. There was no opportunity 
to address this issue as the idea of establishing international human rights norms that would be 
directly applicable to TNCs was dismissed.  
The thesis argues that although the UNGPs provides guidelines for states as well as 
business entities with respect to their activities, and their impact on human rights, it is not 
without its own problems. The UNGPs present a ‘protect respect and remedy’ framework 
which expresses the responsibilities of corporations an expectation and not a legal obligation. 
Nevertheless, it provides that victims are entitled to remedy when the duty to protect and the 
responsibility to respect are flaunted. The thesis argues that it is not legally coherent to establish 
a right to remedy in the absence of a breach of an obligation. To make sense of the victims’ 
rights to remedy, it is pertinent that TNCs should be legally bound to respect human rights.  
The thesis acknowledges that although the current regulatory initiatives place the issue 
of business and human rights squarely on the international agender, they still leave open, 
crucial regulatory gaps. They are silent on critical barriers to access to justice such as the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, separate legal personality and the issue of sovereignty and 
non-intervention.  
 
Does the zero draft of the binding instrument in its current form present any potential for 
the future binding instrument to remedy the current gaps in ensuring the accountability of 
transnational corporate entities for human rights abuses resulting from their activities? 
The thesis contends that although the zero draft of the “legally binding instrument to regulate 
in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business 




current protection gaps. The zero draft provides that its main purpose is to strengthen the 
protection of human rights in the context of business activities of transnational character and 
to ensure effective access to remedy for victims of human rights abuses resulting from the 
activities of TNCs. Thus, it already sets itself up to address the main issues that affect the 
regulation of TNCs. In furtherance of its objectives, the zero draft appears to address some of 
the obstacles to the implementation of the obligation to protect and the impediments to victims’ 
access to justice. 
The zero draft does not expressly refer to the states jurisdiction to exercise the 
obligation to protect extraterritorially, however, article 9 of the draft requires states to ensure 
in their domestic legislation that their TNCs, which are subject to the states' jurisdiction and 
control, undertake due diligence throughout their business activities. Article 5 of the zero draft 
then defines jurisdiction based on where the TNC has its statutory seat, its central 
administration, substantial business interest, subsidiary, agency, instrumentality, branch, 
representative office or the like. This provides a wide range for the application of jurisdiction 
and goes beyond General Comment No 24 of the CESCR.12 Although the zero draft does not 
expressly state any proposals concerning an extraterritorial obligation to protect, a combination 
of the proposals in article 5 and article 9 imply that there is. If states under the future binding 
instrument will be required to obligate the TNCs that are domiciled in their territories to 
exercise due diligence in their extraterritorial activities, then States will in effect regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of the subsidiaries and business affiliates, through the parent 
companies. 
The zero draft in article 10, proposes that the parent company would be liable for its 
failure to exercise due diligence over activities of its subsidiaries and its corporate affiliates to 
                                               
12 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24 (2017) on state obligations under the International Covenant on 





the extent it could control, exhibit a sufficiently close relation, have a strong direct connection 
or to the extent the risk has been foreseen or should have been foreseen. Thus, the thesis argues 
that this provision provides a way of overcoming the challenge presented by the separate legal 
personality obstacle. Rather than being held responsible for the harmful activities of its 
subsidiary, the parent company is held liable for failing to exercise due diligence under the 
conditions stated in article 10 of the zero draft. It is, however, recommended that the drafters 
of the binding instrument should ensure that in the final instrument, articles 5, 9 and 10 be 
expressly interlinked in order to ensure that their practical effect is apparent. 
The combination of articles 5, 9 and 10 also provide a way of avoiding the problems 
that arise from the doctrine of sovereignty and non-intervention. The thesis argues that because 
states are only required to use their domestic laws to control their TNCs by requiring that they 
observe human rights standards in extraterritorial operations, there is no direct interference in 
the affairs of the host states.  
However, the zero draft in article 13 provides that ‘nothing in this convention entitles 
a state party to undertake in the territory of another state the exercise of jurisdiction and 
performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other state by 
its domestic law.’ The thesis argues that this provides a basis for states to hold on to the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens. Thus, it is recommended that a forum necessitatis doctrine should be 
adopted to ensure that victims are not denied their rights to remedy. The general idea of forum 
necesitatis is that when an individual will experience substantial injustice in a jurisdiction that 
is apparently the strongest connection to the subject matter of a given dispute, an alternate 
jurisdiction could nevertheless entertain the matter to ensure that justice is served. 
The thesis recommends that a study of the forum necessitatis doctrine as applied in 
Canada and in the EU states that practice it should be undertaken.13 This should be done with 
                                               




the view of establishing general parameters for its application under the future binding 
instrument. 
The thesis also recommends that in order to more effectively address the asymmetry in 
trade and international investment agreements, the provision in articles 13.6 and 13.7 should 
be amended to include a requirement that states undertake human rights impact assessment 
prior to concluding investment agreements with corporate investors. This will ensure that 
potential human rights abuses are detected and prevented. 
In relation to its implementation and enforcement proposals, the thesis argues that this 
is where the zero draft is most inadequate. The zero draft combines the self-reporting and non-
binding review characteristics of the current regulatory structures with the provisions of 
National Implementation Mechanisms and Conference of State Parties, which have no powers 
to enforce their recommendations. Rather the zero draft relies ultimately, on state-based 
implementation. The thesis recalls that the primary rationale for the call for an international 
legally binding instrument was the need for more effective regulation of TNC activities due to 
the inability and incapacity of states to exercise their obligation to protect. As earlier argued in 
this thesis, the success of any regulatory initiative is measured by how far it can remedy the 
situation that gave rise to its creation. Thus, it is pertinent that the drafters of the binding 
instrument consider whether it adequately responds to the gaps resulting from the states 
unwillingness and inability to protect.  
The thesis argues that there is no theoretical or legal barrier to the establishment of 
international human rights obligations targeted directly at corporations. This will address 
situations where states fail to execute their human rights obligations and will cover all business 
entities, whatever legal contraptions they decide to adopt. In this regard, it is recommended 
that further study be conducted to determine how current state based international human rights 




operations. In order to ensure that TNCs follow through with their direct obligations, it is 
necessary that an overarching body with adjudicatory and enforcement powers is established. 
Such a body could be an international court, which could work independently or based on the 
principle of complementarity as the International Criminal Court, an arbitral tribunal, or even 
civil society organisations.  Although it has been argued that the absence of such body in the 
current zero draft will attract stakeholders to the negotiating table, if the idea of an overarching 
implementation and enforcement body is not contemplated and eventually established, there is 
still the risk of TNCs escaping responsibility for their activities that result in human rights 
harm. Therefore, it is important that further research focuses on the most appropriate and 
effective means of ensuring that the provisions of the future binding instrument will be 
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